11 - 17 April 2002
Issue No.581
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 11 - 17 April 2002 Issue No.581 |
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Prepared for peace, ready for war
By pushing the Palestinians into a corner, Sharon could push Egypt over the brink, warns Hassan Nafaa
Egypt launched its peace strategy with Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Since then, there have been swings of public mood and occasional improvisation in political tactics, but no perceptible change in strategy. However one may assess Sadat's visit, the peace strategy he set in motion brought Egypt under two opposing influences. On one hand, the Arabs tried to dissuade Egypt from pursuing a course of peace, their basic argument being that Israel did not want to meet the minimum requirements of peace. On the other, Israel tried to keep Egypt out of the conflict to impose its own terms for peace on other Arab countries.
The Arabs continued to press Egypt to move back to a no-war-no-peace situation with Israel. Egypt, at least officially, balked. It did not want to sacrifice a treaty that enabled it, after all, to liberate its national soil. Still, it wanted to be accepted back into the Arab fold, and this was not easy, at least initially.
From the start, though, Egypt's views on peace have been at variance with Israel's. Egypt insisted on a comprehensive settlement that would bring Israel back to the 1967 borders in return for recognition of a peaceful Jewish state within these borders. Israel, for its part, wanted full normalisation with the Arabs in return for only part of the land it occupies.
Faced with this unacceptable position, Egyptian diplomacy sought room for tactical manoeuvre which would allow it to maintain its peace strategy. The Egyptian government also sought to narrow the gap between policy and public opinion that emerged under Sadat and was a primary motive for his assassins. Egyptian foreign policy, then, underwent four distinct stages with regard to the Arab- Israeli conflict.
From 1981 to '91, diplomacy sought to end the Israeli occupation while emphasising that a peace treaty did not cripple Egypt's foreign policy options. Several domestic, regional, and international developments were helpful to Egyptian decision makers. First, the political leadership changed hands with Sadat's assassination. Whatever one's moral or political stand, the change gave President Mubarak greater room for manoeuvre. The Arab world was more prepared to turn over a new leaf with a president they did not resent. The world, and especially the US, also came to understand the risks of uncalculated hastiness in addressing chronic historic problems.
Israel's intransigence, too, triggered widespread anger in Egypt. Reluctant to withdraw from Taba, it invaded Lebanon, besieged Beirut, and oversaw the massacres in Sabra and Shatila. Egypt, making it clear that its commitment to the peace treaty did not tie its hands or diminish its regional influence, used the Taba crisis to cool the peace. It reacted to Israel's invasion of Lebanon by recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv, opened lines of communication with the PLO and succeeded in securing safe passage for Palestinian leaders out of Beirut.
The Arab world's inability to provide viable solutions to the conflict eventually led to the collapse of the Iraqi-led front. Iraq, meanwhile, was bogged down in war with Iran, dragging the Gulf states some way into that conflict. For a while, the conflict with Israel lost its importance in Arab politics, and the boycott on Egypt seemed increasingly pointless. Egypt managed to open lines of communications with Iraq and Gulf states and was eventually readmitted to the Arab League.
With Gorbachev in power in the Soviet Union, changes appeared in Soviet foreign policy which made it easier for Egypt to mend fences with the Soviets and restore some balance in its relations with the two superpowers. The changes in the Soviet Union also made Syria -- previous reluctant to engage in peace talks prior to the restoration of military parity -- more amenable to negotiations with Israel.
Egyptian diplomacy employed all these factors in its favour. Egypt cooled off relations with Israel without indulging in emotional posturing. It improved its ties with the Soviet Union and restored its role as a regional power with influence. The gap between official policy and public opinion narrowed too. For a while, a cohesive Arab system looked like a definite possibility. The Gulf War changed that.
Between 1991 and 1998, Egypt consolidated its regional role and foiled Israel's attempts to undermine its pan- Arab importance. With the Madrid Conference, the peace process showed promise, at least in theory. Multilateral negotiations replaced unilateral talks, but the right conditions for a full and comprehensive settlement remained as remote as ever. After the Soviet Union's collapse, Israel began acting as the victor of the Cold War, set to reap the fruits of victory from an Arab world that was exhausted and broken. International and regional changes seemed to work in Israel's favour.
At this point, another transformation took place in Egypt's foreign policy. Instead of justifying its peace with Israel, it moved toward active involvement in remaking the region. Egypt's role became particularly prominent after Israel pressured the PLO into signing the 1993 Oslo accords. Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, and other Arab states engaged in open courtship. Egypt, on the other hand, expressed concern that Israel was unprepared to take the shortest road to peace, and wanted to impose its terms for a settlement, positioning itself as the region's future leader.
Defensive foreign policy moved onto the offensive, mainly because Egypt was displeased that certain peace agreements, about which it had reservations, had been signed without consulting it. More importantly, it was aghast at Shimon Peres's vision of a new Middle East in which Israel was boss.
To confront this new Israeli challenge, decisionmakers settled on multilateral negotiations and the Middle East-North Africa economic conference (MENA). This became the arena in which the shape and future of the region was to be decided. At the time, Israel needed Egypt's moderating role in the final- status negotiations with the Palestinians and talks with other Arab sides, and therefore had to stay on Egypt's good side. Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and replaced by a hesitant and confused Shimon Peres. In turn, he was succeeded by Binyamin Netanyahu, who hardened Israel's negotiating position. Netanyahu's hard-line policies prompted Egypt to coordinate more closely with regional powers that favoured a tougher stand on normalisation. Multilateral talks were frozen and Peres's Middle East project was sidelined, at least temporarily. As Egyptian diplomacy changed tack, the gap between official policy and public opinion was closed. Some of the positions the government took at the time were actually more hard-line than those of the opposition.
