Issue No. 601
Opinion
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29 August - 4 Sept. 2002 Issue No. 601 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Ominous signs
Mamoun Fandy investigates the conundrums surrounding the death of Abu Nidal
Abu Nidal's death in Baghdad is reminiscent of that of Ahmed Shah Masoud last year. On 9 September, 2001, the leader of the Afghani Northern Alliance was assassinated by two Al-Qa'eda operatives. Masoud's position within the configuration of forces in the then chaotic Afghanistan was well known, but initially no one tied his murder to events beyond his own country. In hindsight it is possible to interpret his death as one of events culminating in the awful attacks of 11 September. But only a couple of days before the attacks on New York and Washington analysts shrugged off the death of Masoud as an isolated incident in a far off country. Only on the morning of 11 September did anyone begin to see the event in a broader context.
When Masoud was killed Bin Laden had already turned Afghanistan into a permanent base for Al-Qa'eda. Masoud's death was part of Bin Laden's strategy to fully control the country's territory. It followed a whole series of events that began with Bin Laden's bold attack on the US embassies in East Africa in on 7 August, 1998. One cannot say with certainty that the death of Masoud was directly related to 11 September but, as someone who has followed Bin Laden's career carefully, I believe that the death of Masoud was closely related to Al-Qa'eda's strategy for dominating Afghanistan and spreading its influence. The assassination may even have accelerated the execution of plans for the 11 September attack. Masoud could have been privy to some time sensitive intelligence that could have undermined the whole operation and eventually prevented the attack. No one will ever know this for a fact but the urgency of his murder has led many specialists of South Asia to believe that it is so. History is replete with examples of violent operations being accelerated for fear of compromising intelligence.
The murder of Abu Nidal, mastermind of many terrorist operations in the 70s and 80s, is no less significant than that of Masoud. It is no less ominous. Abu Nidal, who was 65, broke ranks with the PLO as a rival to Arafat in 1974. He was blamed for attacks on PLO offices in London, Paris, Kuwait and Tunisia. His group conducted operations in more than 20 countries and was responsible for the killing and injuring of more than 900 people. Other attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985 and the Pan Am flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986. His group was also linked to the killing of a PLO representative in Tunis in 1995. The group may have constituted the first terrorist organisation with global reach long before the term came into vogue. Abu Nidal spent some time in Libya and Iran before moving to Baghdad two years ago, though the Iraqis never admitted his presence.
Already journalists in the Arab press are writing that Abu Nidal was killed by two of his Iraqi bodyguards "because he was planning to kill an important figure in Baghdad". There are reports that his group received $4 million from abroad to conduct such an operation. Some point fingers at Kuwait as a sponsor of this operation to kill Saddam Hussein. But Kuwait is an easy target for such rumours. The reality is that we do not know why Abu Nidal was killed.
Possible scenarios that led to his death could be that Saddam Hussein had wanted him to carry out some operation on the anniversary of 11 September and he backed out at the last minute. It could also be that the organisation was, as many speculated, being urged by outside forces to kill Saddam and the plot was discovered. This is a scenario that most reports from the region mention. It is also possible that the killing of Abu Nidal is part of an Iraqi game played under the table with the Americans to prove that the Iraqis are partners in the war on terrorism.
But one thing is certain. Even the most tyrannical regimes cannot afford to keep the leaders of terrorist networks in the age of America's war on terrorism. The cost is too high for any state.
During the Cuban Missile crisis, historians discovered that the Russian commander in Cuba had an envelope with the orders to fire nuclear war heads at America. He was told that if communication with Moscow broke down he had to open the envelope and carry out the orders. Fortunately the commander did not need to open the envelope. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that there are many Abu Nidal operatives with sealed envelopes running around. Abu Nidal does not kill. He gives the orders to kill. Have the orders already gone out and in which direction? This is the pressing question. There is no way to know where or when violence could break out though the nature and scope of these operations may be revealed over the coming days. The targets of the violence might be confined to Iraq, or the Middle East, or America.
We know about Abu Nidal's death. But we cannot predict what his organisation will do now that their leader is no more. Last year the death of Masoud was a harbinger of the unimaginable horror that would follow his elimination from the Afghan political scene. Let us remain attentive to the significance of Abu Nidal's disappearance this year.
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