Issue No.589
Opinion
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6 - 12 June 2002 Issue No.589 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Interventionism bound to fail
Hassan Abu Taleb, editor of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies 2001 Arab Strategic Report, presents an abridged version of his introduction to the volume which is published this week
With the appearance of the 2001 edition the Arab Strategic Report has entered its 17th year, its longevity a testament to both academic and technical excellence. And this year the team, working on analysing events of 2001, have reorganised the publication, introducing changes in both form and content.
Readers of the 2001 report will find it arranged according to concentric spheres of interest, starting with the global and ending with the sphere that most concerns readers at home -- Egypt. The first section is devoted to international events, focusing specifically on the profound impact of the September 11 event. Section two concentrates on interactions between the Arab world and neighbouring states, such as Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, while, closer to home, the third section covers developments in the Arab- Israeli conflict, with special attention to the ramifications of the Palestinian Intifada, developments on the various tracks of the peace process and escalating militarisation on several fronts. In section four the report examines the current Arab order, attempts to reform the Arab League and developments in Arab positions on international terrorism. Finally, part five offers an analysis of Egypt's policies vis-à-vis a number of pressing issues, ranging from international terrorism to the development of the political party system, civil society and the Egyptian press, and the Egyptian currency crisis.
2001 was no ordinary year. However poignant the moment of the attack against the US on 11 September, the Arab world had been experiencing moments no less intense for a year prior to that event. They began when the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, when Palestinian-Israeli negotiations broke down and when developments seemingly took on a will of their own, in a manner that was at times predictable, at others incomprehensible.
Arab assessments of the Intifada tended towards the optimistic. It was felt that the uprising marked a new starting point for the Palestinians and would contribute to altering the negotiating balance of powers in a manner that would hasten the end of the Israeli occupation. Also encouraging was the 2001 Arab Summit in Amman, which established in practical terms the principle of periodicity in Arab summit meetings and which rehabilitated the notion of Arab solidarity, economic integration and political revival. At the same time a significant element of political and strategic confusion came in the wake of the election of Sharon.
Just as the progress of the Palestinian cause can be defined in terms of its pre- Intifada and post-Intifada periods and the state of the Arab order in terms of the periods preceding and following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, so the international order be defined in pre- and post-Cold War and in pre- and post-11 September terms.
Although many believe that the events of 11 September and their aftermath have had no real impact on the underlying balance of power that determines the world order, others feel that that catastrophic moment ushered in a clash of civilisations. The latter hold that 11 September represents a historical watershed, the former that it was merely a significant eye-opener. Whereas the notion of a watershed is clear in that it represents a distinct historical demarcation, the idea of a revelatory opening of the eyes is somewhat more ambiguous.
Identifying the effects of a particular historical watershed does not mean that we must look for radical structural upheavals. It does, however, mean that a fundamental change has occurred in at least one dimension of the old order that has impacted, with various degrees of intensity, in other dimensions. In a world in which material and value structures and modes of behaviour vary between one society and the next and within individual societies it is impossible to speak of a comprehensive change between one historical epoch and the next, at least in the absence of a global cataclysm; it is possible, however, to entertain the proposition that a major event precipitated profound changes in elements of the complex equation that determines international relations.
Nor is it difficult to identify major changes in the international order and in the Arab and Islamic orders, as well as important transformations at the level of details. It is patently evident, for example, that in the wake of 11 September the "war against international terrorism" elbowed aside many other priorities while at the same time the material power hierarchy continues much as before, with the US standing alone at the pinnacle and the other international powers ranged below it in an unchanged ranking.
Yet many elements that have retained the same outward form have undergone an element of transformation. The UN, for example, has continued to serve as a structure and model of international interplay and a symbol of the post-World War II order until the present. Its function in the preservation of international peace and security, though, has come under increasingly close scrutiny since 11 September. Certainly, the UN's role in combating international terrorism leaves much to be desired, in terms of the service offered to the international community as a whole and in terms of the limited and biased actions it has already undertaken. The relative absence of the UN, which possesses at least a theoretical capacity to act, points to a degree of change, though one that may not be directly observable.
