Issue No. 600
Opinion
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22 - 28 August 2002 Issue No. 600 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Can the catastrophe be averted?
Should the Arabs resign themselves to a US strike on Iraq? An Egyptian gesture towards Baghdad could still turn the situation around, writes Hassan Nafaa*
Twelve years ago, the Iraqi regime committed a terrible mistake. By invading Kuwait on 2 August 1990 Iraq triggered an international crisis that has left the Arab region reeling to this day. But was the Iraqi regime alone to blame? Its undoubted stupidity does not explain the magnitude of the catastrophe that befell the Arabs, for which the other Arab governments were also to blame. Had the Arab system been more cohesive, the Kuwait crisis would not have been internationalised, and Kuwait could have been liberated with minimum losses. However, the crisis proved too much for the Arab system to handle, and Arab governments reacted to the crisis with immaturity and a lack of vision.
During the 1990 crisis, I wrote two articles, "Saddam and the Trap" and "The Arabs and the Trap," in which I argued that in invading Kuwait Saddam had been lured into a deadly trap, and that he had swallowed the bait because he was both stubborn and reckless. Furthermore, the Arabs, instead of helping their foolish brother out of that trap, had wasted valuable time trading accusations, eventually pushing each other into it as well.
Just before the Gulf War itself broke out, I attended a meeting between a group of Egyptian analysts and a high-ranking Arab official, in the course of which I heard much heated rhetoric about the inevitability of a union between Egypt and Saudi Arabia once the crisis was over. I held a different view about the post-crisis era, a view that displeased the senior Arab official we were meeting with. My view was that the United States was the one really pulling the strings in the crisis, and that, if war were to break out, the US would fight it, win it, and keep the trophies. There is nothing, I said, on the US agenda for the region that favours a union between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or between any other Arab countries for that matter.
However, what happened after the Gulf War exceeded my worst expectations. The US used its victory to accelerate the collapse of the Soviet Union and to entrench its presence in the Gulf region. Washington then realised that the survival of Saddam Hussein at the head of a besieged Iraqi regime was useful in many ways. First, it would scare the Gulf states into signing lucrative arms deals. Second, it would entice some Arab states to normalise their ties with Israel, even ahead of a comprehensive political settlement. And third, it would put pressure on Iran.
Saddam may have been responsible for the rift among the Arabs during the Gulf crisis, when some states sided with Kuwait and the Gulf Cooperation Council and others sided with Iraq. But, was he also responsible for the collapse of the Arab front supporting Kuwait? And was he responsible for the collapse of the Damascus Declaration? The Arab system could have been reconstructed on the basis of the Declaration. Yet, the US was determined to see all the Arabs, not just Iraq, suffer. Washington wanted to see the Arabs defeated and powerless, and they were.
While all this is water under the bridge, it is wise to try to learn from the past. Over a decade ago the Arabs mismanaged the Gulf crisis, miscalculated its ramifications and were too ready to believe what turned out to be lies. Now, as a new war against Iraq is brewing, the Arab system once again faces a dilemma. For Arab governments to manage this, they have to learn the lessons of the Gulf crisis, for this new crisis poses the same old questions.
Will the Arab countries be able to act differently this time around? Will they be able to avert war and a second destruction of Iraq? Or will they continue to act individually and short- sightedly?
Many pretexts gave rise to the 1990 crisis: Iraq had broken international law; a small country had been invaded by a stronger neighbour; and Saddam was refusing to listen. In this present crisis, however, the same pretexts for military action do not exist. No Arab country is under occupation or under the threat of occupation, and military campaigns aiming to overthrow governments have no political, legal, or moral justification. The international community, barring the United Kingdom, is opposed to a US strike on Iraq, many countries actually seeing parallels between current US policy and Saddam's intransigence and arrogance.
This being so, the Arabs have reason to act to try to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, not just to protect the people of Iraq, but also to defend the interests of the Arab region as a whole. Even if the current crisis ends up in the removal of Saddam, the Arabs are likely to emerge weaker, more divided, and less capable of managing their internal and external affairs as a result. Anyone who thinks otherwise should recall the fate of the Damascus Declaration.
In addition, if the United States succeeds in overthrowing Saddam, particularly if it manages to do so with the ease that marked the campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, then Washington will be tempted to try this method elsewhere. It will be tempted to remove not only those regimes that oppose its policies in the region, but also all those that have "outlived their usefulness" and do not fit the US vision of a new international order.
Perhaps the US will argue that the interests of the Iraqis should be taken into consideration, an entire people living under a despotic regime with four million Iraqis living in exile. However, the interests of the Iraqi people have never been part of US calculations, and they never will be. A large part of current Iraqi suffering is caused by US policy -- the blockade and the starvation that is its result -- rather than by Saddam's oppression.
Here, too, Washington believes that might is right, reflecting the same mindset that caused it to undermine the International Criminal Court, to withdraw from the Kyoto agreement, and to do everything it can to sidestep the United Nations. Had the US truly been interested in the interests and welfare of others, it would not have allowed the massacres of the Palestinians to continue.
At the present juncture, some may argue that the Arabs cannot do more than they have already done, with all the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, having made it clear that they oppose a strike against Iraq. The Arab World can object to the strike, but, the argument goes, it cannot prevent the US from doing what it wants. But the Arabs could prevent the strike, if they took serious action to do so. In fact, the world is waiting for just such Arab action.
However, such action can be taken only if Arab governments do not become overly pragmatic about the situation and if the "new realism" in foreign policy that has taken hold of some Arab academic institutes does not seep into policy making. My fear today is that Arab analysts will advise their governments to assume defensive positions: first, try to dissuade Washington from attacking Iraq, and, if this fails, try to minimise the damage and seek some benefit from the attack. Such advice is more opportunistic than realistic, true realism calling for flexibility of options, not of principles. Arab governments would be making a gross mistake if they separate their individual interests from those of the region as a whole.
The next few months will be a crucial period for the region. If Arab governments fail to prevent the United States from removing the Iraqi regime by force, their very future will be at stake, and Arab strategists should seek realistic options to save both the Iraqi people and the region's future.
These are desperate times, and they call for imagination and for exploring the full range of options. Is there a reason why someone with the stature of President Hosni Mubarak, a much- respected international and regional figure, should not make an unconventional gesture, such as calling on the Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders to accompany him on a visit to Iraq? Once there, the Arab leaders could issue a declaration of reconciliation, stating Iraq's acceptance of the decisions made at the recent Arab Summit and the return of international inspectors, and specifying a timetable for ending the sanctions, holding free elections, and declaring a general political amnesty.
Such hopes may seem far-fetched. Perhaps they are. Yet, it would be ironic if a regional power, such as Egypt, would send its leaders to Jerusalem to shake hands with Menachem Begin, a known terrorist, but would flinch from making a similar gesture towards Iraq, involving shaking hands with Saddam, when this gesture could prevent regional catastrophe.
* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
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