Issue No.587
Opinion
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23 -29 May 2002 Issue No.587 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
A new departure
Ibrahim Nafie sets out a vision of a comprehensive resolution to the Middle East conflict
An adequate resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict requires, not the use of military power, but negotiations among the parties concerned. Of all the region's states, Egypt has been the most cognizant of this fact, stressing not only the importance of negotiations but the need for Washington to play a clearly defined role in the process. This Egyptian vision has proved far- reaching: every analysis of the regional and international complications of the conflict indicates that, far from resolving it, military intervention can only complicate it further, making it riskier and more volatile.
It is taking a while for other states in the region to come to this conclusion; this is especially true of Israel, which continues to occupy land that belongs to Arab states and to the Palestinian people, refusing to accept the fact that there is no military solution to the problem. For a long time Israeli political parties have thought the conflict could be resolved militarily; they have been striving to achieve a state of affairs in which their occupation of Arab land would not undermine state or individual security. It is a position that has been supported in many of the statements made by Israeli officials since the flare-up of the Intifada: Israel is capable of winning more than one war at the same time, they said; Israel's military advantage over the Arab states will guarantee its security. During the Madrid Conference in 1991, indeed, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir announced that he was willing to go on negotiating for ten years so long as he did not have to alter his position or sign an agreement to that effect. Such an open-ended outlook is characteristic of Israeli diplomacy.
One inherent obstacle in the way of a political resolution is that, following the Egyptian- Israeli peace initiative the basis for diplomatic agreements has tended to be muddled, leaving room for much ambiguity in terms of their implementation. It is true that the Madrid Conference was based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, but these resolutions were soon passed over in the course of the negotiations that gave rise to Oslo and in neither case was a time frame specified for the implementation of agreements. In order to be effective such agreements must provide a clear timetable agreed by both sides; independent international parties too should provide a guarantee that they will be implemented. After signing the Oslo agreement at the White House, however, the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin felt confident enough to declare that Israel alone would decide when and from where to withdraw.
That Washington did not act as a sincere sponsor of the peace process is one prominent reason for the current crisis; it is Washington's policies vis-à-vis Israel and the negotiations, in fact, that drove the peace process into a cul-de-sac, inducing enough despair among the Palestinians for the Intifada to start. Following Israel's brutal aggression against an unarmed people and the massacres perpetrated against them it has finally dawned on Washington that the use of military power, however sophisticated the weaponry, will never achieve the desired objectives. Israel has managed neither to force the Palestinians into submission nor to end suicide operations.
The military intervention fortified the will of the Palestinians, sympathy for them among Arabs everywhere reached unprecedented heights and a greater number of young Palestinians embarked on suicide operations deep in the heart of Israel. Nor is it coincidental that at a time when the Israeli army has declared its West Bank operations a success suicide operations have resurfaced.
A close reading of the experience of the past months is required before a new point of departure for political resolution can be reached, one that takes account of the factors contributing to the crisis and Israel's decision to rely on brute force. Such a reading must conclude that the use of military force will not resolve the conflict and that Washington, as principal sponsor of the peace process, along with other powers must assume a clearly defined set of responsibilities in this context.
This reassessment of past experience is important. Efforts to resume the peace process have already commenced. Security officials from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as from Palestine and Israel, are meeting individually with their American counterparts: in itself this is an indication of progress. Following these meetings, reliable sources have pointed out, the American security apparatus intends to put together a report to be submitted to President Bush outlining new steps.
This report, the same sources assured me, will emphasise three points deemed integral to the success of any peace moves.
An independent Palestinian state must be acknowledged as a necessary step on the way to peace; Palestinian reforms must be undertaken -- the structure of the security apparatus, for example, must be developed so that it meets the needs of an independent and sovereign UN member, not a national authority operating under supervision from another state -- and the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's peace initiative, adopted by Arab states during the last Beirut summit, must be implemented effectively. This latter means Israel must withdraw from lands occupied in June 1967 in return for normal relations with its Arab neighbours.
After the report's submission, President Mubarak is expected to visit Washington for discussions after which, sources say, a joint Egyptian-American peace declaration will be issued. CIA head George Tenet will be asked to visit the region to oversee its implementation.
In the meantime the parties concerned should pay attention to a few additional points to ensure the smooth progress of the process. President Arafat should begin laying the foundations of a political and economic programme worthy of the state of Palestine, a task that will require internal reforms. In the light of Israel's failure to implement more than the first and part of the second stage of the programme agreed in Oslo some ten years ago -- ignoring the third stage which teems with pivotal questions like Jerusalem, the right of return, settlements and borders -- negotiators should specify the conditions of implementation as precisely as possible, agreeing on a specific time frame within which to implement agreements.
It is the procedure outlined above, and not the use of military power, that can resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and realise the dream of peace in the Middle East.
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