Indeed, a number of principles governing international relations have remained formally intact, though not in substance. The right to self-defence, within which falls the right to resist foreign aggression and occupation, has, for example, acquired an offensive character, as the assault against Afghanistan illustrates. In some instances, it has also come to sanction the right to circumvent the collective security system provided by the UN charter. In other cases the exercise of the internationally sanctioned right to resist foreign occupation and discrimination, a right that had once acquired the status of a duty, has become, after 11 September, a terrorist act. The ultimate irony here is that Israel's brutal repression of the Palestinian people, which would elsewhere be termed systematic terrorism, is termed self-defence.
Among the most noticeable changes set into motion by 11 September is a new American interventionism. Direct and indirect intervention by the strong into the affairs of the weak is as old as history. But now this phenomenon has been compounded by attempts to control the capacities, wealth and fates of other peoples to serve the interests of the sole superpower. Perhaps the only difference between the old imperial drive and imperialism in its modern guise is an aversion to direct occupation. Apart from this, in practical and realistic terms, there is considerable overlap. The US military presence in many parts of the world is a reality that has remained a constant since the end of World War II. This physical military presence, which has grown over the intervening decades, is directly associated with regional strategic balances. There is, however, a fundamental difference between past instances and the nature of the new US military presence that has emerged since 11 September in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, the Philippines and Yemen.
The emerging presence is qualitatively different from that which prevailed during the past decade. US-European intervention in Bosnia, Kosova and Croatia; French intervention in Burundi and Rwanda and regional African intervention in Sierra Leone were justified on humanitarian grounds, giving rise to the expression "humanitarian intervention," a concept that implies the right of the international community to intervene, under the UN umbrella (though in certain instances outside of that umbrella) in the domestic affairs of other nations to prevent gross human rights abuses. The case of Kosova triggered heated debate over the political and legal implications of military intervention outside of the UN framework, even for the most compelling humanitarian reasons. At the time it was strongly argued that this form of intervention contravenes the principle of national sovereignty -- the guiding principle in international relations -- and that it sets a precedent that would allow powerful nations to exercise a form of mandate over weaker ones by citing human rights. Supporters of humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, held that the origin of sovereignty resides in the people and their fundamental freedoms. Should a people be deprived of their rights of sovereignty then the international community, led by its major powers, had every right to intervene to redress the injustice.
The debate that raged during the closing years of the past decade now seems redundant. New cases of intervention display no concern for sovereignty or for fundamental human rights, nor, for that matter, for the inherent right of human societies to choose the mode of life they desire and that they believe best holds the promise of spiritual and material harmony. The "new interventionism" is comprehensive in nature and aims to radically alter the foundations of international relations. And, whether it is practiced openly or covertly, it remains heedless of national sovereignty. Its catchword is not human rights, but the war against international terrorism.
The new interventionism reflects an important dimension of the transformation in international relations following 11 September. This transformation is embodied in the ascendancy of the value of war against what has been termed international terrorism, in spite of the fact that there has been no consensus definition of the term, or of the optimum means of containing the phenomenon. Nor does the new interventionism recognise a distinction between military, political or cultural action. It lumps all these into a single basket and acts accordingly. US pressures on some Arab and Islamic nations to modify the religious component of their educational curricula represent only one instance of the new interventionism in its cultural and value- coded mode. Not only is this form of interventionism highly provocative, it fails to recognise or remedy its own flaws, the most salient being the US's own responsibility for many of the injustices that prevail in the world. That the US at present imagines that it can reshape the world at whim and ignite cultural confrontations towards this end constitutes an interventionism that is simultaneously aggressive and cautious. Like all forms of intervention, it must inevitably clash with all recognised principles regarding sovereignty, protecting human rights and promoting nascent democracies. As such, it is doomed to fail.
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