18 - 24 July 2002 Issue No. 595 Special	Current issue Previous issue Site map
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Of generals and people

The late Egyptian politician Fathi Radwan, the man selected by the army officers to set up their advocacy programme, talked to Mustafa Abdel-Ghani about his recollections of the early days of the revolution

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Fathi Radwan

It is said that you were let out of prison on the morning of the 1952 Revolution because you promised to cooperate with Ali Maher against the Wafd Party.

I was arrested and put in prison during the clampdown at the time of the Cairo Fires, even though no charges were brought against me, nor was I even a suspect in that incident. However, Ali Maher was cooperating with the Wafd, so it's hardly logical that I should work with him against the Wafd, or vice versa. At the time of the Revolution, Ali Maher was prime minister. The king had told him to dissolve the Wafdist parliament, but Maher kept procrastinating. He was hoping for a clash between the king and the cabinet. The result was that he was dismissed, and [Naguib] El-Hilali was brought in to replace him. So I could hardly have been released to work with Maher against the Wafd.

Why was it you, in particular, who called for the creation of a ministry of propaganda in the government of Gamal Abdel-Nasser?

The most important instrument for action and change in the life of mankind is propaganda. This is a lesson to be drawn from every age of history, and it can be seen in practice in modern times. Ideas can be great in a book or out of the mouth of a philosopher, but they only acquire momentum when they reach the masses. It is that contact between ideas and the masses that changes human life.

As a result of the Revolution, we thought of ourselves as being the advocates of change. We despaired at the situation in our country, and we wanted comprehensive change, and comprehensive change meant propaganda. Therefore, I felt there should be a ministry for that purpose. I only wish that I could have accomplished much more than I did at that ministry. The Revolution was still young, and it needed people to be aware and take positive action.

Why were you so enthusiastic about including Soliman Hafez in the post- revolutionary Regency Council?

Soliman Hafez was an amazing and imposing personality. He was forceful and resolute, but at the same time calm and level- headed. He worked with the national movement with quiet dedication until he died. He was always with young men fighting the British. In fact, at one time his neck was not far from the executioner's noose. From early on he was in touch with the nationalist movement. On one occasion, a young man blew himself up while making a bomb to use against the British. In order to cover up the incident, Soliman Hafez paid a monthly salary to the young man's mother so that if anyone asked her about her son's whereabouts she would tell them that he was away on an assignment.

However, one of the king's agents found out about the young officer's death and made it public, and Hafez was arrested along with other suspects. The prosecution took samples of the suspects' signatures, and came close to suspecting that Hafez's signature matched those on the money transfers to the officer's mother. The prosecution had the signatures forwarded to a well-known handwriting analyst at the time, Mahmoud Masoud. Fortunately, Masoud was committed to the national cause, and, at the same time, he had a reputation for honesty. Were it not for the fact that he said that the signature on the money transfer's was not Hafez's, the king and the British would have had him executed. Later on, when Masoud retired, he published his memoirs, in which he confessed that he had been honest throughout his life and only lied on that one occasion.

This was the first time that the true story was revealed, and it proves that Soliman Hafez was part of the armed national struggle. He put his own life at risk and he was prepared to take up arms against the British. When he learned of the Misr Al-Fata [Young Egypt] movement, he would send us money, which always came with a brief message saying, "Mahmoud and the Hagg send their greetings." That was the way he did things -- discretely and with resolve.

When Ali Maher had to strengthen his hand against the National Party, he turned to Hafez and appointed him as an adviser to the judiciary. Later on, [Abdel-Razek] El-Sanhuri appointed him adviser to the State Council and, because of his proficiency, he promoted him to deputy chair.

From the technical standpoint, Hafez was a lawyer without peer. His voice never seemed to reach beyond the podium, but when he spoke the whole room would fall silent. Speakers coming before him shouted and declaimed. But, he spoke softly, calmly, picking apart words and putting them back together, and producing results beyond the dreams of the most famous lawyers.

He was a patriot, he bore arms, and he was a lawyer of the first order. He remained calm at times of crisis, and could not be shaken or provoked. And he could keep information to himself. He knew of people who in the past had belonged to underground armed groups, but he never revealed their names. I recall, for example, that Magdeddin Nassef once told me: "I know Soliman Hafez well from the days of the 1919 Revolution. His role was much bigger than people think." In other words, Hafez was there, but his was a quiet presence.

Is it not the case that you supported Hafez because he belonged to the same party you did before the Revolution?

