Issue No. 599
Region
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15 - 21 August 2002 Issue No. 599 Region |
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Doubtful benefits
Iran remains uncertain whether backing US plans to topple its old foe, Saddam Hussein, would assure a win-win scenario, Azadeh Moaveni reports
It's no secret that the United States will be able to rely on many, if not all, of its Arab allies for private consent in the campaign to unseat Saddam Hussein. Discreetly backing "regime change" will ensure America's anxious friends in the region a voice in Washington's plans. America's plans make things awkward for nearly every country in the region, but for Iran they carry the added danger of the unknown. The Islamic Republic has as much to lose by a failed invasion of Iraq as other neighbours such as Jordan and Turkey, but unlike those two countries, it has no say in Washington's calculations.
To date, Iran's stance on an attack on Iraq has been in step with its Arab neighbours. Appearing indifferent to such an attack would compromise Iran's Islamic foreign policy message, and Iranian officials have publicly insisted they oppose a US campaign. During a meeting two weeks ago with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal in Tehran, President Mohamed Khatami said Iraq should be encouraged to abide by a UN resolution to forestall an attack. His position was echoed by Vice-President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Mohamed Ali Abtahi, who said "We don't agree on striking Iraq, let alone providing services to those who seek such a strike."
Despite this public stance, opinion is mixed in Tehran as to whether the removal of Saddam Hussein will necessarily undermine Iran's strategic interests. Superficially, it would seem that Iran stands to gain by seeing its old foe weakened. Baghdad hosts the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin Khalq, which routinely stages raids across the border into Iran and attempts to assassinate Iranian officials. The Mujahedin came to Iraq after they were thrown out of France, and an American campaign would likely spell their demise. Iranian prisoners of war who remain in Baghdad years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War would be free to come home, and Iranian Shi'a would be free to make pilgrimage to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.
Tehran's embattled reformists, in particular, feel that for a republic struggling to shake off the yolk of dictatorship, a more democratic regime next door would boost their own aspirations. In fact, before President George W Bush labelled Iran as part of an "axis of evil", Iranian reformists were privately open to helping the US change the Iraqi regime. "We could repeat what we did in Afghanistan together," a senior Iranian official said early this year.
As attractive as these incentives may appear, analysts in Tehran say the government would be naive to think an attack on Hussein would be a win-win scenario for Iran. Tehran benefits economically from the status quo in Iraq, as sanctions against Iraqi oil brings Iran's way investors who would ordinarily avoid Iran's tediously complicated finance arrangements. The Islamic Republic hosts more refugees than any other nation in the world, and an invasion of Iraq, regardless of its eventual success, would exacerbate this problem. Besides inevitable chaos on its Western border, Iran's ethnic Kurds, like Turkey's, could push to join or form an independent region. And a freer more stable Iraq might draw more than pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala; Iran's top Shi'a clerics marja-e taqlid (sources of emulations) might consider moving to cities holier than Qom, where they would be unencumbered by Iran's oppressive theological politics.
A more democratic Iraq would also increase the pressure in Iran's domestic power struggle. Hard-liners have always pointed to the repressive regimes in the neighbourhood to counter reformists' urgent push for progress, arguing that Iran is relatively open in comparison. With the Taliban deposed, and Saddam Hussein gone, they would be robbed of this strategy. If nothing else, Tehran would hesitate to condone US military action that is framed in the context of the war against terrorism, which views Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah -- groups Iran supports -- as targets. Why help execute the "war on terrorism" when Tehran might be the next target?
Though an invasion could be disastrous, "Iran will do its utmost not to be isolated in the decision-making process," according to Siamak Namazi, an analyst in Tehran. One means through which Iran can have a voice is the Shi'a Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraqi opposition group it hosts. Members of the group joined other Iraqi opposition leaders in Washington last week for talks, a move which Iran's security establishment must certainly have approved. Iraq, for its part, has noticed that Iranian involvement in Washington's plans is a potential threat, which it has sought to forestall by improved ties with the Islamic Republic.
There was a period after 11 September when the common interest of the US and Iran in toppling the Taliban offered the prospect that Iran might be convinced to accomplish the same with Saddam Hussein. But with the Bush administration openly hostile to the Iranian regime, and the potential repercussions of an invasion for Tehran, both sides seem increasingly doubtful over the benefits of cooperation.
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