9 - 15 May 2002
Issue No.585
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 9 - 15 May 2002 Issue No.585 |
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Al-Ahram:
A Diwan of contemporary life (441)
In a widely publicised case involving alleged financial misdealings, three high-ranking state officials, including Mustafa El-Nahhas, who only six months earlier was the country's prime minister, stood trial in 1929. Opponents of the Wafd Party had used the first whiff of the money scandal to bring down El-Nahhas and the Mohamed Mahmoud government which followed hoped the trial would dash any remaining dreams El-Nahhas and his fellow Wafd leaders harboured of returning to government. From the pages of Al-Ahram, Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* monitored the hearings up to the verdict
Former premier on trial
Prince Ahmed Seifeddin
At 9.00am on Tuesday, 19 January 1929, the members of the disciplinary board of the Egyptian Bar Association, headed by Hussein Darwish, entered the capital crimes courtroom of the National Court of Appeals. Their entrance heralded the beginning of one of the strangest trials in Egyptian history: the trial of former Prime Minister Mustafa El-Nahhas, his colleague and Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Wissa Wassef and Gaafar Fakhri, speaker of the Senate.
Al-Ahram's correspondent in the courtroom writes, "The police commissioner of the capital has taken all precautions to ensure order in the vicinity, deploying police conscripts, police officers and the royal police, and cordoning off the area around the court building in order to prevent the public from approaching."
He continues, "Many of those bearing the white entrance tickets arrived at an hour early so that when the session began the courtroom was packed with lawyers, senators, parliamentary deputies, members of the judiciary and many others. The front row seats were reserved for the attorneys representing El-Nahhas, Wassef and Fakhri. They are Naguib El-Gharabli Pasha, Hassan Sabri Bek, Makram Ebeid Bek, Halim Effendi Youssef, head of the Lawyers Syndicate Mahmoud Bassiouni, deputy head of the Lawyers Syndicate Kamel Sidqi Bek, Sabri Abu Alem and Youssef El-Guindi. The chief magistrate declared the hearings open and ascertained the presence of El-Nahhas and his two colleagues. The chief pubic prosecutor then asked for the names of the defence counsel, a request which the court granted."
The trial was not only peculiar because of the status of the defendants -- a prime minister whose government had been dismissed just over six months earlier and a speaker of the Chamber of Deputies of a parliament that had been dissolved five months earlier -- or because of the composition of the defence team, which included the head and deputy head of the Lawyers Syndicate who, if anything, should have represented the prosecution. It was also odd because of the nature of the charges which the prosecution outlined in its opening statement:
"Prince Ahmed Seifeddin was declared legally incompetent in April 1900, and he remains so until the present. Following this declaration, the prince was sent to a private asylum in London where he remained until he was abducted in August 1925." The prince ultimately resurfaced in Turkey, from where his mother, Princess Nagwan, sent her attorney, Ahmed Shawkat, to Cairo to engage three lawyers to represent the interests of her son in the courts in Egypt. The case aroused suspicion of financial misdealings around El- Nahhas, which the opponents of the Wafd Party exploited to bring down his government six months earlier, even though King Fouad made no reference whatsoever to this issue in his decree dismissing the government. The Mohamed Mahmoud government that succeeded El-Nahhas wanted to make the scandal stick, to ruin any hopes El-Nahhas and his fellow Wafd leaders might have entertained of returning to government in the future. Against this background, then, we can better understand the 10 charges cited by the prosecution:
First: "When the attorney of Princess Nagwan, the mother of Prince Seifeddin, approached them to represent the prince in a suit to affirm his mental competency, they proposed an exorbitant fee that is out of all proportion to the value of the work and the significance of the claim and they concluded an agreement with him on the basis of this fee."
Second: "The agreement they reached is illegal because the defendants stipulated that their outstanding charges would only be payable if they won the claim."
Third: "They agreed to file a suit without having first ascertained the relevant circumstances and without having established direct contact with the concerned party." (The prosecution here was referring to the fact that the lawyers struck their agreement with Shawkat, acting on behalf of Princess Nagwan, on the basis of a power- of-attorney notarised in Istanbul).
Fourth: "They agreed with their client by virtue of written contract upon a set of charges for the claim regarding Prince Seifeddin's annual allowance entitlement and another set of charges for obtaining the revocation of legal incompetence."
