28 March - 3 April 2002
Issue No.579
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 28 March - 3 April 2002 Issue No.579 |
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A new balance of terror
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses some of the difficult problems on the agenda of the Beirut summit
Today, as the Arab summit in Beirut winds up its meeting and delivers its resolutions, it might be useful to distance ourselves from day-to-day developments and contemplate the wider picture in the hope that it will offer a perspective on where we are headed.
Cairo welcomed the recent US intervention to compel Sharon to withdraw his troops from the Palestinian-controlled areas reoccupied by Israel, even though the withdrawal is still only partial. But Washington intervened to reach a goal which is not Egypt's. Cairo's efforts to secure a cease-fire are aimed at creating an environment conducive to a resolution of the Palestinian problem and a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute; Washington's sudden interest in pushing for a cease-fire is motivated by something altogether different: the removal of the most important obstacle standing in the way of an attack against Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Cairo regards the deliberations of the Beirut summit as an effort by the Arab states to break the current deadlock in the Middle East peace process. Washington regards the region as an important link in a global undertaking aimed at eradicating terrorism.
The Bush administration sees its campaign against the Iraqi regime as a continuation of its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. As Mullah Omar was removed and his regime brought down, so too can Saddam Hussein be removed and his regime brought down. But the casus belli invoked to justify the first case does not apply to the second. While there was no doubt that the Taliban regime sheltered Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda organisation, there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was implicated in the 11 September attacks on New York and Washington, despite the deployment of massive resources to build up a case against him. At one time it was rumoured that Mohamed Atta, the alleged leader of the terrorist squadron which blew up the first tower of the World Trade Centre, had met the Iraqi consul in Prague some time before the event, but this turned out to be a case of mistaken identity, as the Mohamed Atta in question had nothing in common with his terrorist counterpart but the name.
Despite the complete absence of hard intelligence linking the Iraqi regime to the events of 11 September, Bush considers there is enough circumstantial evidence to warrant a military attack against Iraq, which, along with Iran and North Korea, is part of an "axis of evil" that sponsors global terrorism and must therefore be dealt with drastically.
Actually, they are not the only countries facing this accusation. The Los Angeles Times reported a couple of weeks ago that the Pentagon is preparing contingency plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons not only against the three "axis of evil" nations, but against four other nations as well: namely, China, Russia, Libya and Syria. Pentagon officials have said publicly that they are also exploring ways of modifying existing nuclear warheads to destroy underground bunkers and other "hardened" targets that countries such as Iraq might use to hide chemical, biological and nuclear arms. "By targeting these seven nations, some of which are new targets, the US is increasing, not decreasing, the possibility of using nuclear weapons in its policy," says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.
The classified "nuclear posture review" that found its way to the LA Times marks a new stage in the world's uneasy relationship with nuclear weapons. Dramatic changes now underway on the world scene can explain, if not justify, Washington's shift from a nuclear strategy of deterrence to one of preemption, a strategy that flies in the face of traditional US and international non-proliferation policies and arms control treaties. The new strategy proceeds from the premise that nuclear know-how is no longer restricted to a selected few, as was the case until only recently. In the last few decades, the technology involved in the production of these weapons has spread, costs have decreased and the possibility of acquiring them ready-made has increased with the breakdown in security of countries formerly under Soviet control. Then came the Indian and Pakistani nuclear blasts, which drove home the point that curbing the spread of nuclear weapons is becoming more and more difficult. And now the US is openly challenging great powers such as Russia and China, although it can no longer characterise them as hostile powers a priori.
We previously experienced a confrontation between two nuclear superpowers throughout the Cold War, a period characterised by a "balance of terror," otherwise known as the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The United States had the overkill capability to destroy the Soviet Union 30 times, the Soviet Union to destroy the United States 20 times; but, because people can only die once, an equilibrium was established despite the lack of parity between the two sides. And so despite, or perhaps thanks to, the threat of total mutual destruction, the world survived.
Today, the equation is more dangerous because, in our unipolar world, there is no pole to counterbalance the sole existing pole nor, consequently, a mechanism that can suppress nuclear terror. And, with Bush's new nuclear strategy, the threat of terror will no longer emanate only from the base of the world community, but also from its summit.
The equation is particularly critical in the Middle East, where Israel is an undeclared nuclear power that is not subject to any form of accountability. Because it does not admit to possessing nuclear weapons, no negotiations can be undertaken to bring them under control. The US intervenes in the Middle East not to compel Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but on the contrary, to help Israel remain unaccountable. Thus the gap widens between states "authorised" to be nuclear and others prevented from becoming so. President Mubarak has pleaded more than once for the transformation of the Middle East into a totally denuclearised zone. But his pleas have so far fallen on deaf ears.
Thus, launching a military strike against Iraq will not be just a repeat performance of what happened in Afghanistan, but will open the door to the unfolding of new dimensions in world conflict. The American administration has set itself up not only as the arbiter of terrorism, the ultimate authority on who is a terrorist and who is not, but also on who is authorised to possess nuclear weapons and who is not. Globalisation for the US administration is the right for America alone to decide on all fundamental global problems. The US only resorts to the UN, and to the Security Council in particular, when it serves US interests to have the world community support its policies. Such was the case with the war against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, and such is the case with the recognition in the present of a Palestinian state. But when it comes to issues on which its stance may be controversial, such as terrorism, or the "axis of evil," particularly Iraq, the US acts alone.
On the issue of arms control, American policy has been very similar to the Oslo accords on the Palestinian issue. Agreements are sought on issues of detail concerning partial and transitional steps, but are avoided on the final goals. When it comes to arms control, the ultimate goal for the US is not the total elimination of these weapons, but that a minimum of "trustworthy" state structures remain in possession of nuclear weapons while the rest of the world community is deprived of this privilege. This discriminatory approach is justified as necessary to ensure that these weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists. But with nuclear proliferation bound to expand, because progress in science and technology cannot be stopped, this justification no longer holds.
This question gives us a glimpse of how critical the problem of a military strike against Iraq can become. It is not simply another facet of the Middle East problem, but the very heart of the issue of implementing globalisation today.
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