Issue No. 592
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27 June - 3 July 2002 Issue No. 592 International |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Afghanistan's wobbly new start
The long-awaited loya jirga failed to live up to the expectations of several of the delegates. Iffat Malik examines what kind of government it produced
Afghanistan's first full loya jirga since the Taliban regime was overthrown drew to a close last week, following nine days of deliberations. Some commentators saw it as a massive step forward along the path to democracy and peaceful cohabitation. Others felt it was little more than a talking shop and totally lacked the ability to reach substantive decisions. Whatever the verdict, the loya jirga has cleared the way for the Bonn Accord's second stage -- a transitional government -- to take power.
Comprising a mix of around 1,600 elected and appointed delegates from all over Afghanistan, the loya jirga was certainly a representative enough body. The Bonn Accord specified that its brief was to choose a new president and cabinet and -- though this was not specified -- a legislature. Its unofficial brief was to promote the political process, ethnic harmony and democracy in a country where these concepts have been unknown for many years. All in all, a formidable task.
The jirga began well, with the selection of Hamid Karzai, the interim administration's chairman, as president. Karzai won a convincing victory over his two challengers, a female doctor and a civil servant. His success was somewhat tarnished by behind-the-scenes American manoeuvring aimed at weeding out more substantive challengers: former King Zahir Shah and former president Burhanuddin Rabbani.
Karzai was sworn into the presidency on 19 June. Just minutes before, he announced his new cabinet. In putting together a new cabinet, Karzai faced considerable challenges from the Tajiks that dominated the interim administration cabinet.
Muhammed Fahim, Abdullah Abdullah and Younas Qanooni held the three most powerful portfolios -- defence, foreign affairs and the interior, respectively. Tajiks are key figures in the militarily powerful Northern Alliance but form a minority of the overall population. Pukhtoons, Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, were hardly represented in the interim cabinet. Karzai, himself a Pukhtoon, had to redress the balance and include greater Pukhtoon representation in his new cabinet.
He also had to find a solution to the problem of powerful warlords like Uzbek Rashid Dostum. These were also excluded from the interim cabinet but, thanks to their military force, hold power on the ground in their respective regions. Including them in the cabinet could convert them from being potential opponents of the new government to supporting it, if only temporarily. The tricky issue of overlooking their notorious human rights record is another issue.
Karzai, torn between the wide range of conflicting demands and challenges that he faced, came up with a cabinet that satisfied hardly anyone. Tajiks held onto two of the most powerful ministries -- defence and foreign affairs.
The Interior Ministry went to a Pukhtoon, Taj Wardak. At 80 years old, and having spent the last fifteen years in California, Wardak will hardly pose a substantial challenge to Fahim and Abdullah. Younas Qanooni was offered the education portfolio. He initially rejected that as too lowly but later accepted it, along with the position of national security adviser.
Karzai avoided appointing any of the most notorious warlords to his cabinet but offered them positions as vice-president. However, his attempt to defuse Rashid Dostum and Ismael Khan's power by luring them away from their Herat stronghold to cushy Kabul postings failed when they turned him down.
Defence Minister Muhammed Fahim did accept a vice-presidential position -- something that strengthens instead of weakening him. The other two vice-presidents are a Hazara leader, Karim Khalili, and Haji Abdul-Qadir, the Nangarhar's province's Pukhtoon governor.
The cabinet was supposed to be approved by the loya jirga. Some delegates expected that they would be offered the right of voting for each appointment. But Karzai opted for an easier procedure. Having read out his list of appointees, he asked the delegates to raise their hands if they approved. A significant number did, and Karzai took that as indicating the loya jirga's overall approval. The cursory procedure left many delegates bitter. One complained, "The cabinet itself was not as important as the manner in which it was made. The loya jirga should have been able to vote on it".
The cabinet has been agreed, though Karzai still has to fill some of the minor posts. But the issue of a legislative body remained unresolved, despite extensive debate. The jirga could not agree on how a legislative body should be formed: whether it should be a miniature version of the jirga and would be elected on a regional basis or not. In the end, Karzai sent the delegates home with proposals for a 45-member council drawn from the jirga to continue work on a legislative body.
The loya jirga was far from a totally free and democratic gathering. Many delegates complained of the intimidating presence of intelligence men and warlords. But it was a huge step beyond the Taliban's harsh authoritarianism. The extent to which Afghanistan has changed since Taliban rule can be gauged from the fact that the jirga rejected a suggestion to include "Islamic" in the new government's title. Under the Taliban, even to suggest such an exclusion would have merited the death penalty.
Hamid Karzai will be hoping that his new government will be able to promote ethnic harmony in Afghanistan and prevent it from sliding back into civil war. An indication of the huge challenge it faces in performing this task came just a day after Karzai was sworn in as president. Police in Kabul blocked a road to the Interior Ministry to protest the appointment of Taj Wardak in place of Younas Qanooni. The road was later unblocked, but tensions remain.
The interim administration managed to survive despite ethnic tensions, disgruntled warlords and solid Pukhtoon resentment largely because it was a temporary six-month affair with a fixed end- date. The new transitional government is set to rule for 18 months. It is far from certain whether it will be able to survive that long.
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