Issue No.587
Opinion
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23 -29 May 2002 Issue No.587 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Facing an unknown future
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed wonders if the Palestinian problem is facing a future with unidentifiable features
Where does the Palestinian problem stand after Sharon's attempt to liquidate the Intifada under the pretext that it is nothing more than an outburst of violence and terrorism having nothing to do with a liberation movement? Since the Palestinians were recognised as a separate, and, indeed, central, party in the negotiation process launched by the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Palestinian problem has gone through two distinct phases: a first phase, in which it was seen as amenable to a peaceful resolution and the hopes pinned on the peace process were running high; and a second phase, in which the peace process ground to a complete standstill in the wake of the failure of the Camp David summit between Clinton, Arafat and Barak, which consecrated its collapse and dashed all hopes of a peaceful resolution of the problem. As despair and anger replaced hope on both sides of the confrontation line, the second Intifada erupted in the Palestinian street, and Sharon, representative of the far right, came to power in Israel. And, as though these new and explosive givens were not enough to destabilise the situation in the Middle East, the new American administration, totally engrossed in the issue of terrorism after September 11, adopted a hands-off policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, there seems to be a recognition by all concerned that if peace efforts failed, so too did the paroxysm of violence which erupted in reaction to their failure. The Palestinian problem appears to be entering a new phase, one with entirely new characteristics that are still unclear though a number of developments can help shed light on the shape they are likely to take.
One such development is Sharon's call for a regional conference, which Arafat would be barred from attending and to which neither Syria nor Lebanon would be invited, to launch what he calls a new intermediate phase. During this phase, which could extend for decades, the more intractable problems responsible for the failure of the Camp David negotiations will remain suspended.
The most dangerous feature of the proposed regional conference is that it would not resume negotiations from the point at which they left off, but begin from scratch, as it were, on the basis of the new realities imposed on the ground by Sharon's military operations against the Palestinians. Most of the previous agreements concluded within the Madrid and, later, the Oslo, frameworks, will be scrapped, leaving only those that serve Sharon's vision of a settlement. In short, the regional conference would be closer to a diktat by the victor, an occasion to crown the political gains of his bloody campaign against the Palestinians with international legitimacy.
Washington came up with the counterproposal of an international conference which would include, in addition to the United States and the regional parties, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations. The latter's participation would guarantee that previous frameworks, notably Security Council Resolution 242, are not dropped. Moreover, all the proposed participants are for the establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel.
But a resolution recently passed by the Central Committee of the Likud Party, the majority partner in Israel's coalition government, rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state ever. The architect of the resolution is Sharon's arch rival, Binyamin Netanyahu, who, unlike Sharon, is not bound by statements made by Bush, on more than one occasion, that a Palestinian state must be established.
Sharon links the resumption of talks to the removal of Arafat and top basic changes in the Palestinian Authority. Actually, the need for reform is also acknowledged by Palestinian parties. Some members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) have called for change in an open letter addressed to the Palestinian people, rather than to Arafat, to underscore the democratic character of the request.
The PLC signatories of the reform proposal deny they are acting in response to Sharon's insistence on making reform a condition for peace talks, even if their proposal comes at a time when Israel, the United States and the European Union are putting pressure on Arafat to introduce reforms in the Palestinian Authority that would eliminate corruption and mismanagement. The US and the European Union have welcomed Arafat's "encouraging statements" on the need for reform, including his decision to hold presidential and parliamentary elections within six months (the PLC later voted unanimously to hold presidential elections in the first quarter of 2003, general and local elections within one year). In fact, elections are long overdue. The previous elections were held in January 1996, and the chairman and the council were elected to serve until May 1999. All Palestinians had the right to run in the previous elections, but Hamas and other radical groups boycotted them.
That does not mean that Arafat is unpopular. According to polls conducted by Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki, Arafat's approval rating stood at 75 per cent when he was first elected head of the Palestinian Authority in 1996, plummeted to 30 per cent the following year, and rose to 70 per cent when he was under siege in Ramallah. But his rating has dropped since his release and that is why he is keen on early elections to revamp his legitimacy.
According to prominent PLC member Hanan Ashrawi, a legislative committee proposed that the present Palestinian cabinet remain in power for the coming month and a half, then cede power to a pared down government made up of 19 ministers rather than the 34 it now has. However, the PLC was unable to agree on how such a transfer of power should be effected.
The PLC reform package requires Arafat to make people occupying official positions accountable for squandering money; to close down state security tribunals whose judgements are not appealable; to limit the term of office of security officials to four years to prevent them from meddling in political matters and initiating contacts with the Israeli side without prior permission from the political leadership; to create a watchdog agency to monitor government activities; to reinforce supervisory organs and ensure their subordination to civil society, and to put an end to abuses. Legislators have also suggested that the post of prime minister be created to handle the day-by-day operations of the PA, but legal complications have made it necessary to postpone this last suggestion.
Mohamed Rasheed, a senior aide to Arafat, has declared that the president is determined to bring drastic changes to the political and security organs of the PA before the international conference convenes at the end of June or beginning of July. He also added that American officials, including Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, are actively involved in helping shape the changes, including reducing the number of ministers to half and unifying the 12 Palestinian security forces into one central security operation which alone will be entitled to carry arms. The PA has indicated its readiness to implement these proposals, but insists on linking elections to the end of occupation. It is in the midst of these events that another suicide bomb attack occurred in Netanya.
It is clear that the power struggle between Sharon and Netanyahu is making Sharon still more extremist in his demands on the Palestinians. In addition to trying to impose reform as a condition for the resumption of talks, he is arguing that it is senseless for Washington to send emissaries to rebuild the Palestinian security force as long as Arafat is still in power. But Colin Powell insists that the US continue to build on what has previously been agreed and that some of Arafat's recent statements are encouraging and should be taken into consideration.
Actually these disagreements reflect deeper divergences over how to reform the Palestinian Authority. The American administration believes the Palestinians must be given hope that their state will one day materialise for them to relinquish terrorism, while Sharon believes that strengthening the PA will encourage it to resort still more to terrorism. Moreover, Israeli officials believe the ground must be set for military operations against Hamas in Gaza, along the lines of what happened in the West Bank. An operation in Gaza had been decided upon, but was deferred for political reasons. This does not mean that it has been cancelled.
According to a State Department report to Congress, "there is no clear evidence" that Arafat and other senior officials of the PLO planned or approved of terror attacks on Israel in the second half of last year. But the State Department is not the only, or even the most influential, body which determines US foreign policy. Can it ensure that requirements for peace will prevail over responding to the ambitions of Israel's far right? Peace will remain a mirage as long as this question is not settled.
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