12 - 18 September 2002 Issue No. 603 Region	Current issue Previous issue Site map
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America's Iraq debate

Although opinion polls clearly show that the majority of Americans support the ousting of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, there are many questions now being raised about the consequences of that war and its cost. Mohamed El-Sayed Said, in Washington, spoke to two former senior officials heavily involved in the Middle East about whether the war against Iraq could be avoided, and the possibility that the United States could get international backing for its expected move. Following are the two interviews with former US State Department officials Edward Walker and Richard Murphy

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Richard Murphy

Do you think that debate on Iraq has to do with upcoming Congress elections and competition between Democrats and Republicans?

I don't believe that it is a Democratic- Republican split. The basic situation is that the president has not made his case clearly to the American people. He said that a change of regime is needed but he did not provide the public with an argument that justifies going to war.

The first opportunity to deliberate the issue more clearly was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings in July. The hearings brought key senators in the committee who raised several contentions on the issue of war and the American responsibilities after the war, the post-war reconstruction and the cost of war. It was the first time the Senate officially announced the negative side of the war option. Before that, the administration officials viewed the whole matter as a simple and straightforward operation.

Do you expect Congress to grant President Bush the declaration of war that he needs?

In order to get the approval of the Congress, the president has got to argue for it. He will delay going to the Senate until it becomes essential to go.

Would you give me a sense of the magnitude of opposition to the war from within the American political elite? Some have characterised the present situation within the Republican Party as a rebellion against the hawks who seem to dominate the administration now.

It is impossible to answer this question today. People like Scowcroft and [former Secretary of State James] Baker did not oppose the war as one of the major options. They nonetheless oppose going to it alone. They argued that there should be an international coalition. Some others have expressed doubts on the convenience of the war.

Rebellion is a strong word. Most of those who took an issue with the present formulations are in total agreement on the need for change. [Former US Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger, for instance, argued the need for careful preparations, and a clear argument to be presented to world public opinion that focuses on the mass destruction weapons rather than on [Hussein's] personality and morality.

How?

I think that things will develop. There will be serious attempts to allow the inspection committee back without restrictions. Efforts should be made to persuade the international community to get the inspectors re- admitted. The assumption here is that if we ask the international community to make this try and fail it will come to support the military option.

It is clear that the world likes to have other options considered before coming to the conclusion that war is the only option left. Inspectors have to be allowed back and to operate freely. If [Husssein] cooperates fully, there will be no war. He actually has the option, as he had it in 1991, to stop the invasion.

What do you think is needed to undermine or rule out an American invasion?

The first requirement is full commitment to the UN resolutions. The second is granting full freedom for the inspection committee.

But according to Powell, in one of his latest public statements on this issue, Iraq will not be spared war and invasion even if it admits back the inspection committee.

I believe that Secretary Powell was judging by historical records. He is saying that he does not believe that the regime in Baghdad will ever cooperate fully with the inspection committee and that he [Saddam Hussein] will continue the policy of hide and cheat.

But this is already emphasised by Vice-President Cheney in his latest speech. It means that the readmission of the inspectors will not rule out war because, according to Cheney, inspection, as a policy instrument, failed to work. War will be inevitable anyway. Why in hell then should anyone expect the Iraqi president to re-admit the inspectors?

You are partly right. The specific conditions and policy formulations need to be better defined.

But what I am getting at is this: it seems that the administration is really not serious about bringing back the inspectors. It is, indeed, encouraging Iraq not to admit them so as to make the war justifiable. As a matter of fact, many observers believe that you backed the Iraqi regime so completely to the wall that he had to end his cooperation with the Security Council. You practically never wanted him to conform with UN resolutions.

No, you are not right on this. Saddam Hussein never fully cooperated with the UN. We did not know how substantial the biological weapons programme was until it was disclosed by his son-in-law in mid 1999.

Before the defection of Al-Meguid, the regime always said that it did destroy it in full.

Assuming that he did not cooperate, what incentives did he have for what you call "full cooperation"? Moreover, you always said that he has to go. If he had to conclude that you will force him out, why should he cooperate?

