Issue No.590
Opinion
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13 - 19 June 2002 Issue No.590 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Contradictory rumours
Mixed signals from Washington are in urgent need of clarification, writes Ibrahim Nafie
Some amazing fabrications were spun in the wake of President Mubarak's visit to Washington. From some Arab quarters we have heard reports that the Egyptian president outlined an initiative for the declaration of a Palestinian state on only a portion of the West Bank. Israeli sources were more outrageous. Haaretz, for example, wrote that in his private meetings with Bush, Mubarak said that Arafat had caused his people tremendous suffering and that he -- Mubarak -- would be willing to help topple the Palestinian president if he failed to make the necessary reforms to the Palestinian governing structure.
How tendentious can rumours get? All the more so when the Egyptian president had made his positions explicit in every press conference or media interview he held since his visit. In his joint press conference with Bush, Mubarak said that Arafat should be given sufficient opportunity to reform the PA, and in his interview on CBS News he declared, "Palestinian President Yasser Arafat is the democratically elected president of his people and no one has the right to ask him to abandon the mandate his people vested in him."
I have no doubt, therefore, that falsehoods over the substance of Mubarak's visit were prompted by any number of spurious motives. In the Arab world, envy at Egypt's pivotal role in the region seems the most obvious. And from Israel, where the media began to unleash its attacks in advance of the president's visit, we have come to expect attempts to prevent the development of Egyptian-US relations. Close ties between Cairo and Washington are a particular bugbear for Israel and its supporters in the US, as has been shown by Israeli media assaults in the past against US administrations that have sought to promote Egyptian-US relations. This applies, in particular, to the military domain, with regard to which Israeli sources have gone so far as to charge that Washington was jeopardising Israeli security by furnishing Egypt with advanced weaponry.
It could be that Mubarak's recent visit to Washington aroused an element of suspicion in some quarters because it took place less than three months after his previous visit and because this interval presented no new developments that merited another summit between the two presidents. While on the surface this might appear to be the case, in fact the visit was necessary -- compellingly so. It was essential at this juncture to work to preserve the solidity of Egyptian-US relations and press home to Washington the Egyptian and Arab points of view on the situation in the Middle East at a time when Israel and the Zionist lobby have a virtual monopoly on the ear of the American administration.
One of the president's most important tasks in his recent visit was to put paid to the lies being circulated by certain parties to the effect that Egypt has not been putting sufficient effort into resolving the current situation in the region in the wake of Israel's incursions into Palestinian territories. Mubarak, therefore, had to make it clear that Egypt, as always, is fully committed to promoting efforts aimed at the resumption of the negotiating process on all tracks. At the same time, however, he stressed the prerequisites for the success of these efforts, which Egypt had outlined on numerous occasions. Israeli forces must withdraw to their positions before 28 September 2000, cease all further incursions and raids into Palestinian territories and stop its murder and assassination operations against the Palestinian people.
Mubarak also underscored that the volatile situation in the region was a result of the anger and frustration over Israel's blockade of Arafat, the destruction and suffering it has wrought upon the Palestinian people and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.
The president further emphasised that sincere peacemaking efforts must look beyond Palestinian suicide operations to the causes that generate such acts of violence and fuel support for them among some sectors of the Palestinian people. Only when the sources of tension are eliminated and negotiations are resumed, Mubarak said, will such operations taper off and eventually end entirely as a comprehensive peace prevails in the region.
The late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin was fully aware of this dynamic. He knew that the ultimate aim of Palestinian paramilitary operations was to stop the peace process and drive the region back to a climate of conflict, which is why he would never allow the occurrence of such an operation to sway him to call for a halt to negotiations, to the redeployment of Israeli occupation forces or to the implementation of his commitments under any agreement he signed. Rabin firmly believed that the steadfast pursuit of the peace process was the only way to bring an end to violence and that to stop peace efforts was to cave into the mentality of the perpetrators of violence.
