Issue No. 601
Chronicles
Previous issue
Site map
|
|
29 August - 4 Sept. 2002 Issue No. 601 Chronicles |
Current issue Previous issue Site map | |
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (457)
Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life News from Iraq
News of distant Iraq were traditionally scarce in Egypt. However, in the 1920s Al-Ahram introduced a section that brought its readers news from Mesopotamia. Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* reads through these columns to find out about Iraq's relations with Egypt and with colonialist Britain
"By the time the antidote arrives from Iraq, the bitten man will have died," wrote the famous chronicler Sheikh Abdel-Rahman El- Gabarti in connection with events in 1807. The popular saying epitomises the impression Egyptians had of Iraq as a remote country -- one that persisted to a degree into modern times. As they grew up, Egyptians studied the history of the Abbasid Empire and read the poems of Abu Nuwwas, they thrilled to the feats of Al-Hajjaj Ibn Youssef Al-Thaqifi, to the splendour of the court of the Caliph Harun Al-Rashid and to the adventures of the heroes of One Thousand and One Nights. However, they had only scanty knowledge of contemporary circumstances and events in that distant country. As a result, one could say in the collective Egyptian mind Iraq was both tangibly present and palpably absent.
Perhaps this explains, in part, why when Al-Ahram first appeared, of the 12 news agents it engaged for the Levant, agents who frequently doubled as correspondents as well, only one was resident in Baghdad. Perhaps this accounts, too, for why news on Egypt in Iraq was so sparse. For example, on the Urabi Revolution (1881-1882) Al- Zawraa, Iraq's sole newspaper then (founded in 1869) observed only that the purpose of the British occupation of Egypt was to "maintain law and order and to prevent violence and theft". It said nothing of the colonialist designs behind the British occupation or of the khedive's complicity with the British.
The remoteness between Egypt and Iraq had more than just a geographical cause. History had succeeded in driving a wedge between the two countries since the Mongol invasion of the central Islamic lands and the simultaneous success of the Mamluke sultans of Egypt in stopping the invading hordes at Ain Jalut in Palestine. While Iraq remained caught in the tug-of-war between the Persians and the Turks in the modern era, Egypt entered securely under the wraps of the Ottoman Empire.
Throughout the 19th century, colonialist rivalries to secure routes to the Far East worked to keep the two countries separate, with energies concentrated on the Suez Canal and the overland route to the Gulf, most of which passed through Iraq giving rise to the Baghdad Railway. Later, the divide was reinforced through British imperial policy, which rendered the administration of Iraq subordinate to the India Office and that of Egypt to the Foreign Office directly, as were Ottoman affairs in general.
However, the growth of Arab nationalism gradually drew Egyptians' attention to Iraq. This was manifested first in the Ahd Society, a secret society formed in Paris in 1913 by Arab officers in the Turkish army, chief among whom was Aziz El-Masri. True, the Syrian element predominated in the Society, but the Iraqi voice was clearly heard in the conference hall as well. The voice from Baghdad was heard louder in the Iraqi revolution of 1920, which many here believed was inspired by the 1919 Egyptian revolution against British rule.
Developments in the 1920s drew Egypt's attention closer to the east. Egyptians were riveted by the conflict between the Hashemite King Hussein and Ibn Saud, which culminated in the latter seizing control of the Hijaz. To the north, the regime of Faisal in Damascus toppled before a French invasion, after which the monarch, a son of King Hussein, was made king of Iraq. At about the same time, Prince Abdallah, another son of the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, was installed as the head of the newly created kingdom of the Transjordan. Yet, of particular concern to the Egyptians were the negotiations that took place between the Iraqis and the British. That successive Egyptian governments at the time were engaged in a similar process, with similar nationalistic aims in mind, contributed to the belief that the Iraqis and Egyptians could learn much from each other's experiences.
As Egypt and Iraq drew closer, Egyptians were also struck by another concern the two countries had in common: the ominous situation in Palestine. In its coverage of reactions to the first Al-Aqsa Intifada in Palestine Al-Ahram observed: "Events in Palestine reverberated powerfully in Iraq. In Baghdad a huge demonstration was held, in which protesters called for death to Zionism and long life to the Arabs. Iraqi Jews issued a statement during the demonstration in which they denounced Zionism and declared their solidarity with the Arabs."
