Issue No. 592
Opinion
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27 June - 3 July 2002 Issue No. 592 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Unilateral withdrawal?
Unable to impose its will on the Palestinians and the Arabs, will Israel now consider unilateral withdrawal from the occupied territories, asks Hassan Nafaa
At present, the fate of peace in the region seems solely contingent upon the choices available to Israel and, consequently, upon the outcome of developments within Israeli society. This is not to imply that Israel has become the regional power capable of directing the fate of the entire region on its own. However, it certainly acknowledges a political reality that has certain obvious consequences, especially in the wake of the recent visits of the Egyptian president and the Israeli prime minister to Washington.
The primary facets of this reality are, firstly, that Israel has yet to develop a plan for peace acceptable to the Palestinian Authority (PA) or to Arab governments, it not having the power simply to impose a lasting solution on the Arabs or the PA. Secondly, the Arab governments, whether individually or collectively, do not have the power to alter the de facto reality created by the Israeli occupation, through either peaceful or military means. Thirdly, the US does not possess the means or the desire to push for a settlement that would stand a chance of winning the approval of the conflicting parties or that could reasonably be imposed on these parties. Moreover, whenever Washington displays a tendency to act independently or diverge from the Israeli line, Israel hastens to bring it back in tow.
In his recent diplomatic drive, President Hosni Mubarak took the US position as his starting point, in the hope that he could sway it in a direction that favoured a settlement acceptable to all sides. While in Washington, the Egyptian president sought to persuade President Bush to transform his "vision" for the establishment of a Palestinian state into a concrete agenda approved by all the parties concerned, with a time frame for the implementation of specific rights and obligations under international supervision.
Indeed, if the recent diplomatic moves accomplished anything it was to reaffirm that the peace process, in its current approach, will produce nothing because of underlying structural flaws that create a powerful undertow always dragging it back to zero. The upshot of this process so far has been to lay bare a bleak and unproductive reality. In spite of its might, Israel is incapable of imposing its conditions for a settlement on the Arabs, and the Arabs, however weak, still possess the power to say no to Israeli dictates. Meanwhile, the US, albeit pro-Israeli to a fault, is caught between domestic pressures and a fear for its interests abroad, and is therefore unable to formulate, let alone impose, its own plan for a settlement.
Granted, Israel holds the greatest power of initiative and the broadest scope for manoeuvre among all the parties involved in the Middle East conflict. Nevertheless, the inability of that small, irascible nuclear power to impose its conditions on the Arabs, and the high human and political costs it has brought upon itself because of the tenacity with which it seeks to cling to the realities it has created on the ground, since the Palestinian resistance has proven itself able to survive under the most adverse conditions, have compelled it to look for other options to extricate itself from the current impasse. Unilateral withdrawal from most of the occupied territories appears to be the alternative that has gained the most widespread attention of Israeli public opinion.
In an article that appeared in Le Monde of 12 June, Bar Ilan University professor, Ilan Greilsammer held that Israel should withdraw immediately, unconditionally and without waiting to sign an agreement with any party from all the areas in which there are isolated Israeli settlements that are difficult to protect. These areas, which he estimates make up between 40 and 45 per cent of the West Bank, should be placed under the control of the PA, bringing the total area under its authority to approximately 85 per cent. He further stressed that the withdrawal he called for should ensure the geographic contiguity of Palestinian territory, the idea being, one supposes, to put the PA in a position where it could declare an independent Palestinian state on that territory.
This is not the first time that the idea of unilateral withdrawal has been voiced in Israel. However, aired at this time and in a manner that has drawn the attention of international public opinion, there are signs that this trend of thought may soon gain considerable momentum. Should this be the case, it will have had little to do with the relative weight of those Israeli intellectuals who propound the alternative within Israeli society, for their influence is at best marginal. Rather, it will be because a political and psychological grassroots sentiment has come to exist within Israeli society at large that favours the dissemination of such ideas at present and across a broad spectrum of public opinion.
That the notion of unilateral withdrawal also appeals to the current Israeli government, given certain conditions, augments the likelihood that a version of this proposition may soon be presented to the Israeli public. The Sharon government has long been keen to seek a "protracted interim solution" as a means to evade pressures towards reaching a permanent solution. Withdrawal, even unilaterally, from a large portion of the occupied territories, could be the answer Sharon is looking for, particularly if it enables him to sidestep the demand to withdraw from all Palestinian territories occupied in 1967.
If the chances of reaching a formula for a solution that gains the approval of all sides appear nil, the possibilities for a long-term interim solution are close to being exhausted. A regional conference is out of the question, since this Sharon-inspired proposal has already served its objective, which was to buy time as he built up an anti-terrorist alliance at home. At all events, when the Arabs sought to transform it into a truly international, comprehensive peace conference, the idea of the conference petered out. Similarly, attempts at reviving the Tenet Plan and the Mitchell Recommendations have now run aground.
It might have finally dawned on Sharon that neither the Palestinians nor the Arabs are prepared to accept a long-term temporary solution, but it is certain that he has not relinquished his goals of suppressing the Palestinian uprising against the occupation and of annexing to Israel as much of the occupied territories as he can. However, Sharon's wishes are one thing and his opportunities for realising them are another. It is, therefore, likely that events develop so as to compel him to abandon his quest for a negotiated long-term interim solution and settle for unilateral action.
It is not difficult to foresee how this might come about. Initially, Sharon will persist in his drive to demoralise the Palestinians and push them into submission. Simultaneously, he will pursue construction of the mammoth 350-kilometre long reinforced concrete barricade along the so-called "green line", at a cost of $300 million. One can also envision an escalation in Israeli incursions into PA territories with the reoccupation of larger swathes of land for longer periods after each suicide operation.
The Palestinian resistance will seek to prove through suicide operations that the security fence will not accomplish its objective, that it is, in fact, physical testimony to the inherent racism in Israeli policy and that the recourse to force and the reoccupation of land will solve nothing. The success of such operations, in spite of the barricade and military reprisals, will give increasing preponderance to the trend of opinion in Israel that is appealing for unilateral withdrawal.
Eventually, the Sharon government will begin to consider how to respond to this idea. As this government has ground in its heels against the creation of an independent Palestinian state, with or without Arafat as its president, it will probably withdraw its forces and West Bank settlers to behind the green line, while sustaining military operations aimed at thwarting the establishment of Palestinian institutions that could pave the way to the founding of a state. Perhaps, too, at this juncture it will seek to create a Palestinian authority tailored to its specifications, so that it can enter into negotiations with that authority leading to an agreement that recognises the concrete barrier as the permanent boundary between Israel and Palestine.
Naturally, one cannot pin any hopes on the Sharon government, whether or not it adopts the idea of unilateral withdrawal. The concrete barricade also cannot serve as a permanent border between Israel and Palestine. Even if events do pan out as described above, Israel's withdrawal of its forces and its citizens to behind the green line will not in itself presage a comprehensive and lasting peace. On the contrary, the existence of the barrier will only serve as yet further proof that resistance is the only way for the Palestinian people to attain full independence.
The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
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