Issue No. 598
Opinion
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8 - 14 August 2002 Issue No. 598 Opinion |
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Comparative advantages?
When Sharon ordered his F-16s to drop a one-ton bomb on a residential area in Gaza City on 22 July, killing 17 Palestinians, including 11 children, it was generally recognised that the Israeli prime minister was begging Hamas, Jihad or the Al-Aqsa Brigades to send in the next martyr. The attack on Gaza came on the heels of inter- Palestinian discussions on a cease-fire declaration in which they vowed "to do everything in our power to end attacks on Israeli civilians, on innocent men, women and children... without seeking or demanding any prior gains."
The declaration was significant in that it was the initiative of grass-roots leaders of Fatah and not a deal struck by the PA under CIA tutelage. It seemed to reflect a growing awareness within Palestinian ranks that so-called "martyrdom operations" had, at the very least, proven to be an exercise in futility.
This was a strategic choice if ever there was one, a choice drawing on the concrete experience of the struggle for liberation and reading such experience in the light of a thorough assessment of the situation in the occupied territories and Israel as well as regionally and internationally. They would, first of all, have had to acknowledge that martyrdom operations have become synonymous with Palestinian resistance, dwarfing and subsuming all other forms of struggle. The Palestinian activists would have been asking themselves basic questions . Are these operations moving the struggle forward or likely to do so in some foreseen future? Are they harming the struggle, reflecting negatively on the spirit and organisational capabilities of the struggling Palestinian people? Do they harden the sway of militarism, fascism and racism in Israeli society? Do they act to undermine the international solidarity movement with the Palestinian struggle? Are they playing directly into Sharon's hands?
And such questions must of necessity be asked in the light of a wider strategic perspective. What are we fighting for? A somewhat improved version of the bantustan "generously" offered by Barak at Camp David, so that a little nudge (via intensifying Israelis' sense of insecurity through suicide attacks) would be sufficient to bring it about? And even had that been the Palestinian people's choice (as it's been for the PA and its various Arab friends), are there any indications that "martyrdom operations" are bringing it any closer to realisation -- a year and a half down the line? Alternatively, are we fighting for genuine liberation and self- determination; a truly independent, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state? The latter objective would (it should by now have become absolutely clear) imply a considerably longer-term strategy of struggle, defining a host of tactical, shorter term objectives aimed at bolstering Palestinian steadfastness, gradually raising organisational and mobilisational capabilities, ameliorating inhuman conditions, giving them greater control over their destiny and an ever greater say in determining their future. Such a strategy would doubtless involve the adoption and continuous refinement of forms of struggle aimed at identifying and striking at the weakest links in the Israeli occupation regime, loosening Israel's hold on Palestinian territories, obstructing, isolating and eventually besieging the Jewish colonies in the midst of Palestinian land. It would need to leave an ever-growing imprint on Israeli society beyond the Green Line, not in body counts but in terms of generating greater sympathy among Israeli Jews for the Palestinian cause, stronger bonds with Israel's one- million-plus Palestinian minority, wider recognition of and disaffection with the devastating effects that the continuing oppression of a whole people has on Israeli Jews themselves, spiritually, socially and politically.
One state, two states or some form of federation is not the real issue; rather, I would argue that an absolute condition for genuine Palestinian liberation is to deliver crushing blows to the racist and colonialist elements embedded in Jewish nationalism. This, in turn, is impossible without acting to build, and continually working to widen, the alliance between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line and progressive Israeli Jews. The experiences of Oslo and beyond have revealed that separation is an Israeli, not a Palestinian objective; its only possible realisation is Apartheid.
Whether or not these or similar questions and propositions were examined and debated in the prelude to the cease-fire initiative I can only guess at. What I find increasingly senseless is the recourse to moral justification when the task at hand is to debate political strategy. "Why are their children's lives so much more precious than ours?" "What kind of a world is this when Israel's systematic and deliberate reign of terror against the Palestinians is viewed as self-defence, while the desperate suicidal acts of deeply humiliated individuals are deemed as terrorism?"
These are legitimate questions. They are also useless in informing the strategy and tactics of the struggle. And in any case, the argument about whether we should be as brutal and heartless as our oppressors is redundant. The fact is that they're much better at it than we can ever hope to be.
There can be no legitimacy, however, in recognising that Sharon is deliberately instigating Palestinian suicide operations and, in the same breath, celebrating and defending the right to conduct them. Such flaunting of logic can be explained only by total cynicism or total stupidity. I don't know which is worse.
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