Fifth: "The expense charges stipulated in the contract are inordinately exorbitant and far in excess of the value of the work required and the importance of the claim." (Evidently, the prosecution felt this might strengthen their hand if they pushed up the number of counts, for this charge is obviously a repetition of the first).
Sixth: "The agreement over the charges pertaining to the allowance entitlement is of the sort prohibited to lawyers as the charges are based on 50 per cent rather than one-tenth of the claims regarding back wages."
Seventh: "The lawyers asked the Royal Court Council for LE120,000 in allowance, or at least LE60,000 a year, even though prior to filing the suit they cited a figure of LE22,000 as sufficient to cover all claims. Their exorbitant claim constitutes either a disdain for the court, a derision of the earnestness of their profession or an attempt to achieve personal gain."
Eighth: "They did not enter into this agreement solely in their capacity as lawyers. Rather, it was understood in the contract that these lawyers had powerful political positions and that these positions could influence the outcome of the suit." (As this was the most damning of the charges, the prosecution backed it up with evidence regarding why Shawkat chose them in particular, the way the contracts were drawn up, the heavy secrecy surrounding the contract, the inflated fees they charged and finally the circumstances surrounding the case).
Ninth: "Prior to their contract, they were aware of the deliberations then under way over the bill to abolish the Royal Court Council. Whether or not they were involved in bringing this bill before parliament and whether or not they undertook actions to ensure the passage of the bill, they sought to convey to the parties concerned in this case the impression that the draft law had a direct bearing on the outcome of their suit to revoke legal incompetence. In so doing, they demonstrated that the use of their influence was a significant factor in their assessment of the fees they intended to charge their client."
Tenth: "While they were under contract with their client, two of the defendants assumed highly sensitive political positions: prime minister and speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. In view of their great influence and in view of the delicacy of combining the responsibilities of government with involvement in a case certain aspects of which entailed government agencies and actions, the prime minister failed to dissociate himself from the case in a manner sufficient to allay all suspicions of abuse of power. In fact, he continued his involvement in the suit in spite of the fact that he had stopped practicing law in general and despite the fact that his activities were in conflict with the gravity of his new duties and responsibilities. This reality furnishes absolute proof of their intent to use their political influence and to capitalise on it in their contractual agreement with their client."
The hearings lasted a full week (from 29 January to 5 February), after which it took another 10 days for the court to prepare its verdict which was announced on 14 February. Al-Ahram followed the proceedings closely and the most interesting features of its coverage were the reaction of the Egyptian public to the charges and the arguments of the defence which demonstrated the acumen and sophistication of the Egyptian lawyers of that time.
Although the defence team was large, the most significant rebuttals were made by only two of them: El-Gharabli, who rejected the first charge, and Ebeid, who discredited the eighth and tenth charges. Addressing the court in the session of 30 January, El- Gharabli argued that there was nothing to restrict the manner in which a lawyer and his client assess fees which, once agreed upon in a contract, are valid and legally binding, regardless of the amount in question. The court, he said, should not permit itself to interfere in the matter of fees except under two conditions: in the event a dispute arises between the contracting parties over fees and in the event of demonstrable bad faith and coercion in the assessment of the fees. He then asked, "How could the prosecution allow itself, in the absence of a grievance from the client -- indeed in the face of the frank and repeated admissions of the client that the fees agreed upon were less than the value of the work his attorneys would undertake should they attain the desired results -- to claim that the fees were exorbitant? Further, how could the prosecution permit itself to offer its illusions as grounds for an accusation on the basis of which it demands disciplinary action?"
El-Gharabli went on to contend that the court did intervene in the question of fees but that this normally took place after the lawyers performed their job and, generally, after the results appeared, "for only then can a judge assess the remuneration due to the attorney. However, the prosecution, in addition to appropriating powers beyond its jurisdiction, granted itself the right to make a judgement even before the essential factors were available to formulate an opinion as to whether or not the fees were exorbitant."
The defence lawyer then stressed that the fees were not exorbitant, a fact confirmed by the attorney for his client, Shawkat, who attested that before engaging El-Nahhas's firm he had approached several foreign lawyers who asked for a fee of LE30,000. Shawkat further attested that the reason he had not engaged those lawyers was not because he found the fee excessive but because of his objection to certain conditions they stipulated.
