Issue No. 595
Opinion
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18 - 24 July 2002 Issue No. 595 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Building on the past
In reviewing the Egyptian Revolution, Ibrahim Nafie urges an objective, forward-looking handling of the past
Egypt is celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Revolution of 23 July. Over the years I have followed the debate -- it always grows more strident at this time of year -- between its staunch defenders, who see only good in the revolution, and its detractors, for whom it is the source of all evil, a coup mounted by a clique of adventurous army officers. And whenever the controversy rages I cannot help but recall the advice President Mubarak has always offered in his speeches commemorating the revolution, that history must be regarded as an incentive to move forward and not as an impediment that pulls us backwards.
Those incapable of being objective and fair in their approach to history are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past. No nation's history is free of errors and blunders. But some nations know how to benefit from their mistakes while others stop in their tracks and let history drag them down.
President Mubarak's advice seems the only logical approach to commemorating the July Revolution. Certainly the revolution wrought magnificent achievements that placed Egypt at the forefront of liberation, development and leadership in the Third World. Certainly, too, the revolution had setbacks. This is why I am always shocked when I see intellectuals and politicians in Egypt so sharply divided over the revolution, with one camp deploring it as a historical aberration, the other believing in it as if it were some kind of miracle.
Today, as we celebrate the revolution's golden jubilee, we should regard it as the product of the efforts of a group of talented Egyptians. These young officers had in common a deep dismay at the plight of their country, staggering under the oppression of a foreign occupation while the king and his retinue were revelling in their palaces, pleasure houses and resorts, and a profound revulsion at the betrayals and corrupt arms deals that led to the defeat of the Egyptian army against a collection of Zionist gangs.
As we contemplate the revolution today we must strive to be as objective as possible, which entails placing the revolution in its contemporary domestic, regional and international context. The revolution occurred in the mid- 20th century. It took place when the Arab world, Africa and Asia were under European occupation and its purpose was to improve the lot of the Egyptian people, the vast majority of whom were living in abject destitution and utter ignorance. It took place at a time when the conflict between the US, leader of the capitalist camp, and the Soviet Union, leader of the socialist camp, was beginning to flare. As these two powers locked horns others were either allies or enemies.
As we reflect on the history of the revolution we must also take into consideration that the systems of government that existed in the world were not as developed as they are today. The established democracies were prone to gross discrepancies in their treatment of certain segments of their citizenry. Not a few European nations, such as Greece and Spain, still lived under military juntas and the vacillations wrought by military coups d'état.
It is important to bear in mind, too, that the July Revolution was not an event confined to a specific date. The revolution that took place in 1952 brought into power Mohamed Naguib, then Abdel Nasser, Anwar El-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. As such, the revolution must be seen as an ongoing, cumulative process; a series of consecutive interlocking circles. Such a long view will help us comprehend the development of the ideology of the revolution and its interplay with changing regional and international realities. If we apply this approach to our assessment of the various phases of the revolution we will have met Mubarak's condition that history should be treated as an inspiration, not a millstone.
It also arms us with the necessary objectivity and detachment for our analysis of the post- revolutionary phases. Certainly, given the pre- revolutionary situation locally, regionally and internationally, the banning of political parties following the revolution was not a crime but a way to contend with contemporary realities. True, the pre-revolutionary period was not all evil either. But the shortcomings, follies and rivalries between the political parties, at the expense of the welfare of the average citizen and the freedom of the nation had led the leaders of the revolution to the conclusion that political party activity must be outlawed.
That the answer to the multiparty system should be the state party system was commensurate with general trends sweeping the Third World. The great majority of governments that assumed power following colonial rule had a specific vision for mobilising the energies and resources of their newly independent nation towards the development of stable, cohesive societies and towards bettering the social and economic circumstances of their peoples. This vision inspired the leaders of revolutionary movements to adopt a centralised political system, around which there evolved an entire body of literature extolling the political, economic and social benefits of the state party organisation for emerging independent national entities. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1950s and 1960s this system prevailed virtually throughout the African continent.