For the above reasons, Al-Ahram was keen to strengthen its bonds with Iraq and, towards the end of 1927, it engaged someone to cover "our sister country" in greater detail. From that point forward, the newspaper featured a "News from Iraq" column with the byline "Al- Ahram's special correspondent".
Although the newspaper never revealed the identity of that correspondent in Baghdad, he was obviously not one of the newspaper's staff writers from Egypt. Rather, the style and substance of the column suggest that the correspondent was an Iraqi press member, most likely with connections in government. On 13 May 1929, for example, he writes of his interview with the new Iraqi Prime Minister Tawfiq Al-Suweidi: "I asked his excellency, in my capacity as a correspondent for Al-Ahram, whether he would grant me a private interview. He readily agreed in spite of his many duties." Apart from the implication that he has other "capacities" and apart from certain elements of style, the column reveals a familiarity with the intricacies of Iraqi politics rarely found among non-natives.
In creating the "News from Iraq" column Al-Ahram demonstrated itself unique among its contemporaries for its concern for foreign news in general and news of the Arab region in particular. This interest stems in part from the Levantine origins of the newspaper's founders. In part, too, it stems from the management's reluctance not to transgress certain bounds in the coverage of domestic wrangles. The column appeared fairly regularly at least once a week.
Not surprisingly, Iraqi-British relations received the greater share of the attention of Al-Ahram's special correspondent in Baghdad. The period between 1922 and 1930, the dates of the first and last treaties signed between the two countries, was especially fraught. As one treaty succeeded another, negotiations seemed never to end while the duration or dismissal of a government was contingent upon its ability to produce success in this process.
One of the first reports from Baghdad on this situation discussed Iraqi demands. These were eight, the first of which was the end of British supervision of the Ministry of Finance, the army and the customs. The correspondent dwelt at length on the second and third demands: the introduction of compulsory military service and the creation of a strong army under domestic command. In Egypt, a system of compulsory military service had been in place since the 1820s, under the reign of Mohamed Ali Pasha. Thus, when the British occupied the country the most they could do was introduce a few modifications. This was not the case in Iraq, in which the tribal order had continued to prevail under Ottoman rule. The absence of an existing centralised army made it easier for the British to recruit from the tribes to build a force that they used primarily for their campaigns in the Indian subcontinent. Iraqi nationalists objected to this system because it would not lead to the creation of a national army with a nationalist morale and purpose, all the more so since it ensured that the volunteer recruits remained subject to the command and influence of British officers. Nationalists also charged that the system placed an enormous strain on the national budget, diverting much needed funds from vital national projects.
The fourth Iraqi demand pertained to control over the port of Basra and the railways, the fifth to the level of diplomatic representation abroad. The latter was a great sticking point for Iraqi negotiators who felt that full representation in the League of Nations was a symbol of sovereignty that was lacking in all previous agreements struck with the British. The sixth demand focused on the ubiquitous British presence in government. British "advisers" were attached to all ministries and had the final say on all matters. Also, until then the Iraqi treasury had to sustain the costs of the British forces stationed in Iraq and, more curiously, the costs of the office of the British high commissioner in Baghdad. Not surprisingly, the last two demands sought an end to this situation.
While negotiations were in progress between the government of Abdel-Mohsen Al-Saadoun and the British high commissioner, the British press provoked the ire of Al-Ahram's correspondent in Baghdad. The British had a civilising mission to perform in Baghdad, elements of the British press argued, and the government in Baghdad, which had enormous funds at its disposal towards this end, was remiss in its performance of this duty. The correspondent riposted, "The persistence of the British press in these tendentious, biased and fatuous criticisms, so degrading to the Iraqi people who are determined to defend their honour, has exposed the true nature of the policy of that country. Nevertheless none of the means and methods of that policy has succeeded."
