Issue No. 605
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26 Sept. - 2 October 2002 Issue No. 605 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
From Al-Aqsa to Iraq
The US and Israel are now working in complete coordination, Israel to end the Palestinian problem in any way it wishes and the US to reorganise the region, beginning with Iraq. But US and Israeli security will never be achieved without Israel's acceptance by its neighbours, writes Ahmed Abdel-Halim
At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, US President George Bush senior announced that a "New World Order" had begun to emerge and that henceforward the problems of the world would be resolved peacefully. In the Middle East, he continued, the time was at hand to reach a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, indeed, the US began to push towards the realisation of that end. Under US auspices, the Israelis and Palestinians signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, Jordan and Israel concluded a peace treaty in 1994, and Syria and Israel entered into negotiations, which broke off following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin.
However, in spite of these auspicious beginnings, changes in the international and regional climate determined the course of subsequent developments. Most significantly, the US was now alone at the peak of the world order -- a unique precedent in the history of mankind -- and its prime concern was to remain in that position for as long as possible. In the Middle East, the byproduct of this was that Israel acquired greater freedom of movement than ever. Confident in the unstinting support of the most powerful nation on earth, Israel was able to act on its every desire, specifically regarding the so-called "final-status" issues, using any means at its disposal, including force. It was at this juncture that the rules of the game changed and Israeli practices, and, of necessity, US practices, took a new turn.
In addition to an end to the Palestinian problem, Israel also wanted to eliminate what it perceived to be the threat to its security emanating from Iraq and, above all, from Iran. Simultaneously, the US wished to eliminate what it regarded as the obstacles to its policy in the Middle East: the political attitudes of Iraq and Iran. On the basis of this convergence in outlooks, Tel Aviv and Washington began to work together towards the implementation of their political and military objectives. Israel's rush to hasten the end of its negotiations with the Palestinians, and Washington's rush to reshape the region in accordance with the US-Israeli vision for it, underscore the connections between the various problems in the Middle East.
Israel precipitated events with Sharon's visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which triggered the eruption of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000. This act of provocation was deliberate: Israel needed a pretext for resorting to force, which it had come to perceive as its primary instrument for realising its goals -- occupying the remaining Palestinian territory and driving its Palestinian inhabitants into neighbouring countries. However, the Palestinian Intifada was to prove more powerful, resilient and longer lasting than the Israelis had anticipated. Worse, it began to reap political fruit, rendering the Israeli position increasingly awkward. Tel Aviv's response was to lash out with even greater violence.
In this context, a second landmark event occurred on 28 March 2002. On that day, delegates at the Arab Summit in Beirut issued a resolution declaring the Arab desire for peace and their willingness formally to recognise Israel and establish normal relations with it, in exchange for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders. This Arab resolution was fair and balanced, but Israel had other ideas, for had Israel accepted this initiative it would have had to abandon the hopes it had pinned on this phase of the conflict, which entailed the use of force to accomplish its political objectives. Israel's response, therefore, was to initiate a new and more brutal onslaught, intended to break the will of the Palestinian and Arab peoples. The US supported the Israeli action, signing new security and defence accords with Tel Aviv and upping military and economic aid, while using its global clout to silence any regional or international outcry. Against this backdrop came the hijack attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001.
The events of 11 September did not alter US foreign policy objectives, but they did change the means employed. From a recourse to diplomatic channels to advance its political objectives, Washington abruptly adopted a preference for direct military intervention.
This shift was the product of a fundamental change in US strategic thinking on self-defence both at home and abroad. As it passed laws to tighten domestic security, brought intelligence agencies under a unified command, and, for the first time, designated a segment of the armed forces to operate on home ground, Washington reserved the right to launch preemptive strikes against forces abroad that it believed were plotting operations against it. It has further invoked the nuclear option and designated seven states as possible targets against which conventional and/or unconventional weapons could be brought to bear. In addition to Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- the famous "axis of evil" -- Washington has cited Syria, Lebanon, China and Russia. The inclusion of the latter two is easily understandable; it is essential for Washington to keep these two military powers in check to ensure that its global supremacy remains unchallenged.
The convergence between US and Israeli objectives explains the inclusion of the Middle Eastern states in the blacklist. For the first time, and increasingly blatantly, US and Israel are working in complete coordination, with roles assigned to each whereby Israel is to close the Palestinian problem after its own manner, while the US moves to reorganise the region as a whole, beginning with Iraq. When these two interrelated issues have been settled, the region will have been set up for subsequent developments, for the US is simultaneously working to prime the region to accept its vision for it, using a panoply of different kinds of pressure, including the sobriquets of human rights, democratisation and aid. Indeed, it has also sought to intervene in the purely domestic affairs of some countries in its push for educational and religious reform.
Washington's focus on Iraq, in particular, serves two ends, the first being to tip the strategic balance in the region further in favour of Israel and to facilitate an end to the Palestinian issue and other negotiating tracks in accordance with US-Israeli conditions. The second is to secure US control over Iraq's enormous oil reserves and complete the encirclement of what it perceives as another threat to Israel, Iran, which can be dealt with, perhaps using different means, at a later stage.
In its striving towards these ends, the US has given little heed to the need for a gloss of legitimacy by placing its actions under a UN umbrella. Rather, it has moved to create an "international coalition" that will bend to fulfill US interests. Now that this coalition has served its purpose in Afghanistan, Washington hopes to mobilise it again against Iraq and, eventually, against other countries. Nevertheless, these plans are not without their shortcomings, the foremost obstacle being that the majority of the international community opposes force if peaceful means are available to resolve disputes. Another is the high costs of a military operation against Iraq. Estimated to run to $100 billion, even the US cannot afford to foot the bill alone, especially if it intends to move on to other targets. Certainly, the other countries that the US hopes to bring on board its coalition are aware of Washington's intention to distribute the costs. The third major problem the US faces is the possible toll on the lives of its servicemen, a spectre that has haunted US policy- makers since Vietnam.
Everything begins with the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948, generating a situation that has evolved, over various phases and in accordance with the logic of regional and international events, into the circumstances that prevailed on the eve of the second Palestinian Intifada and the subsequent precipitous deterioration of security in the region. What Israel, and, hence, the US, have failed to realise is that their gains from all this are ephemeral. Military might, no matter how brutal, cannot produce lasting peace and security. True security for Israel and for US interests in the Middle East and elsewhere can only be achieved when Israel is accepted in the region and when it establishes normal relations with its neighbours. That was the message of the Beirut Summit in March 2002. One only hopes that it is not too late for the Israelis and the Americans to heed this lesson.
The writer is a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
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