7 - 13 March 2002
Issue No.576
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 7 - 13 March 2002 Issue No.576 |
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Swapping normalisation for withdrawal
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed asks whether total Arab normalisation of relations with Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines can become the basis for a final Middle East settlement
Three weeks ago, The New York Times published an article by the well-known American journalist Thomas Friedman in the form of a letter addressed by President George W Bush to President Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, King Abdullah, President Bashar Al-Assad and the rest of the Arab League. In the "letter," Bush suggests that the next Arab summit meeting in Beirut issue one simple resolution: "The 22 members of the Arab League say to Israel that in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines -- in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem and on the Golan Heights -- we offer full recognition of Israel, diplomatic relations, normalised trade and security guarantees. Full peace with all 22 Arab states for full withdrawal." After all, he goes on to say, "since you've all told me privately that this is your position, why not make it public and get the benefit? This is how to bury Osama Bin Laden and define for the world who the Arabs really are. If you can't take that risk, why should I?"
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah rose to the challenge. On 17 February, The New York Times published "ideas" (actually an all-out peace initiative) advanced by the prince, offering Israel full normalisation with Arab states in exchange for complete withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967. Shortly after the Saudi initiative was launched, it received the backing of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In an interview with the Abu Dhabi-based Al-Ittihad daily, the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, Hamdan Bin Zayed Al-Nehyan, confirmed his country's commitment to a just and comprehensive peace in the region that would guarantee Israel's full withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Al-Quds as its capital.
Sharon's reaction to the Saudi proposal was reserved -- after all, its requirement for an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June lines is completely unacceptable to the Israeli right, but centrist members of his cabinet hailed it as the first concrete peace signal in 17 months of unmitigated violence. Defence Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer said the proposal "has new elements" and should be looked at "positively," as a viable starting point for the resumption of negotiations. Among the positive elements of the plan in Israeli eyes is the fact that it emanated from Saudi Arabia, a state which until recently did not recognise Israel in any manner; the fact that it enjoys the support of the Arab Gulf states, thereby ensuring that mutual commitments between Israel and the Arab states will extend to all members of the Arab League, and not remain confined to the Arab states bordering Israel only; and, finally, the fact that full normalisation of relations between Israel and all Arab states is a security guarantee, bringing an end to the hostile environment that Israel uses for not surrendering the occupied territories.
The plan carries positive elements for the Arab side as well. If implemented, it would restore to the Arabs all the territories they lost in 1967, and would, moreover, settle the question of final borders, recognised by Israel, once and for all. The Saudi initiative's restatement of the land-for-peace formula in clearly-defined terms leaves no room for the kind of ambiguity that has derailed previous rounds of negotiations: it is a package deal in which withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders would be met by full normalisation, that is, by a regional peace that is neither "cold" nor "warm," but established in accordance with the rules governing peaceful relations between states. The plan also deprives Israel of the argument that the Arabs' refusal to officially recognise its right to exist by establishing full diplomatic relations proves their bad faith, an argument it uses to justify the most extreme measures as "self-defence." Finally, Israel's withdrawal to the pre-June 67 borders would not only guarantee the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state with Al-Quds as its capital, it would also meet Syria's conditions for a comprehensive peace.
It goes without saying that the Saudi initiative occupied a prominent place in Mubarak's talks with Bush in Washington two days ago. But there were certainly other items on the agenda of the meeting between the two leaders. There is no doubt that Cairo is keen on maintaining solid relations with Washington. But there is also no doubt that Cairo's views differ from those of Washington on both the Palestinian and the Iraqi problems. With the Palestinian problem passing through its most critical moment ever, and with the US gearing up for a military offensive against Iraq to topple Saddam, it is certain that the two issues were thoroughly debated during Mubarak's meeting with Bush in the White House.
After an initially lukewarm reaction, Washington came out strongly in support of the Saudi initiative, describing it as an "important step." Israel, for its part, could hardly ignore an event that has generated so much interest both inside and outside the Arab world. Israel's president, Moshe Katsav, said he was prepared to go to Riyadh to discuss the plan or to host Prince Abdullah in Jerusalem, while Sharon reportedly told EU representative Javier Solana that he would like to explore the "interesting idea" further, and that he was ready to "meet anybody from Saudi Arabia, formally, informally, publicly, discreetly, whatever, to get better information about this initiative."
What is certain is that the initiative puts Sharon on the defensive. It undermines his policies based on consolidating and expanding Israeli settlements in Arab occupied territories and on not relinquishing the vast majority of Arab territory occupied in 1967. Moreover, his failure to respond positively to an initiative that offers Israeli citizens the chance to shed their pariah status in the eyes of their neighbours and to live in peace within the region, for the first time since the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, can only drive his already waning popularity still further down. There is also the fact that the initiative has breathed new life into the beleaguered Israeli peace camp, which recently emerged from a long hiatus to stage the largest demonstrations witnessed since the advent of the second Intifada. Can Sharon afford to ignore new developments that are bound to negatively affect his ratings at the polls, which now stand at just over 50 per cent? An additional complication is that the Saudi initiative is likely to deepen the differences between Sharon and Peres and could encourage the latter to go beyond his current role as the "moderate" face of Sharon's policies who is only authorised to act within the boundaries fixed by the prime minister. Could the differences between the two reach the point of bringing down the coalition government?
Another question worth asking is how the Saudi initiative will affect the Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq and bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Will Saddam take advantage of the opportunity and declare his support for the initiative, even if in principle only, and as a point of departure for negotiations, thus embarrassing Washington and forcing it to revise its plans to topple him? Bush has decided to send his vice-president, Dick Cheney, to the Middle East in the coming days to visit the leaders of 10 Middle Eastern countries (excluding Arafat). Cheney's mission is to drum up support for America's plan to oust Saddam Hussein. Will the latter operate in a manner that would thwart the American plan, or will he prove unable to do so and, instead, end up thwarting the Saudi initiative, while exposing his own regime to a tragic end?
A main weakness of the initiative is that it requires the acceptance of the 22 Arab states with no exception, including, and perhaps even in particular, Iraq. The more effectively unanimity can be achieved, the more difficult it will be for Sharon to ignore the effect on wide sections of Israeli public opinion of the promise of total normalisation of relations with the entire Arab environment.
Actually there are two conflicting logics which have come to the forefront in the Middle East: a "technical" way out of the present impasse, based on the Mitchell report and the Tenet arrangements; and a "political" way out that transcends the technical details, presently based on Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative. The future of the Middle East depends on which of the two approaches will prevail, an issue that will be decided at the upcoming Arab Summit. Much will also depend on the Arab league in dissipating difficulties still obstructing Arab unity. Will the Saudi initiative prove potent enough to help build a common Arab stand or will Prince Abdullah find himself forced to postpone his initiative to a time when inter-Arab dissension will be less acute?
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