El-Gharabli then turned to the first charge and the reference to the significance and value of the claim. From a moral standpoint, he argued, a declaration of mental incompetence is a form of human degradation and an annihilation of a person's existence. If that is the case for an ordinary human being, "imagine how it affects Prince Ahmed Seifeddin, a member of the royal family whose peers enjoy a panoply of freedoms but who has been condemned to live deprived of everything, including the recognition that he is a rational human being. If the only result of revoking the custody on the prince was to return him to the world of the free, then this alone would be sufficient to award his attorneys their fee many times over."
From the material standpoint, he continued, the accounts of the prince's estate listed the net annual revenue on his property for 1919 as LE120,000. "This figure represents the revenue on properties managed in the absence of their owner. Alongside them are properties, such as vacant plots, that do not accrue revenue. If we take the revenue alone, calculating on the basis that the ratio of income to revenue is five per cent, the value of the prince's estates exceeds LE6 million." The fee the lawyers charged their client, El-Gharabli continued, were nowhere near commensurate with this figure. Moreover, the work required from them involved more than revoking custody. "They must also ensure that their client has his assets restored in full. This process brings into play major judicial processes," and in financial circumstances as complex as those of the prince, "one can only expect that the complications that would arise are manifold."
The defence's rebuttal of the charges pertaining to abuse of political office took up two full sessions, on 2 and 3 February. As was the custom of the most famous lawyer of his time, Makram Ebeid opened his defence with an anecdote. On this occasion, he spoke of his impressions of how the defendants received the news of the charges. El-Nahhas, he said, laughed, chuckling at the lengths to which his adversaries would go. "Were it not that a certain shine in his eyes and a quiver in his voice betrayed his innermost concern and profound anger, I would have thought he felt no more than indifference tinged with scorn." Wissa Wassef, who then entered the room holding the writ of charges, was smiling. "Wissa has a philosophic view of life. He does not want life to bring him the good without the bad."
As was also Ebeid's habit, his presentation was heavy with sarcasm. The prosecution had initiated an "impossible case" that was nothing but a "political ploy." When politics meddle in such matters, "it should not surprise you to see the accused and victim blend into one. Politics has no conscience in any country, but in Egypt it has no mind either."
Following this prelude, Ebeid addressed the eighth charge, concerning Shawkat's selection of the defendants as his lawyers, opening with the rhetorical question: "Are people prohibited from choosing these lawyers because of their political and parliamentary status?" The motives behind people's choices in these matters are a purely personal psychological matter that no one has the right to question unless they affect one directly. In all events, Shawkat made his position clear. He said, "Because of the magnitude of the issue, I searched for individuals who would have the appropriate breadth of knowledge and expertise, the necessary intrepidity and established integrity." As to why courage was a requirement, Shawkat explained, "The whole business is riddled with intrigue, because everybody holding on to the prize doesn't want to let go and will concoct 20,000 plots to keep the prince from getting all of what is due to him."
In order to corroborate the charge that the lawyers had marketed their political clout, the prosecution made much of the way the contracts were drawn up and the secrecy they kept. Ebeid suggested that the prosecution constructed its case out of thin air. Four copies of the contracts were drawn up, he said, because Shawkat had to leave Egypt that same day. There were no scribes in Wassef's law offices to do this because, as was the norm for law offices, their scribes had to be in the courts all morning. In addition, it was El-Nahhas's custom to draw up the contracts between him and his clients in his own hand, but "is such an ordinary daily event a crime or indicative of suspicious intent?"
The prosecution cited the fact that the defendants concealed the theft of the contract, which ended up in the hands of El-Nahhas's adversaries, as proof of intent to conceal their dealings. Ebeid countered that the contention had him entirely baffled because it was on record that the contract was stolen from the home of Gaafar Fakhri in Alexandria and that Fakhri reported the theft, clearly stating that the documents concerned the case of Prince Seifeddin.
Turning to the tenth charge regarding the defendants' abuse of their political offices and the intent to exploit the draft law to abolish the Royal Court Council in order to drive up their fees, Ebeid maintained that the draft was the product of an agreement between three lawyers -- Murzbach, Mohamed Mahmoud Khalil and Hafez Ramadan and that Wissa Wassef, as speaker of the house, had no knowledge of this agreement until two months later. Ebeid brought in one of the lawyers, Hafez Ramadan, to testify to this. As for El-Nahhas, immediately upon assuming the post of prime minister, he removed himself from the case, informing Shawkat of this decision in writing. Shawkat responded in a letter dated 21 March 1928, stating that Princess Nagwan had acknowledged his decision. Ebeid submitted the letter, written in Turkish, to the court.