Actually Saddam had the chance to re-integrate, if he cooperated fully. I am aware that some would have never admitted his regime back, but those could have been stopped if he acted in good faith and cooperated with the UN.

Where was this chance? More than 10 years of sanctions have left Iraq with no fighting force or conventional military capabilities that match its neighbours. Given enormous losses and weapon obsolescence any other state or actor would have tried to cheat, anyway.

This is again not true. Iraq was weakened, but it still had sizable conventional capabilities.

You may be right on this point or not, but I am referring to the doctrine of regional/international balance. For example, you were successful in averting the complete humiliation of Germany after its defeat in World War II so as to avoid the rise of a new Hitler as happened after the First World War. Given the extremely fragile balances in the Gulf region, political scientists and strategists should have expected the rehabilitation of Iraq, after the second Gulf War, rather than its profound humiliation and weakening. Engagement worked in other cases, why shouldn't it work in this case as well?

Germany was a very different case. Germany accepted non-conditional surrender, while the agreement with Iraq after the war was only a truce or end of hostilities. What you mentioned may have been tried if the regime in Iraq was honouring its obligations.

But as a result of your conduct, many in the region fear that you are going to target Arab countries one after the other. Those who read statements from influential figures in this country are more than justified in reaching this conclusion.

I don't think it is realistic to consider campaigns against Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. This is no more than rhetoric. There is no plan for attacking any other country. We have doubts about the Iranian regime, but President Bush recognises that the Iranian leadership wants to have a decent relationship with us.

You yourself have observed America from within and how complicated the political scene is, but I assume that you know that these things are sheer rhetoric.

We have Christian fundamentalism that may not be very different from Iranian fundamentalism, but those people are not the government of the United States.

I would like to end by asking for your advice on how to rule out prospects of American invasion of Iraq. What precisely do the Iraqis need to do to achieve this?

I am hopeful that the Iraqis will surprise us all by accepting full and unrestricted access to inspectors and cooperate fully once and for all with the UN.

US President George W Bush addresses local supporters on Thursday to win support for military action in Iraq (photo:AP)

Edward Walker

Our readers know by now the main themes in the national American debate on the issue of war against Iraq. They probably need to know more about the mapping of positions on this issue within the American political landscape, including the varying positions within the administration. How do you read this map?

You start with a group of people who have been around for a long time. Former Senator Jessie Jackson rebelled against what he saw as Democrats' flexibility on foreign policy, and called for a strong American leadership in the world arena. A group of people evolved around him. When President [Ronald] Regan was elected, a number of those people shifted to work with him, people like Richard Pearl, and Paul Wolfwitz and so on. Some of those individuals stayed with the Democratic Party, but most of them left to Republicans. They were all part of the Regan administration. And they were brought in by this administration where they occupied more senior positions and have political allies who didn't really exist before, such as the Christian fundamentalists who form a very important component of the right wing of the Republican Party.

Keep in mind that Scoop Jackson, the originator of this circle, was a very big supporter of Israel, and most people who came around him were also very close to Israel. So you combine that with the Christian fundamentalists who believe that the only way for the second coming of Jesus Christ is when the temple is re- built, which is supposedly on the top of Al-Aqsa Mosque. And since it is the Israelis who are presumed to re-build the temple they had to support Israel too.

And then you add in a third component which is the right wing of the Jewish constituencies, those are the people who will support Israel no matter what it does. They are not a majority but they have substantial political influence. They have a strong alliance within the administration, and they are active supporters in the elections.

Numbers here do not really matter because they are committed: they vote, contribute money and fight for their cause. This is why they are an important component in the electoral process of this country.

Keep in mind that in this country you need to change only a few votes to win the elections, as actually happened in the last presidential elections. Now, still this group is by no means a numeric majority. It is an ideological group but not everybody in it is an ideologue. Certainly, the vice- president [Dick Cheney] is not an ideologue. He has conservative views but he is a practical man.

How has this map changed since the events of September?