In the 1998-2000 period, when Ehud Barak succeeded Netanyahu in office, hopes revived for progress in the peace process. The five-year transitional self-rule period was over and final status talks were due. The focus shifted from multilateral talks (and Peres's Middle East vision) to a final settlement on the Palestinian track.
Egypt's position was that it should not speak on behalf of the Palestinians on final-status matters. The Israelis and Americans, however, remained hopeful that Egypt would press the Palestinians to make concessions. The second Camp David conference, held in the summer of 2000, was the most serious attempt made thus far to reach a final agreement on the Palestinian track, and the Americans and Israelis turned the heat on Egypt. Clinton and Barak phoned Mubarak repeatedly, asking him to "soften" Arafat's position. Mubarak refused.
The deal Barak was offering was defective, ambiguous, and rigged with loopholes. Israel insisted on annexing the settlements surrounding Jerusalem, and sharing sovereignty over Al-Aqsa. Israel also refused to let Palestinian refugees return or receive compensation in accordance with Resolution 194. The deal featured no timetables or detailed maps of the areas from which Israel intended to withdraw, or of those it wanted to cede to the Palestinians in return for the colonies.
The Palestinians could not cede sovereignty over Al-Aqsa and forget about the right of return in return for an Israeli withdrawal that was incomplete and questionable. Barak offered to withdraw from an area ranging from 94 to 97 per cent of the West Bank, but he excluded Jerusalem, the colonies, and the Jordan Valley in his definition of the West Bank. Practically speaking, Israel was only offering to withdraw from a maximum of 97 per cent of 60 per cent of the total West Bank area. Later on, Barak made more sensible proposals, but insisted that the Palestinians should "take it or leave it." They left it.
Had Egypt pressured the Palestinians to accept such a poor deal, it would have jeopardised its standing in the Arab and Islamic world. At the time, the Lebanese resistance was in the process of liberating south Lebanon. The mood was one of resistance, not concession. So Egypt tried to offer calm guidance and sensible advice to all those concerned. Even after the outbreak of the Intifada, its main concern remained to avert a spill-over of regional violence.
Sharon was elected as a prime minister of Israel by an unprecedented majority. He formed a national unity government with the explicit aim of crushing the Intifada and reducing Israel's peace offers. Meanwhile, the Palestinians became more determined to continue their uprising until full liberation, regardless of the sacrifices involved. Retaliation operations against Israeli attacks began, taking the battle into the heart of Israel.
To make matters worse, George W Bush almost immediately made it clear that his administration would not interfere in the peace process. Sharon interpreted this aloofness as a go-ahead for repressive measures against the Palestinians. Sharon used the terrible events of 11 September as an excuse. Having convinced Bush that Palestinian resistance was a variant on the terror that had hit the United States, he proceeded to reoccupy Palestinian self-rule areas.
Sharon's policies pose a great dilemma for Egypt's peace strategy, which seeks a compromise solution whereby Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders. Israel wants to keep as much as possible of the Palestinian territories while undermining Egypt's regional credibility.
The reoccupation of land, the siege on Arafat and the killing of Palestinians are causing unprecedented outrage on the streets of Arab and Muslim countries. These countries, and Egypt in particular, are now under immense pressure to respond with more than rhetoric. This is why the Egyptian government decided to sever all forms of ties with Israel with the exception of diplomatic relations, and President Mubarak addressed the nation, blaming Israel for the current violence, and warning of a terrible regional conflagration. The Egyptian street is not yet calm. The public demands more decisive steps, ranging from a complete severing of ties with Israel to war. The public has lost faith in Israel's commitment to peace and many believe that it may breach its peace treaty with Egypt and launch a war at any moment.
Egypt's view of peace as a "strategic option" and of the 1973 War as the "last war" may be a reflection of our goodwill. Our commitment to peace should not mean that Israel alone can decide the time, place and course of any future war in the region. This does not mean Egypt should go on maximum alert or take up arms each time Israel makes threats. Israel has threatened force before and used it more than once. It besieged Beirut at one point. When it invaded Lebanon in 1982, Egypt was not the only Arab country to refrain from using force. Syria did the same, although it had troops in Lebanon. In the end, it was Israel, not Syria, that lost the battle in Lebanon.
One should not repeat the same mistake twice. Egypt should avoid any Israeli or Arab attempts to drag it into war. Yet it cannot refrain from taking up arms if Israel launches an attack on Syria or begins collective deportation of the Palestinians. These possibilities remain remote for the time being. However, Israel still insists on crushing the Intifada by force. Egypt therefore may decide to adopt an alternative strategy that aims to exhaust the Israeli war machine, politically and militarily, and bring the Israelis to the realisation that they cannot resolve the conflict through force.
The US is beginning to understand the perils of the ongoing violence. Powell's mission, however, will not automatically end the escalation or banish the spectre of war. This is why Egypt should adopt a three-pronged strategy. It should bolster its domestic front, cooperate with all forces that reject Israeli hegemony, and consolidate communications with the major powers that seek a just and balanced settlement in the region.
As we ponder the best means of addressing Israel's actions, it is perhaps advisable to keep in mind that this is a long-term conflict in which one should remain ready for all possibilities. We have to be prepared for a war that could break out tomorrow, and for a peace that could last forever.
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