Sadly, Rabin's successors were not of such calibre, with the result that they succeeded in stifling virtually the last remnants of hope among Palestinians. As Israeli commentators themselves have said, Rabin was the last Israeli prime minister to have a clear and positive vision of a peace process that would realise an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It has been said that the president's visit was not successful because the US did not issue a statement affirming its commitment to an international peace conference and the declaration of a Palestinian state in accordance with a specific time frame. This contention is absurd, especially considering how the notion of a peace conference originated in the first place. Following the adoption of the Arab peace initiative at the Beirut Summit, Sharon, desperate to buy time, proposed a regional conference. Egypt quickly stepped in to counter Sharon's ploys and ensure that comprehensive peace remained the ultimate objective. It was at this point that the idea of holding a new international peace conference was first voiced. While Egypt was not averse to the idea, it insisted that such a conference must be well prepared and that numerous steps had to be undertaken first in order to ensure a climate conducive to its success.
Contrary to the above-mentioned assessment of the president's visit, it offered many reasons to take heart. Firstly, Bush hosted Mubarak in the US presidential retreat in Camp David, an invitation that the US president had only extended to one head of state before him -- British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In addition, on the first day of his stay in Camp David, Bush met with Mubarak in a closed session lasting approximately three hours, then the following day the two heads of state met, at the head of their respective delegations, for yet another hour.
These talks delved into the minutest detail on a range of issues, to the extent that maps were pulled out for reference. I also learned that Bush asked Mubarak to help oust Arafat and that Mubarak rejected this request in no uncertain terms, a position he was determined to reiterate in his joint press conference with Bush and in his subsequent interviews with the US media. In this context it should be stressed that the rumours that Mubarak suggested that a Palestinian state could be created on 42 per cent of the West Bank are entirely groundless. Such an idea could not possibly originate with the Egyptian president, who is committed to generating the conditions conducive to a resumption of negotiations and the implementation of the principles of international legitimacy which are embodied in the Arab initiative calling for a full Israeli withdrawal to pre-June 1967 lines.
Thus, from the purely Egyptian and Arab perspective President Mubarak's visit to the US was successful. Indeed, fearful of precisely this outcome, Sharon had urged CIA Director George Tenet to arrange a visit for him to Washington to take place immediately after Mubarak's visit. As Yediot Aharonot noted in its 5 June edition, Sharon wanted to get to Washington before it determined its next step in the Middle East. "Sharon's purpose in this visit is to strike from the agenda Mubarak's suggestion regarding the declaration of a Palestinian state headed by Arafat."
While in Washington, Mubarak appealed to the US administration to exercise its fundamental role in the region with care as the course of events in the Middle East depends on how the US acts. "The US is the key to the peace process because if the Israelis and Palestinians are left to their own devices they will accomplish nothing," Mubarak told Fox News.
It was clear both during and after Mubarak's visit that the US is readying itself for a major diplomatic offensive in the region. Yet, while the Arabs take hope that a resumption of negotiations is in the offing, Sharon, bent on his military solution, is busily working to thwart such hopes. As Uzi Benziman commented in Haaretz on 9 June, Sharon's vision of a solution is founded on the use of force and "he has no intention of giving up control over the occupied zones, which is a fundamental condition for ending the conflict with the Palestinians."
In the wake of Mubarak's visit it seemed that Washington had the ideal opportunity to view the region with a more objective and less partial perspective. It had the chance to tell Sharon to stop his adventures in the Palestinian territories because the use of force will not bring security or stability to his people and will only drive the region closer to the brink of disaster. Unfortunately, during Sharon's visit there, Bush's statements ominously echoed the opinions of Sharon. Although White House Spokesman Ari Fleicher tried to alleviate the impact of such statements, the mixed signals suggest that the US administration is at odds with itself.
This inconsistancy only plays into the hands of Sharon, who thrives on the confusion, and it certainly does little to advance the peace process. When Washington gives its ear to Arab leaders it issues statements that give rise to great hopes. But, no sooner do Israeli officials arrive and the Zionist lobby moves into gear then out come a spate of contradictory statements. Naturally, observers are left perplexed as to what the US really wants and how it plans to act and Washington's friends and allies are at a loss as to how to work towards the restoration of calm and resumption of the negotiating process. Therefore, perhaps the first constructive action Washington should take at present is to clarify for itself its policies on the Middle East.
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