16 - 22 May 2002
Issue No.586
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 16 - 22 May 2002 Issue No.586 |
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We Need Answers
The Palestinians are at a political watershed. But, writes Azmi Besharah, their leaders are not addressing the real questions
A heated debate has erupted on the Palestinian scene since Israel lifted its siege on President Yasir Arafat. The tenor of discussions, of self-criticism, and of pointed questioning has reached a pitch not known since the aftermath of September 1970, the Lebanese 1982 invasion, or the Gulf War. In press as in cafes, in formal as in informal gatherings, the sense of tension is tangible, the need for answers is overpowering, and the answers are not forthcoming.
The debate, lively as it is, is disjointed. It takes place in separate realms, in disconnected subcultures. It has not yet coalesced into a form of purposeful national debate, into a pace-setting cognitive process that can guide the step of our national liberation movement, or calibrate the actions of the nascent nation-state. No one knows whether the debate ongoing in Rafah is in tandem with that in Ramallah, whether the questions on Fatah’s mind are similar to those deliberated in other factions at home or abroad. I have witnessed fragments of this debate in public gatherings in Nazareth and Jerusalem, in the United Arab Emirates, in Chicago and Philadelphia. The questions raised on each of these occasions were mostly similar, but the motives and intentions behind them remain were not.
The predominant theme of the ongoing debate is reform, but in which direction? Some reform advocates believe that the Palestinian leadership should have accepted what was offered in Camp David and avoided the intifadah. Others believe that Camp David left the Palestinians with no other choice but resistance, but what course of resistance?
Reform is both a muddled and persistent demand. Calls for reform were made after September 1970, after the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, after the Gulf war, after Oslo, and at every turn in the past eight years of self-rule. In each case, the reform ended once its advocates were allowed to edge slightly closer to the centre of Palestinian decision-making.
Of course, there is a need to reorganise the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority. Of course, the Palestinian decision-making should be made more democratic. Of course, the lines of command should be spelled out, for the cabinet ministers, for the PLO Executive Committee, and all the way down. The political role of Fatah and of the Palestinian opposition must be stated clearly. All these are make-or-break national decisions and they have to be brought into the public domain. But these are not the questions uppermost on Palestinian minds. Average Palestinians are wondering about the future of confrontation with the occupation forces, the political solutions at hand, and the political intentions of their leaders. And these questions remain largely unanswered.
In moments of frustration and despair, conspiracy theories abound, charges of treason dart back and forth, and focus is lost. The task of intellectuals, therefore, is to keep the debate from drifting, to remind everyone of the options at hand. I will try here to anchor the debate by focusing on three main questions.
Is ours a national liberation movement or a state-in-waiting?
This question has been hanging in the air since the beginning of the 1980s and it became absolutely paramount after the creation of the Palestinian Authority as an entity bound to security agreements. Authority and opposition, national unity, security coordination will all remain meaningless terms until this question is given an unambiguous answer. If the answer is in favour of a national liberation movement, then the debate should focus on the resistance strategy. If the answer is in favour of the state-in-waiting, then we are ready to believe that a graduated political process would bring about an independent Palestinian states - based on what was offered in Camp David, or on a combination of Camp David and the Saudi initiative. Whether such a belief is warranted should be a matter of public discussion.
What is unacceptable, domestically and internationally, is a middle path that combines resistance with collaboration. Denouncing resistance operations while trying to make political gains of them is detrimental to Palestinian credibility and national cohesion. The Palestinian public may condone power struggle once full statehood is achieved. It cannot, however, tolerate, political wrangling and bureaucratic corruption when the state is incomplete, when its symbols of power remain hallowed and under threat. The last thing the Palestinian public wants to see at this juncture is factional strife. The public wants a sense of direction restored to national objectives and methods.
I am personally convinced that the recent Israeli offensive leaves the Palestinians with no other alternative but national resistance. The recent offensive has, in my view, made it clear that a Palestinian political entity ñ even one that is partially sovereign ñ does not stand a chance of interacting with Israel on equal terms. This leads us to the next question.
2) What is the strategy of the Palestinian national liberation movement in the present circumstances?
The national liberation movement should, in my opinion, combine political action and legitimate resistance against the occupation. Politically, it should seek the support of the Palestinian and Arab public. In addition, resistance operations should be appraised, not piecemeal, but as a contextual endeavour toward a well-defined political goal. The success of the resistance should be gauged by how far it brings the nation closer to viable statehood.
3) Can this be achieved in the absence of a unified political leadership?
The Palestinian resistance cannot perform tactical manoeuvring with any degree of success so long as there are divisions and bickering among its top echelons. In order for the resistance to succeed, the movement should have a central leadership capable of making ñ defensive and offensive - decisions and imposing them. For this to happen, a strong leadership ñ one that can maintain a fruitful dialogue with various factions ñ is needed. Otherwise, divisions and even civil strife may ensue.
These are the issues at hand, and I fear they may have been ignored on purpose by a leadership that is averse to reform, except on its own terms. There is nothing basically wrong with political divisions and rivalry, so long as these are based on the real issues. What we have now is political inertia, where the leadership is doing little or no leading, practically abandoning the initiative to young Palestinians who engage in martyrdom operations, to Sharon’s bullying tactics, and to US machinations. It is time the Palestinian leadership changed its ways.
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