After what happened on 11 September the American people felt a huge vulnerability, they looked to their leaders for guidance and support. They rallied around the president, and they looked for a strong leadership. They were not particularly interested in nuances. They wanted black and white solutions. That enhanced the influence of the right wing within the Republican Party. So their position was strengthened.

Also, 11 September changed the nature of the threat, basically. Before, there were some worries about the Middle East, but the region was not really on people's mind. September 11 brought it to the centre of attention. People suddenly found out that things are happening to them personally because of the Middle East, and they became afraid of the transformation of these terrorist groups from doing what they did to the World Trade Center to doing much worse with chemical and biological weapons, and ultimately nuclear weapons.

These fears are encouraged by the administration. The fear projected here is not over Iraq developing, like Russia, nuclear and other weapons and ballistic missiles or means to deliver these weapons. The fear that developed is that they are going to provide these weapons, technology or capabilities to terrorist groups that are far harder to defend against. We may defend missiles by missiles, but we are not going to come up with a 100 per cent barrier to individual threats.

Here is how Israel comes in, because what is happening in Israel is individuals strap bombs on themselves. You just heightened these fears here because if Israel fails to defend itself against human bombs, people ask what are our chances of defending ourselves against people who are willing to sacrifice themselves. It is a whole new threat.

Now, we need to get the sense of magnitude. You spoke of the new conservatives, of the Christian fundamentalists and Jewish right-wing groups. How do these forces measure up within the American political landscape? Some, for instance, speak of a rebellion by the traditional conservatives against the creeping domination of the new conservatives and fundamentalists within the administration and the Republican Party. What does this mean?

In the American landscape, we look at this in terms of states. The influence of Christian fundamentalists is spread all over the south. The Republicans have taken the south.

But it is not just numbers as it is commitment. Any politician would love to have 10 committed people rather than 50 non-committed. They will go door-to- door campaign for him.

So don't look for majorities. This is not how the system works. We look at committed cadres.

But we still need some sense of numbers or proportions.

If you lose Christian fundamentalist votes you lose a dozen states, probably.

Personally, I do not know the numbers. But it is unrelated to numbers. In the normal scheme of things, it is not dominant. Only in a few states. But in today's environment, they really matter, because people look for simple answers, they want security.

Has the mainstream within the Republican Party changed in their favour fundamentally?

The landscape changed quite a few years ago. It was very dramatic. The type of Rockefeller Republicans dominated by New York and the East Coast has retreated, when the south shifted to the Republican Party and when the new fundamentalists came in you started seeing changes in the party for a more militant foreign policy.

The hostage crisis in Iran catalysed their dominance in the party. People felt humiliated and that America is not getting the treatment it deserves and not exercising the leadership that it should have.

Now, let us shift to the Democratic Party. The war theme seems to be bipartisan, but more opposition to the idea seems to come from Democrats than Republicans. We may take here the deliberations in the hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Well, first of all I do not know of anyone in the Democratic Party who does not think that Saddam Hussein has got to go. People know his history, the way he treated his own people, the rationality issue at least from our own perspective. No one would have handled the Gulf crisis. He could have avoided it by withdrawing.

So, there is nobody I know of within the Democratic Party -- and I know a lot of them in the previous administration -- who does not want to get rid of him. The question is not that. The question is the cost, and who are you going to replace him with.

That is the kind of question we ought to ask.

How many people ask these questions?

You got a substantial number in the Democratic Party who were reluctant to ask, partly for fear of elections. As you know from the polls, there is a substantial majority for people who want to get rid of him [Hussein].

But polls have really become notorious on this and many other issues. Don't you think so?

It is not politically a popular position to say that we ought not to act. But increasingly, basically after [former national security advisor under President George Bush senior Brent] Scowcroft put his piece in the Christian Science Monitor, people started to ask. He simply emboldened people to ask a series of questions on nuances, since his conservative credentials cannot be questioned.

In a cocktail party I attended people who are fairly conservative, of the old generation, were asking about risks to human life, how much this is going to cost, what support we are going to get from the region, the impact on the economy and the impact on oil market, but most of all the impact on the Iraqi society.