What British policy did wreak was instability, which was manifested in a number of developments in 1929. At the outset of 1929 a new British high commissioner replaced Sir Henry Dobbs, whose incumbency had been "filled with grief that only the people, the legitimate owners of the country, could feel. His was a period of many projects that were not in the interests of Iraq. It was also a period in which the safety of this country was at peril more than once, whether from the Iranians to the north or from the Wahhabis to the south. Yet, he failed to permit the necessary measures that officials in the Iraqi government advised were necessary". Dobbs' successor, General Gilbert Clayton, revived Iraqi hopes when, upon arriving in Baghdad, he voiced his optimism over the prospects of an agreement between Iraq and Britain. Also encouraging was the fact that Clayton was "renown for his extensive knowledge of the affairs of the Arab world".
Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that British and Iraqi views were diametrically opposed, or as Al-Ahram's correspondent put it, their differences extended to "the foundation and the core". The British, he wrote, rejected the Saadoun government's proposals for the basis of a new treaty that would "eliminate the protocols that are so prejudicial to Iraq without the slightest detriment to British interests". He concludes, "It has become abundantly clear from developments that have taken place this year while negotiations continued uninterruptedly, that the British think that everything that might benefit Iraq is harmful to them. Evidently, the British will only accept a treaty that exhausts the Iraqi economy and gives them control over every matter, large or small, in our politics and administration."
Negotiations collapsed, and, in May 1929, the Saadoun government, supported by the majority Progress Party, resigned and was replaced by the Tawfiq Al-Suweidi government. The "cabinet of vestiges" as it was disparagingly called, in reference to the fact that it consisted of ministers of previous governments, agreed to abide by the treaty of 1922. "Reverting to this treaty has set back the Iraqi cause and delivered a fatal blow to the aspirations of this country," wrote the correspondent from Baghdad.
While these events were in progress, stability in Iraq received yet another shock. On 21 September 1929, the "News from Iraq" column reports, "High Commissioner General Clayton went to play polo. He was fit and healthy. Yet, as he was driving home he felt painful throbs in his chest and by the time he reached the high commissioner's residence he was feeling extremely faint. He lay down on his bed and expired shortly thereafter."
A second surprise occurred less than two months later. So unpopular was the Suweidi government that the king dismissed it and charged Saadoun with forming a new government. Soon afterwards, Saadoun committed suicide, leaving a note for his son, saying, "I have found no pleasure, comfort, pride or honour in life. The nation expects me to serve it. However, the British reject our demands while the Iraqi people demand independence even though they are too weak and have not yet attained the station that would warrant independence. The people are unable to appreciate the value of the vice of men of integrity such as myself. They have called me a traitor and a puppet of the British. But trust that I am still faithful and ready to do everything possible for my country."
At the eastern gateway to the Arab world, Iraq had certain strategic considerations that were also the subject of Al-Ahram's column. In the 1920s, relations with Iran were the central preoccupation in that direction, especially after Tehran annexed Arabestan, which it renamed Khuzestan. Over the following years, Baghdad sought to assuage that wound, as we learn from the Al-Ahram correspondent there.
In his column of 24 April 1929, he relates that an Iraqi delegation went to Tehran to attend the crowning ceremony of the Shah. In addition, the government of Iraq issued "strict orders to all official quarters to ensure the necessary facilities for Iranian subjects residing in Iraq." These measures "demonstrate the attention Baghdad has dedicated to developing the bonds of friendship with Tehran, [and] their effects have been visibly manifested in the capital of the country with the arrival of thousands of Iranian pilgrims, tourists and merchants".
Later that year, in December, he reports that the Iraqi government decided to establish a diplomatic mission at the level of minister plenipotentiary in Tehran and a consulate in Kermanshah and that parliament approved the necessary allocations for that purpose. He adds, "Iraq is in desperate need of diplomatic representatives in Iran in view of the many Iraqi interests in that land."
Iraqi relations to the south were of a different order in view of the rivalry between the Saudi and Hashemite clans. Nearly a decade earlier, the Saudis had occupied the Hijaz, up to then ruled by Sherif Hussein of Mecca. Shortly afterwards, his son Faisal came to occupy the throne of Iraq and he, in turn, opened the gates of his kingdom to his brother Ali and to his father, Hussein. It is against this background that Al-Ahram's correspondent in Baghdad recounts the movements of the Wahhabis along the Iraqi borders. His suspicions of their intentions, undoubtedly shared by Iraqis in general, seemed well grounded.
On 29 December 1928, a "band" of Wahhabis attempting an incursion into Iraqi territory encountered a squadron of fighter planes, which opened fire on them. The tribes "fled to the borders for safety, leaving behind them three men and 12 camels".