That's true, I don't deny it. We were together in the National Party. But, the National Party had many members, among whom were many powerful figures, perhaps better known even than Hafez. Still, I did not recommend any of those people to Abdel-Nasser. Therefore, I don't think my support for Hafez was due to our common party affiliations. Rather, it was because of his many praiseworthy qualities.

What was your relationship with Sparkos, and did it have anything to do with why you were not brought into the government at that time?

I did not know the man, or, more precisely, I knew of him only as an official personality after the Revolution. But Salah Salem told me of a conversation he had had with Sparkos that went as follows:

Sparkos said, "Didn't I tell you that Fathi Radwan shouldn't be in the cabinet?"

"Why are you against him?" Salem asked.

"Because he's a communist."

"He's not a communist. If you compare what he says to what you hear on Radio Moscow you might think he's a communist. But he's not."

Then why weren't you brought into the government?

I learned later that the US and British ambassadors to Cairo had had a meeting with Abdel-Nasser and protested against his choice of me as minister. I was a candidate for the Ministry of Social Affairs, but because of foreign pressures I was given no portfolio.

What was your relationship, as an intellectual, with the Revolution Command Council in the early fifties?

Actually, I felt completely at home with them. The only difference I felt was that they looked up to me as a man with experience, and therefore they showed me great respect and deference. Certainly, there was never any cause for grudges between me and them, or between me and Nasser. For example, I recall that once I had an argument with Abdel-Latif El-Baghdadi, but the Council made him call on me at my home and apologise. The same happened on other occasions.

Could you give me an idea of the relationship between the military and intellectuals?

Ultimately, it was a fruitful relationship. No civilian minister can complain that Nasser ever addressed him improperly -- telling him to "shut up", for example -- when tempers flared between the two parties, as sometimes happened.

Let me give you an example. There was one occasion when Nasser was speaking, but Sharbasi interrupted him. In a loud voice, Nasser snapped at him, "Let me speak!" After the meeting was over and before everyone left Nasser apologised to Sharbasi in front of all of us, saying "I'm sorry. Forgive me."

Nasser was always sensitive and polite. During all the years I knew him, and in spite of his many powers and authority, I never saw him take out his anger on anyone.

To be fair, among the civilians in the council, especially in the later phases, there were those who did not behave in a dignified manner, and many of these brought disgrace on themselves.

What made you assist Abdel-Nasser in reopening the investigations into the death of Hassan El-Banna?

That was only natural. Hassan El-Banna had been my friend. He was a patriot and a national figure worthy of respect, and his death was a crime. I was certain of the identities of those who killed him. In addition, I was in close contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, and I defended them in their cases before the courts. We should also add that, as you say, the State, in the early period of the Revolution, had a close relationship with the Brotherhood.

Did the idea to reopen the investigation into El-Banna's death originate with you or did other officials ask you to do it?

I did talk about this with the RCC, but the investigations were reopened without my having to ask. The investigations went on throughout the time I was in the cabinet, and just before I left, the trial took place and the court sentenced Mahmoud Abdel- Maguid and former members of the Royal Police.

Which had the greatest influence on Abdel-Nasser, the National Party or Young Egypt?

Nasser was a devoted disciple of Ahmed Hussein. He emulated him in the way he delivered his speeches, in the way he stood, in the way he spoke and in the ideas he voiced. To Nasser, Hussein was a venerated mentor and model, but not to the point of accepting everything he said, for there was always much debate and give and take.

In 1982, you said that you were part of the Nationalist Party group that took part in molding the Nasserite ideology. How did that come about, especially in terms of the relationship between him, as an officer and later a ruler, and you as an intellectual?

Nasser began his political involvement in Young Egypt and continued to be influenced by the ideology of the movement after he joined the army. This influence manifested itself when he came to power. In the first period of his rule, from 1952 to 1959, it was as though he had a chance to put into effect everything Ahmed Hussein had taught him. In this period, Nasser applied Young Egypt principles.

Do you think that's why he was less harsh with people from Young Egypt than he was with those from other parties?

Of course. Nasser was a great admirer of Ahmed Hussein, and, at the same time, he was deeply saddened by the constant differences between him and the Young Egypt people.

You said on one occasion that you wrote Nasser's speeches for a long time. Did Nasser, personally, ask this of you? Where did your thinking and his meet in terms of "Nasserist rhetoric?"

