Issue No. 605
Opinion
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26 Sept. - 2 October 2002 Issue No. 605 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Questions awaiting answers
Have the Arab parties decided how they will react to an invasion of Iraq, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
As the clouds of war gather ever more ominously over the region, the time has come to launch a general debate over what can be done to avert the impending showdown as well as to define what the collective stand of the Arabs should be in the event of US President George W Bush pushing ahead with his threat to attack Iraq, whether unilaterally or pursuant to a Security Council resolution.
The Arab League, notably its secretary- general, played a crucial role in convincing the Iraqi regime of the need to accept the return of UN weapons inspectors with no pre- conditions. Its successful intervention proves that Arab determination and collective Arab action can be effective in preventing a further deterioration of the situation, perhaps even in finding a peaceful way out of the impasse. But first it is necessary to consider all possible scenarios.
Let us begin by assuming that, in the light of Saddam's decision to re-admit the weapons inspectors, even while declaring that "Iraq is totally clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons", the Security Council issues a resolution aimed at testing his real intentions. This will give rise to one of two possible scenarios: either a declaration by the inspectors that no banned weapons have been discovered, or that evidence has been found to suggest or confirm that Iraq is harbouring such weapons. The "dossier of evidence" released two days ago by British Prime Minister Tony Blair about Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction is meant to bolster Bush's case.
The discovery of banned weapons would go far towards silencing the opponents of Bush's war plans, although a number of international parties are keen not to limit the Iraqi file to the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Important economic interests link Iraq to many states, including such major powers as Russia and France, which are not ready to see their interests sacrificed only because the president of the US has decided to make Iraq the next target in his war on terror.
Scenarios become more complicated if the inspectors come up with inconclusive results -- or if the US administration ignores Iraq's declared readiness to re-admit the inspectors and unilaterally decides to move militarily against Iraq without waiting for a Security Council resolution authorising intervention. Secretary of State Colin Powell has declared that the US will find the means to stop the inspectors from returning to Iraq unless a new resolution on the Iraqi problem is issued by the Security Council. In other words, the return of the UN inspectors should be based on a Security Council resolution, not on the sovereign will of the Iraqi people or the approval of their head of state. And what if Washington deliberately provokes the Iraqi leader in the aim of making him pull back on his offer to "receive any scientific experts, accompanied by politicians you choose to represent any of your countries, to tell us which places and scientific and industrial installations they would wish to see"? Who, in such a case, should be considered responsible for the failure of the enterprise?
Still more critical would be the scenario in which the Security Council, whose members are divided over the Iraqi problem, fails to come forward with a resolution altogether. Bush has already dismissed Iraq's offer to allow the inspectors to return as nothing more than a tactical "ploy to delay tougher measures". According to the US president, efforts should be concentrated on an alternative Security Council resolution that is totally unrelated to the Iraqi initiative. Obviously, a new Security Council resolution would have to be implemented by open military intervention -- either by the US alone, or in alliance with a number of other states. What will be the attitude of the Arab countries should that come to pass?
Washington is already paving the way for such a scenario. The first step was Bush's request to Congress for sweeping authority to "use all means he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region". He has also warned that "if the United Nations Security Council will not deal with the problem, the United States and some of our friends will."
The American president needs congressional approval for a possible military strike by no later than mid-October, that is, before the coming congressional elections in November. This will make it possible for the US president to implement his new security doctrine, which is a comprehensive rationale for shifting American military strategy away from the Cold War policy of containment and deterrence towards pre-emptive action against hostile states and terrorist groups suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction.
Although the new doctrine, which is presented in a 35-page document, has been thoroughly discussed within the top echelons of the Bush administration over the last few months, it is believed to have been formulated largely by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. The Iraqi crisis is the first opportunity to test the doctrine in practice.
One of the most striking elements of the new strategy document is its insistence "that the president has no intention of allowing any foreign power to catch up with the huge lead the United States has opened since the fall of the Soviet Union more than a decade ago. Our forces will be strong enough," the document states, "to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States." With Russia's severe financial straits ensuring that it can no longer come close to matching American military spending, the doctrine seems aimed at rising powers like China, which is expanding its conventional and nuclear forces. Much of the document focuses on how public diplomacy, the use of foreign aid and other international institutions can be used to win what it describes as a battle of competing values and ideas, including "a battle for the future of the Muslim world".
The new doctrine describes itself as not seeking "unilateral advantage", but rather as encouraging "free and open societies". But such an allegation contradicts the American administration's determination to remain the most powerful state on earth. Bush has often repeated since 11 September events that whoever is not on the side of the US is actually standing on the side of terrorism.
This places the Arab world before difficult choices. Throughout the last decades the Arab world has described itself as "'non-aligned", neither aligned with the East nor with the West. Now it is required to relinquish its non-aligned identity. Indeed, how, within the logic of the new American political philosophy, can any state be "non-aligned" between the mightiest state on earth and states which constitute an "axis of evil"?
The Bush doctrine raises questions to which we need to find answers. For example, what must our attitude be if Iraq is subjected to an American invasion in the near future? Should it be determined by the fact that Iraq is an Arab, Islamic state and, as such, part of the Arab system, or should we give precedence to our adherence to the global system, at the heart of which stands the United Nations? What if the Security Council authorises a military incursion into Iraq? Despite the fact that many great powers are opposed to such an eventuality, it does not follow that they will resort to veto prerogatives. What do we do then?
When Iraq invaded Kuwait just over a decade ago, many Arab countries, including Egypt, stood on the side of international legitimacy (i.e. Security Council resolutions) against the pan-Arab/Islamic legitimacy invoked by Saddam, a question of an Arab, nor a non-Arab, state invading another Arab state. Today, the reasons for which the US could be invading Iraq are not acceptable to a wide range of parties around the world, in the Western world, and even in America itself -- not only in the Arab and Islamic worlds or more generally, in the countries of the South. To what extent is considering oneself bound by "international legitimacy" justified in such a context?
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