On 15 February 1929 Al-Ahram blazoned the following banner on page one: "Lawyers Disciplinary Board rules innocent in the case of fees against El-Nahhas, Wassef and Fakhri." Although the verdict addressed all 10 counts, we will focus here on the recitations regarding the first, eighth and tenth charges.
Regarding the first charge, the verdict stated that so long as a lawyer had the right to estimate how much he charges, then it must be presumed that the defendant's estimate was founded on the conviction that his estimate represented a correct remuneration for the services he would perform for his client and that he was aware when he reached this estimate of the amount of work and attention that the case would require. At the same time, "a lawyer cannot be obliged to declare in advance the course he intends to follow in the pursuit of the claim, nor the appeals he expects to make or the difficulties he anticipates, for that would be to disclose the secrets of his profession and betray the confidence of his client to his opponents and the public, furnishing them with information that should remain confidential between the attorney and his client who alone has the right to release his attorney from the pledge of confidence. On this basis, the charge is without grounds."
Turning to the eighth charge, the court found that there were no grounds for questioning Shawkat's testimony to the effect that he selected this team of lawyers on the basis of their skill and integrity. Nor was there any cause for suspicion because the contracts were drawn up in the lawyer's own hand, "and because the contract over fees is a matter that concerns only the attorney and his client and has an element of confidentiality. It has further been demonstrated from the contracts that El-Nahhas submitted to the court that it is his custom to write out such contracts personally."
The verdict then addressed the prosecution's allegation that the defendants were so keen to guard the secrecy of the contract that they did not report its theft. Contrary to this claim, the court found that the hearings bore out the defence's claim that the theft occurred in the home of Gaafar Fakhri on 8 March 1928, that the thief entered the home with the sole intent of taking documents pertaining to the Seifeddin case and that when Fakhri discovered the theft "he notified the police that documents were stolen but that it would require some time to ascertain what precisely these documents were." The verdict added that Fakhri offered as evidence a file from which only one document had been stolen -- a letter he had written in Turkish to Faridun Pasha, the husband of Prince Seifeddin's mother. It then concluded, "It is illogical that Gaafar Fakhri was overly secretive on the matter of the aforementioned contract, for such secrecy would be of little avail after the contract was stolen. Having fallen into the hands of a thief, it would be no longer a secret. Therefore, the charge is founded on pure imagination and on something that could not be demonstrated to exist and corroborated with evidence."
On the final count, the court declared that there was no legal obstacle to prevent Wissa Wassef as speaker of the house from continuing to practice law. It added, "Whereas he correctly saw that it was preferable to make arrangements so that he would be freer to dedicate himself to the business of parliament, he delegated the appeals of some of his cases in the Mixed and National Courts to some of his colleagues. However, this fact does not lead to the conclusion that he continued to devote himself solely to the case of Prince Seifeddin to the exclusion of other cases." The court reached a similar conclusion with regard to El-Nahhas, adding that in light of the letter from Shawkat to El-Nahhas dated 21 March 1928, "the charge is groundless and invalid."
If Mohamed Mahmoud had hoped that this case would deliver the fatal blow to El-Nahhas and the Wafd leadership he would discover that his plan backfired. On 18 February, Al-Ahram featured an editorial entitled, "The lawyers constitution and the ethics of their practice," harshly criticising government officials responsible for prosecuting El-Nahhas on baseless allegations. Rather than suiting their designs, the verdict established a number of principles governing the practice of law: the right of lawyers to set their fees, the jurisdiction of civil courts rather than the disciplinary board to adjudicate on a dispute over fees between attorney and client, the right of lawyers not to disclose the secrets of their profession and the principle of confidentiality. The verdict also established that a lawyer had the right to exact a portion or all of his fees from his clients until after he had won their case and that a contract may stipulate that the final fee was contingent upon the verdict.
The "government of the iron grip" was not about to let matters pass that easily. Not long afterwards, it drafted a bill introducing disciplinary measures against lawyers for committing violations such as charging fees that greatly exceeded the value of their work and for entering into certain prohibited contracts. Fortunately, such tailor-made laws to which authorities in Egypt have frequently resorted to were never destined to live long.
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
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