21 - 27 March 2002
Issue No.578
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 21 - 27 March 2002 Issue No.578 |
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A last chance
Quibbling over the terms of Arab peace initiatives suggests something other than a will for peace on the part of Israel, writes Ibrahim Nafie
Arab summits seemed destined never to be "routine," even when planned as such. When, in 2000, Arab League members decided the summit should be a regular event, they hoped to usher in a new phase of collective action in which they could turn their attention to such business as developing economic cooperation and settling outstanding inter-Arab disputes. Recent developments in the region, however, have determined that this will not be the case in Beirut.
It has become clear that the Arabs will be unable to iron out inter-Arab cooperation until a viable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is found. This reality has been driven home to Arab leaders by the brutal Israeli response to the Palestinian Intifada, the repercussions of which reverberate from the Atlantic to the Gulf.
It is clear that a decade since Madrid the framework of the peace process is so delicate that any extremist government that reaches power in Israel can bulldoze it back to zero, placing the entire region on the brink of war. This danger has compelled the Arabs to reconsider individual priorities and devote every effort to offsetting the risks threatening us all.
It is interesting to compare the Arab attitude towards the Middle East conflict now to the prevailing mood before the Amman summit last year. Before Amman, when the Al-Aqsa Intifada was only a few months old, the violence still seemed within controllable bounds and Barak, the PA and the US were still working to reach a final settlement. As President Mubarak pointed out in a recent interview on Israeli television, there were formulas on the table that could have led to equitable solutions had time not been so short.
Today the situation is vastly different. The Intifada is now in its 19th month and armed violence has spiraled to unprecedented levels. Every indication is that the bloodletting will intensify given the policies of an extremist government in Israel with seemingly no desire to reach a cease-fire or resume negotiations.
Ironically, Arab leaders today are more committed than ever to a strategy of peace. They have reached the conviction that while pandering to public opinion may bring immediate rewards at home, it will serve neither the Palestinian cause nor the interests of regional security.
The initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah is a manifestation of the new Arab resolve. The significance of the initiative should not be underestimated. Saudi Arabia has a long history of involvement in the conflict. One of the most important Arab peace initiatives came from the then Prince Fahd in 1982, under circumstances not dissimilar to today's. Then another hawkish government was in power in Israel -- that of Begin. Sharon, then minister of defence, had embarked on another belligerent venture -- the invasion of Lebanon. Against this background, Fahd presented his initiative to the 12th Arab summit, which adopted it.
Abdullah's initiative, too, is likely to become an all-Arab peace initiative. Egypt, Jordan, the countries of the GCC and other major Arab states declared their support for the initiative during the intensive prime ministerial deliberations over the draft that is to be brought before the Beirut summit. I cannot anticipate any obstacle to the adoption of this initiative as a joint Arab stance. At the 1996 Cairo summit a resolution declaring peace the strategic option was unanimously adopted.
The Saudi initiative contains the necessary ingredients for a comprehensive and rapid settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and adds a major dimension to the Madrid formula. Under the Madrid framework, peace negotiations proceeded on two tracks, the first bilateral, aimed at reaching agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese along the lines of the Israeli-Jordanian agreement of 1994. The second aimed at reaching operational agreements on a range of multilateral issues, the substance of which remained unfinalised at the time that track froze. The Saudi initiative offers broader opportunities: because it extends beyond agreements between Israel and its immediate neighbours to include the other Arab nations it offers greater prospects for a comprehensive peace while avoiding the extra complications that might emerge after bilateral agreements are reached in accordance with the Madrid framework.
The all-Arab peace initiative is based on two interdependent conditions: full Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and comprehensive peace between Arab states and Israel.
In more than ten years since the beginning of the peace process, the first condition has been made more than clear to Israeli leaders. Indeed, specific understandings had been reached between Israel and the relevant Arab parties prior to the arrival of the Likud to power in Israel. Israeli leaders should also recall that Arab negotiators proved more than responsive to Israeli concerns regarding security and water rights, and have been willing to accept inventive formulae regarding borders. The Arabs have been far from rigid in their dealings with Israel in spite of their absolute determination to secure all their legitimate rights.
As regards the second condition -- hairsplitting between "full peaceful relations" and "full normalisation" with Israel seems inconsistent with the spirit of commitment necessary to move beyond the existing obstacles. Such wrangling over terms, which has always plagued the Arab-Israeli conflict, may be justifiable when it comes to hammering out specific obligations, but not when it comes to the general conceptual framework of peace.
In all events, "full peaceful relations" is a much broader concept than "normalisation": it implies the eventual integration of Israel into the region, toward which "normalisation" is only one step. The notion of "normalisation," moreover, has always triggered more problems and sensitivities than it has solved, for it has given rise to interpretations varying from ordinary relations such as those that exist between other nations of the world to a special form of relations that cannot be determined in advance.
What is needed more than anything is to "normalise" the state of Israel, which is to say to transform it into an ordinary nation with ordinary peaceful relations with other nations in the region. The Arabs are offering Israel the prospect of full peaceful relations in exchange for Israel's full withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. Quibbling over words serves little purpose if Israel is truly intent upon reaching what might be its last chance for a viable and lasting peace.
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