Issue No. 601
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29 August - 4 Sept. 2002 Issue No. 601 Opinion |
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The Kagan thesis (2)
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed presents American scholar Robert Kagan's original interpretation of the notion of post-history in contemporary politics
History and post-history interrelated
In a recent speech outlining a vision of Europe's future, German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer postulated that "the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was, and still is, a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648."
Of course, it is the integration and taming of Germany that is the great accomplishment of Europe -- viewed historically, perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved. Fischer's principal contention -- that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations -- is widely shared across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper wrote in The Observer (7 April, 2002), "Europe today lives in a post-modern system that does not rest on a balance-of-power but on the rejection of force. In the post-modern world", writes Cooper, "raison d'Etat and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft have been replaced by a 'moral consciousness' in international affairs".
It is in terms of such a development that, according to Kagan, Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace. But Kagan's post- history is not Fukuyama's "end of history". It is not a global stage beyond history. It is not history's end. It is a new stage in history, in which a given group of states, namely, the European states, abandon the world system they themselves established in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. This treaty marked the close of the period of religious wars. Thereafter, European armed struggles were waged principally for political ends. Outside the European Union politics are still marked by the traditional features of modern history. This is particularly true of the US. But, on the other hand, the uninterrupted conflict that ravaged Europe ever since the violent birth of Germany in the 19th century has been put to rest.
In the new situation, collective security is provided for Europe from without, by the US operating through the military structure of NATO. Within this wall of security Europeans pursue their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics. This evolution began in Europe during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War, by removing the external danger of the Soviet Union, allowed Europe's new order, what Kagan describes as its new "idealism", to prevail. In Europe the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power.
Most Europeans, many of whom are in positions of power, would like to apply Europe's experience to the rest of the world. The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's mission civilisatrice. Thus, we arrive at what may be the most important reason for the growing divergence of views between Europe and America. America's power, and its willingness to exercise it, unilaterally if necessary, represents a threat to Europe's new sense of mission. Hence its distinct lack of enthusiasm for Bush's proposed war against Iraq, which represents an assault on the essence of "post-modern Europe" -- of the post- history of Europe. Otherwise nothing will distinguish Europe's present mission civilisatrice from the one in the name of which it launched its colonial wars during the Imperial age. Actually, to deny the validity of the new European "idealism" is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the new European project.
And it is precisely this fear that hangs over Europeans, even as Europe moves forward. The French and the Germans are not sure that the "German problem" has really been solved. The French are still not confident they can trust the Germans and the Germans are not sure they can trust themselves.
This puts forward the question: can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? There has been no shortage of European leaders urging it to do so. Yet the political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, and for the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires power. Its mission is to oppose power, and perhaps also, "to multilateralise" the United States. Pro-American British scholar Timothy Garton Ash wrote in The New York Times, "America has too much power for anyone's good, including its own."
Kagan contends that Europe's evolution to the present state occurred under the mantle of the US security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. More important, the United States was the key to the solution of the German problem and perhaps still is. Germany's Fischer noted that two "historical" decisions made the new Europe possible: the US decision to stay in Europe, and France and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links. The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the "state of universal peace" made possible by world government would be an even greater threat to human freedom than the Hobbesian international system, in as much as such a government, with its monopoly of power, would become "the most horrible despotism". How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe's supranational government to provide it.
Europe's new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And now, the fact that United States military power has solved the European problem, especially the German problem, allows Europeans today to believe that American military power -- and the "strategic culture" that has created and sustained it -- are outmoded and dangerous. In other words, the passage of Europeans into post-history has depended on the United States not making the same passage.
Cooper argues that "the challenge to the post- modern world is to get used to the idea of double standards." Among themselves, Europeans may operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with the world, "we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era -- force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary. Among ourselves we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle we must also use the laws of the jungle!" In other words, Cooper is advocating a return to colonial behaviour.
What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into the Kantian paradise and still plays a role in keeping that paradise possible, it cannot enter it itself. It mans the wall but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams, the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others. This raises one question: has the Kantian paradox really been overcome, or is it now being displayed in a different setting?
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