The reality is that if Shi'ites are the majority, a democratic regime in a post-Saddam state is going to be a Shi'ite one. What could be the impact of that? Sunnis may not accept being ruled by Shi'ites. This complicates the way we think of regime change. There are all kinds of arguments on that.

So what I am saying, like most Democrats, is let us be certain of what we are doing lest we de-stabilise the whole Arab world, and cause more trouble than what we already have.

Now, there is a debate on whether the president has to come before the Congress asking for a declaration of war or not. If he does, and most likely he will, for fear of being haunted by constitutional issues, what do you think the result will be?

The president was actually notorious on constitutional issues. No one thought of taking him to the constitutional court because he is very popular. And once the president launches war everybody is going to rally behind him. The question may be asked later, but it would then be too late to make a difference.

I think, though, that the president will consult with the Congress, and it will do what he says, ie consult with the country as well, regardless of whether he has the answers to these questions or not.

What is your sense then of the result in the Congress? If he gets a slight majority, it could be as bad as having no majority, I believe.

It depends so much on how the build-up goes. If the president goes to the [United Nations] Security Council and makes a serious attempt to get the Iraqis to accept inspectors, and gets a flat no, as everybody expects, getting the Congress's approval is going to be easier. If he gets a Security Council resolution, he can then ask for authority to enforce it.

In the present Congress, he can get a majority, in my view, if he answers a set of questions. You've got to say a lot more than the vice-president did yesterday, to get the country's, and the Congress's, approval. The vice-president seems to be saying that deterrence doesn't work. But it did actually work in 1991. [Hussein] had chemical weapons and used them already, but did not use them against us because of fear of reprisals.

Now, we know the position of President Bush and Vice- President Cheney. What are the positions of the rest of the crowd within the administration? I am particularly bewildered by Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Every single person within this administration agreed from the start that one of the major objectives of foreign policy is to get rid of Saddam Hussein. That was never in question by anybody. They differed on how to do this, and some of them have changed position.

At the beginning, for example, Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld felt that this was not urgent. Now, he obviously does. Some feel that we need to consult allies, we need to get the Security Council in. Rumsfeld is in charge of military plans. [National Security Advisor Condoleza Rice] Condi doesn't have a lot of experience in the Middle East, but she brings to the administration her deep experience with the Russians and Eastern Europeans. She has been a driving force for Russian policy and how to deal with this portfolio. This will have an impact on Iraq as the Russians are dealing with Iraq.

I believe that the president feels very strongly about Saddam Hussein, and he is definite that we can do it militarily. But he is not irresponsible. The way he handled Afghanistan step by step shows that he will be saying and doing more before he decides on this.

But "step by step" is overwhelmingly feared by our people in the Arab and Islamic world. You started with Afghanistan. Now, you are coming to Iraq, which is very close to Syria, and probably later Saudi Arabia and Egypt, etc. I am conveying to you the prevalent theory in Arab political discourse at this point.

You've got to be careful not to take the right-wing ideologues as the American foreign policy. That talk about Iraq and then Iran, and Saudi Arabia, is nonsense. The talk about democracy in Iraq and other countries of the Middle East seems to be also misguided.

It is not democracy that is likely to take over but fundamentalism. You are going to create the very seeds of terror, which you think to be fighting. And nobody should take these blatant assertions that come out of super-ideologues like that Rand presentation [on Saudi Arabia] as the same [position] of the administration.

What about the military's view on the war issue?

Their basic view is that we will do what Mr President asks us to do, but there will be a varying scope of costs, depending on the build-up we have, on the type of support from regional and international allies.

The basic view is don't start something you cannot finish successfully.

You presented a complex view on probabilities of war, but sometimes and at the end of the day, we come to rely on our gut feeling. As a Middle East expert with substantial knowledge of the region and of the domestic political process, what is your hunch on the likelihood of war? Is war coming?

I think this administration will take a military action against Saddam Hussein. But they will do a lot more preparation before they do it. They recognise now that it is not just the attack itself. The question is who can win the peace. How long we are going to stay after winning the war, and what occupation will do to us?

Occupation is not a good thing. It could be a massive disaster.

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