The leaders of the Egyptian revolution were human beings, and thus fallible. The early phases of the revolution, therefore, were not error free, and one can easily point to a number of mistakes, blunders and excesses. However, this by no means diminishes the wealth of the legacy of that period or its importance in establishing future national endeavours.
It was also a virtue of the revolution that, in its subsequent phases, it was capable of accommodating the changing circumstances. When President Sadat assumed power following the death of Abdel-Nasser he forged ahead with the struggle to liberate the Sinai. Under Nasser this struggle had taken the form of the war of attrition. Nevertheless, according to the memoirs of those who were in positions of power in the 1960s and 1970s, Nasser had set a date for a decisive offensive to liberate the occupied peninsula, but passed away 40 days before that. After consolidating power and unifying the domestic front, Sadat resumed preparations for the battle, preparing the domestic climate for the forthcoming confrontation and putting into place the plans, logistics and material as the head of a team of like-minded people.
After winning the military victory over Israel in the October 1973 War, President Sadat turned his attention to the domestic order, initiating the transition to political plurality and a multiparty system, and to a more open, decentralised economy. Simultaneously, he spearheaded the move towards a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict out of the conviction that this conflict could never be resolved militarily. In adopting this vision of peace Sadat proved ahead of his time.
But, this epoch, too, had its share of faults and setbacks. The transition to political plurality ran aground in the early 1980s, economic and social circumstances fell into disarray and mounting sectarian incidents had begun to jeopardise national unity. In addition, Egypt's relations with the rest of the Arab world deteriorated following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel in March 1979. Meanwhile, the domestic scene grew more turbulent, culminating in the assassination of Sadat on 6 October 1981.
When Mubarak assumed power the situation in the country could not have been more bleak. But the new incumbent took firm control of the helm, steering Egypt towards the realisation of a national harmony that had been entirely lacking. The first step Mubarak took towards this end was to rescind Sadat's notorious September decrees that landed most opposition leaders in prison. Then, by initiating a dialogue with diverse political forces over all issues crucial to the future of the nation, the president succeeded in guiding Egypt into more tranquil waters.
Under Mubarak Egypt made the transition from partial to full political plurality, enabling the number of political parties in Egypt to rise from six to 17. Under Mubarak Egypt not only entered an extended period of political stability but in 1991 initiated an enormous programme of economic reform. These policies enabled Egypt to make sweeping strides forward in education, health care and other fundamental social services, a progress that was consistent with the president's frequently declared sympathy with the poor and those on limited incomes and determination never to sacrifice the welfare of these segments of the populace.
As many writers and politicians have begun to note as we mark the revolution's golden anniversary, Mubarak must be credited with effecting a reconciliation between the various links in the chain of the revolution. Mubarak was the first to acknowledge the achievements of his predecessors and to build on these achievements with consummate objectivity. In affirmation of his commitment to the revolution, he rehabilitated the names of all the leaders of the revolution, rejecting the logic that favours one phase or individual over another, while stressing that the revolution was a momentous act that changed the history of Egypt and, more importantly, that the revolution was the ongoing product of a collective effort that relied upon the support of the Egyptian people as a whole.
We are also indebted to Mubarak for having restored Egypt, without making the slightest concession, to Arab ranks. Under Mubarak the Arab League returned to its home on the banks of the Nile as Egypt resumed its leadership in defence of Arab causes. Also, as international experts and officials have testified, Mubarak succeeded in restoring equilibrium to Egypt's foreign policy towards international powers. While strengthening the special bond of friendship and cooperation with the US, Egypt simultaneously built a network of close relations with Russia, with the nations of eastern and central Europe and with the nations of western Europe.
In our retrospective of the history of the revolution, the success of Mubarak's policies underscore an important point. This success would not have been possible without an objective, forward-looking vision of history.
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