Nasser asked me to write his speeches, so I wrote them. But at the level of ideas he never told me what to write. I remember a time just before the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Nasser was in Yugoslavia on his way to Moscow. He had [Mohamed] Hassanein Heikal with him. He sent a message to Cairo telling me to write a speech for a particular occasion, and I wrote the speech and sent it off to him. I was with Nasser all the time, and I knew how he thought. So he could be away, and I would know what he wanted to say. In all events, our ways of thinking overlapped considerably.

Then what caused the rupture between you and Abdel-Nasser? Was it a difference of opinion, or did Nasser find someone else?

Nasser never found anyone else, and he was keen on keeping our good relationship. But what happened was that I had certain ideas about choosing people, and he sometimes chose people who I thought were not qualified. This is what paved the road for discord, because some of these people took advantage of this disagreement to stir up trouble between us.

When Nasser chose people I disapproved of, I always spoke my mind on the subject. But Nasser always thought that I should serve in a bureaucratic capacity, so that I could follow through the cultural programme I had started. He thought I should become a minister in the Ministry of National Guidance, serving in a bureaucratic capacity at a time when I thought my ministry should also have a role in planning.

I brought the subject up with Abdel-Hakim Amer. I said, "I'm not a bureaucrat, I'm a politician. You chose me for my political capacities, but then when you create a ministry with a political function you give me the job of a bureaucrat!"

Amer said, "Fathi, your programme in the Ministry of Culture and Guidance is very valuable, and we want you to see it through. Don't be like the Syrians who get angry when we put them in the Federal Cabinet because they want to stay and work in Syria."

"Yes, but they're acting out of personal ambition, whereas I only want to work in the job for which I think I am the most suited."

Then I asked Amer, "Why didn't Nasser talk to me about this personally?"

He answered, "Because Nasser would never turn you down if you spoke with him directly. Also, Nasser wants you to be in the Ministry of Culture, under the Ministry of Guidance."

"Why?"

"For two reasons. Because Salah Bitar is the Minister of Culture in the Federation cabinet, and Nasser says that no one can make life hell for Bitar like you can. Secondly, Nasser wants you. He thinks that you are the right person to continue activities in the Ministry of Culture."

Nasser was very happy with the many activities I started at the Ministry of Culture: the ballet company, the Puppet Theatre, the national folk arts and the national orchestra. Nasser would always tell people that our accomplishments in culture were a source of great pride to him.

Where were you in the 1954 crisis? Why didn't you take a clear stance?

I did make my opinion clear, even if Nasser misunderstood me. I remember I told him that the Revolution needed both a general to give orders and people to carry them out. At the time, tensions between Abdel-Nasser and Mohamed Naguib were at their height. In spite of our close friendship, Nasser mistook my meaning. He glared at me and asked, "And who's the general you want?"

However, Nasser checked his anger, but, later when we were alone, he said, "You don't know Mohamed Naguib. He's a liar and a cheat."

I said, "I know that, and I've said it before. But the times in which we live require you to stay close to him."

Nasser said, "I can't do that. I can't go on being threatened by his ploys and his contacts with others."

I said, "Let's wait then. We shouldn't take a rash decision."

So, I did have an opinion, which I voiced at the time. I also wrote about it later, and it could be summed up as follows: Nasser and Naguib were dependent on each other, they had to work together. Nasser was furious at me.

In your opinion, were the organisations Nasser created, such as the Liberation Rally and the Arab Socialist Union, attempts to attract intellectuals of all ideological colours?

Nasser had great respect for intellectuals. He himself was an avid reader. He was always looking for something new to read, and he borrowed many books from me and was always interested in what I was reading.

But in spite of his awareness of the importance of intellectuals and their ideas, he had few contacts with them. What with the conferences, meetings and the many concerns a man in his position had to deal with, the opportunities were not available. I often told him that whatever differences he had with the intellectuals could be resolved in no more than a few meetings during which there could be give and take of opinions.

But, to return to your question, the political organisations you mentioned were the state party. But, there were many other ways to attract intellectuals. For example, he could give them official posts -- not to co-opt them, but to benefit from their energies and ideas.

At the time the 1923 Constitution was rescinded Nasser asked you to write an article for the press. What happened?

Yes, my article came out on the occasion of the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution. Nasser was delighted when he learned that I had written that the Constitution was the people, that the Constitution was a collection of texts, but that the true text was the extent to which the people cherished their rights, were prepared to sacrifice themselves to safeguard their rights and would fight all who attempted to encroach on their rights.

On Nasser's instructions, the article appeared on the front page of the country's four newspapers, along with my name as the author.

Based on an interview conducted in the late 1970s.

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