25 April - 1 May 2002
Issue No.583
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 25 April - 1 May 2002 Issue No.583 |
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The Tao of Oslo
Oslo preached that the way to peace was a peace in itself, but a new report issued by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group suggests that it is time to look to the end, not the means, of a peaceful resolution, reports Nyier Abdou
Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in late September 2000, the state of the Middle East peace process has been analysed ad nauseam by think tanks, diplomatic circles, academics, human rights organisations and opinion columns from Washington to Cairo to Tel Aviv and beyond. Given that the world's store of general knowledge is already bloated with the detritus of this vast machinery that digests and regurgitates anew the same stagnant issues, one more report issued on how to salve the wounds of this conflict is not news in itself. That said, the Middle East report issued earlier this month by the International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based conflict resolution think tank, is evidence of a noticeable shift away from the sanctity of Oslo, as well as its latter-day scions, Mitchell and Tenet.
The report, "A Time to Lead: The International Community and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," is the first to come out of the ICG's new Amman-based Middle East programme, which was launched in January of this year. The report starts from the viewpoint that the incremental "land for peace" approach and the recommendations offered by the so-called Mitchell report -- the result of the high-level international fact-finding committee led by former US Senator George Mitchell sent to the region in April of last year -- "have become increasingly detached from the realities on the ground." Assuming that the larger international community is to intervene in a coordinated effort, the report suggests that an all-encompassing deal should be tabled, rather than waiting on the hard issues of borders, Jerusalem and the right of return. Notably, the report suggests that a US-led international force "would provide security to both states" and monitor the implementation of the agreement. Only then, within the context of a complete settlement, could a lasting cease-fire flourish.
This argument turns on its head the reasoning put forward in the so-called Tenet Plan, named for CIA Director George Tenet, whose job it was in June 2001 to piece together a way to a secure cease-fire that would lead to full implementation of the Mitchell recommendations. In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, Robert Malley, who heads the ICG's Middle East programme, reiterated the conviction that an "incremental approach" simply cannot work at this late stage. Speaking of the Mitchell report and its confidence-building measures in the definitive past tense, Malley noted that "even if it had a chance of success," none of these steps -- particularly a cease-fire -- are now possible due to the long period of inaction on the part of the international community. Without a clear vision of the end, Malley argued, no trust can be formed on either side, nor will there ever be a "full and genuine" commitment.
In an interview with the Weekly, Ingrid Jaradat Gassner, director of the BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights in Bethlehem, and Terry Rempel, the centre's research and information coordinator, insisted that there is currently nothing to refer to as the "peace process," but rather "a systematic Israeli effort to destroy any option for peace in the short- and medium-term." The ICG report stresses unequivocally that the main flaws of Oslo were that it lacked a powerful mechanism to enforce the agreement and deferred the thorniest issues. But Gassner and Rempel are equally firm in their conviction that this was never the heart of the problem. "What really brought about the collapse of the Oslo-Mitchell process is the lack of reference to international law, humanitarian norms, and the fundamental human rights of the Palestinian people," Gassner argued. The BADIL group points to an unwillingness on the part of the international community, "foremost the United States," to recognise that before peace, there must be justice.
This point was echoed by Arjan El-Fassed, at the public advocacy department of LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights, in Jerusalem. "The Mitchell report's notion of freezing the building of settlements in exchange for [the PA] calling for an end to the violence misses the point that the settlements and the military occupation are themselves the source of the violence," El-Fassed told the Weekly. "The Palestinian uprising is in response to the occupation."
The ICG report maintains that a third-party presence (an "Implementation and Verification Group," or IVG) is a pre-requisite for a final and lasting settlement. The eventual deployment of such a group is starting to be accepted among key actors, even the Israeli leadership, as inevitable.
Arjan El-Fassed, of LAW, says the kind of monitoring force being discussed is by definition insufficient. "What we have been calling for is an immediate and effective international protection presence," El-Fassed said. Drawing a distinct difference between "international protection" and "monitors," or even "cease-fire monitors," El-Fassed stressed that any real settlement "relies on a de facto situation in which international law is respected, international agreements are enforced and third-party guarantors can be relied upon to perform their role effectively."
El-Fassed's comments point to one salient issue raised by the report about a future IVG: the fear that any international force sent to the occupied territories would inevitably suffer from a crisis of disappointment. The Palestinian people, no matter what is made clear from the outset, will assume that they are finally being granted a protection force. The report falls short of recommending a full peace-keeping force that is enabled militarily, not just politically, and this is clearly because such a force would be categorically unacceptable to the Israeli side. Malley affirmed this point, noting that such a force would be "unrealistic." But he did also suggest that because even the most basic infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority has been torn asunder by recent military attacks, there may come a point when it will be necessary for any international intervention to "perform all the functions of the Palestinian Authority" -- including security operations -- for some time.
A call similar to that of the ICG for a stronger European role and a final settlement first was put forward in December of last year in the report issued by the London-based Centre for European Reform (CER), "Europe after September 11th." In his essay "A New Phase in US-European Relations," CER senior research fellow Steven Everts argued that the time had perhaps come "to move beyond the ritualistic calls for restraint, a cease-fire and a resumption of peace talks." Like the ICG, Everts suggests that the EU and the US should settle on a mutually endorsed settlement plan and essentially force it on the Arabs and Israelis. "I already felt in December -- and do so much more strongly today -- that the outside world has to work out a blueprint [for an agreement] and then present it to the parties as non-negotiable," Everts told the Weekly.
Asked how crucial he thought the endorsement of countries like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia actually was, ICG's Malley answered without hesitation that it is "absolutely critical." Without a commitment from Arab states, Malley claimed, there is "no chance of success." Noting that there has been a flurry of activity from the Arab contingent over the last few weeks, Malley's only warning was that the "question is whether they [Arab states] can rally around a plan."
The ICG report seems to hint that some of the moderate on-the-ground successes of the EU Informal Group is due to its thorough engagement with all the actors in the conflict, including armed groups. The US has only dealt with the PA leadership and the Israeli government, but this seems to leave out a factor in the equation that simply cannot be ignored: armed resistance groups like the Fatah Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. The question arises whether more might be achieved at the negotiation table were these groups represented behind the scenes. But on this point, Malley is doubtful, noting that in its negotiations, the US has dealt with the PA leadership, plain and simple; it cannot pick and choose who represents the Palestinian Authority.
The BADIL team agrees, noting that Palestinians already have a legitimate political leadership, with a democratically elected president. "These are the parties to be addressed and engaged by international actors, just like Prime Minister Sharon and the Israeli government are addressed on the Israeli side," Gassner and Rempel argued. "Has the option of engaging Israel's right-wing parties, groups and settler organisations been taken into consideration?"
The ICG report can be accessed online at www.crisisweb.org. Issues raised in the report are also covered in an article co-authored by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs.
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