The correspondent relates that Al-Taqaddum, the mouthpiece of the ruling Progress Party, commented that the raid could only mean one of two things. Either it took place against the wishes of Ibn Saud, in which case the Saudi monarch had lost the respect of his subjects. Or Ibn Saud, "while feigning peaceable intentions and the desire for arbitration, has unleashed his tribes to disturb the peace and security of his neighbour, in an attempt to placate Iraq by assuring it he has accepted arbitration and simultaneously to placate the tribes by allowing them to raid across the border. In so doing, he is playing with fire and the gun. It is the right of the government of Iraq to demand that Ibn Saud declare his aims and intentions frankly in the manner of civilised nations".
Baghdad's relations with countries to the west were much better, their driving force being their common Arab affiliation, a dynamic that was particularly evident in its relations with Palestine and Egypt. The Iraqis were deeply affected by events in Palestine in the autumn of 1929 and their sympathies manifested themselves in protest demonstrations and donation drives.
The most famous demonstration in solidarity with the Palestinians was that which took place in Al-Haydarkhana Mosque in Baghdad on Friday, 30 August. Thousands gathered after the Friday prayers, where they were joined by Christians in support of Arab unity and brotherhood, to protest "the inequity of British policy in Palestine as the result of the implementation of the abominable Balfour Declaration". During the rally, an executive committee was formed, after which the demonstrators, chanting protest slogans, left the mosque and marched towards the royal palace, the British high commissioner's residence and certain consulates.
Egyptians reading the "News from Iraq" column that year would have been surprised at the extent of the relations between their country and Iraq. The 1920s brought the creation of the Egyptian diplomatic corps, following the Declaration of 28 February 1922. In 1929, Iraq and Egypt exchanged embassies, with Mustafa Makhlouf as Egyptian consul in Baghdad and Rashid Al-Khoja as his counterpart in Cairo. Al-Ahram's special correspondent recounts the warm reception accorded to the Egyptian diplomat upon his arrival in the Mesopotamian capital. "Not only was his excellency the consul warmly received by government officials, but also by young Iraqi intellectuals in recognition of the moral and material bonds between the Arab peoples." He goes on to describe a banquet hosted in honour of Makhlouf, and concludes, "Since his arrival in Baghdad, his excellency the Egyptian consul has been continuously hosted by Iraqi officials and youth in honour of our sister country, Egypt, the standard-bearer of Arab culture and renaissance."
At the cultural level, a number of Egyptian artistic groups visited Iraq. That which the correspondent in Baghdad found the most exciting was the Fatma Rushdi Theatre Company, to which he dedicated several reports. In one he wrote, "All the plays presented by the Fatma Rushdi Company delighted Iraqi audiences who attended them in large numbers. They were particularly impressed by Madam Fatma and Aziz Eid who played the principle roles in these plays, which were indicative of the progress the dramatic arts have attained in Egypt." In a subsequent report, he observes that out of all the plays, Iraqi audiences most admired The Nation, performed on behalf of the flood victims in Iraq. "Madam Fatma displayed a magnanimity that commands admiration, having dedicated her profits from the performance to the benefit. People were deeply moved by her donation."
However, Egyptian-Iraqi relations at the time were not always unruffled. For example, Iraqi officials were disappointed at the level of technical assistance from Egypt. They had hoped to bring over teams of Egyptian farmers, but the Egyptian government, fearful of the competition of Iraqi cotton, was impeding travel arrangements. The officials held that the position of the Egyptian government was unfair, because in spite of the fact that Iraq had recently passed a law prohibiting palm tree samples from leaving the country, it had permitted the Egyptian mission to take out as many samples as they wanted. Fortunately, Iraqi anger in this regard was a situation that would not last. Within a matter of decades, Egyptian fellahin went in droves to till the fields of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
|
 |
|
|||||||||||||||||
| ARCHIVES Letter from the Editor Editorial Board Subscription Advertise! |
WEEKLY ONLINE: www.ahram.org.eg/weekly Updated every Saturday at 11.00 GMT, 2pm local time weeklyweb@ahram.org.eg |
 Al-Ahram Organisation |
