Issue No. 597
Opinion
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1 - 7 August 2002 Issue No. 597 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Time for redemption
Nationalists, professionals, politicians, intellectuals, officers, adventurers, bandits, opportunists, ideologues and a great mass of bystanders crossed the stage of the 1952 Revolution. What is needed now is national consensus and historical redemption, writes Ayman El-Amir*
T.S. Eliot, the great Anglo-American poet, once wrote that "We do not like to look out of the same window and see a different landscape". What we see out of the window these days confirms Eliot's insight: a barrage of controversial newspaper articles, commentaries, flashbacks, revisionist assessments, opposing accounts and recollections that purport to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Egyptian 1952 Revolution. This rugged landscape is not even much softened by the nostalgic, patriotic and inspirational songs that have relentlessly been transmitted from the Egyptian radio and television networks.
What we see out of the window is a post-mortem rather than an anniversary celebration. But even this post-mortem has been hampered by the lack of a methodical approach and by vitriolic disagreements about the date and the cause of death. Looking through the prism of history at the legacy of 1952 provides even more confusing perspectives. The anti-Sadatists firmly believe that late President Anwar El-Sadat terminated the 1952 Revolution when he radically reversed its course on 15 May 1971, in what he called a "Corrective Revolution". A large body of nationalists considers that the "Nasserite Revolution" ended with the overwhelming military and political defeat of 1967, which has soothingly been called a "setback". The jurists' view is that the 1952 Revolution accomplished its mission when it turned itself into a constitutional republic in 1956. Liberal democrats and independent nationalists argue that the revolution's demise came when it turned its back on the democratic ideals it had proclaimed, when it struck down civil liberties, banned political parties, gagged freedom of speech and abridged political power to a one-man dictatorship.
For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood has had bitter and tragic scores to settle with the revolution and its leader, Gamal Abdel- Nasser. On the other hand, the Marxists have taken their cue from their view of the military dictatorships that ravaged Latin America in the 1940s. There were also the three military coups that took place in Syria prior to the 23 July 1952 "army movement", as Egypt's first President Mohamed Naguib, preferred to call it. In principle, the Marxists saw the protagonists of the 1952 coup as a military junta on the Latin-American model, and they only began to warm to the revolution after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the defeat of the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli aggression. They finally embraced it after the introduction of the "Socialist Decrees" in 1961, the declaration of the "National Charter" a year later and the fostering of an alliance with the former Soviet Union that was ushered in by the visit of the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to Egypt in 1964. Lastly, the Wafdists still wonder, in denial, "Revolution? What revolution?". As for the younger generation, their perception of the significance of 1952 is either ambivalent, at best, or indifferent, at worst.
Egyptians from different walks of life agree that 23 July 1952 was a defining moment in their modern history. They welcomed it as a movement, not by the people, but for the people. The controversy that is still raging is an indication that Egyptians have not come to terms with the revolution. They are still divided about its history, achievements, failures, policies and, especially, the personalities that have dominated their lives and shaped their destiny over the past 50 years.
Their dilemma is not totally unjustified. Early on, they heard their wildly popular leader, Nasser, tell them "Liftup your head, brother, for the era of enslavement is gone forever". But when they raised their heads, they raised their voices too, and the military regime was unprepared for that unwelcome cacophony of free speech. So, tens of thousands of Egyptians ended up in military detention camps, where the cruel, inhuman and degrading torture meted out to them was unparalleled, even by mediaeval standards. Nasser told the nation "Freedom, all freedom is the privilege of the people. No freedom is allowed for the enemies of the people". He alone defined who the enemies of the people were. However, fair-minded Egyptians will not deny 1952 its achievements: the evacuation of the British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, the nationalisation of the Canal itself in 1956, the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli campaign against Egypt three months later, the alliance with the national liberation struggles in the Third World and the building of the Aswan High Dam. What followed those historic developments is more controversial, eventually leading to the 1967 debacle. Then there was the redeeming victory of 6 October 1973.
Historians generally agree that when military rebels don civilian clothes and form political regimes, they do not lose the gusto of revolutionary violence. Thus, the abuse of power becomes inevitable, especially when power looks at defenceless citizens from the barrel of a gun. This is what happened to a host of revolutionary leaders, starting from Lenin and running through the whole gamut of Third World celebrities. The Anglo-Irish philosopher and playwright, George Bernard Shaw, called Napoleon Bonaparte "The Man of Destiny". Nasser, in his Philosophy of the Revolution, saw himself in a similar light, adapting Italy's renowned author, Luigi Pirandello's famous play Six Characters in Search of an Author to his own situation. He was 1952's "Man of Destiny" in as a much as Mohamed Naguib, an officer and a gentleman, was its tragic hero.
As is the case in many similar situations, the stage of the 1952 military movement was crossed by many characters. There were nationalists, professionals, honourable men, politicians, intellectuals, officers, advisors, adventurers, bandits, opportunists, ideologues, soldiers of fortune, villains, diplomats, businessmen, pseudo-historians, good and bad actors and a whole mass of bystanders. They were all witnesses, and contributors to, the post- 1952 drama. Everyone had a role to play to varying degrees. No one escapes responsibility, especially the silent majority -- the innocent bystanders who applauded the achievements and the abuses of 1952.
Everyone who was party to 1952 and its aftermath has a story to tell, depending on his or her degree of proximity or distance from events. However, no one can claim to be an authority on writing the history of the 1952 Revolution, especially those who have been closest to it or had a special part to play in it. Writing the history of the revolution requires historical distance and a total dissociation from the events that shaped that history. Only then can scientific accuracy and academic integrity be assured. Many books, memoirs, personal and public accounts, documents and anecdotes have been published about 1952, the developments that issued from it and their consequences. This is the raw material for historians, who will have the awesome responsibility of writing the history of the revolution for generations to come. Moreover, this torrential outflow of documents and memoirs, I believe, represents only the tip of the iceberg. Seven-eighths of the facts remain submerged, waiting to be brought to the surface.
Students of revolutionary change often take the 1789 French Revolution as a point of reference. They note that the French Revolution was primarily a revolution by the people for the people. Nonetheless, its progress was also often marred by violence and by the deaths of innocent victims. It has been said that a revolution, like a mother-cat, can sometimes be so scared by a perceived danger that it will devour its newly-born kittens in an attempt to protect them. Revolutions sometimes behave in the same way. In most cases, the victims are overzealous supporters or innocent bystanders, not traitors. Thus, over its first 20 years, the July 1952 Revolution turned itself from self-idolisation to self-immolation.
Fifty years after 1952, it is time to review the lessons learned. We have all been partners who revelled in the victories achieved and suffered the consequences of the failures incurred. Controversy and squabbles will not further the cause. A time for healing and redemption is needed to set the course straight. And nothing short of a national consensus among the silent majority, which needs to come forward and offer its testimonial for history and future generations, will achieve that.
* The writer is a former correspondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of the United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
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