Issue No. 607
Opinion
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10 - 16 October 2002 Issue No. 607 Opinion |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
The right to pressure
The Bush administration's intervention in the case of Egyptian democracy activist Saadeddin Ibrahim has been condemned as hypocritical and politically motivated. Neil Hicks* offers a counter argument
There has been widespread condemnation in Egypt of the Bush administration's decision to withhold supplemental foreign assistance because of the outcome of the trial of Saadeddin Ibrahim and 27 of his associates. This opposition has come not only from Egyptian government officials and government supporters, but also from independent figures, including prominent figures in the Egyptian human rights movement. Some of this opposition to the US action has been pragmatic and expedient, based on the argument that US pressure will harm rather than improve Ibrahim's situation, but much of it has been based on fundamental, substantive objections that US pressure through placing conditions on foreign assistance is illegitimate, and that any stated US concern for democracy and human rights in Egypt is insincere. It is important to remember that protests about the trial and its outcome have come from many quarters other than the US, notably from the European Union, Australia and Canada. But it is the stance of the US government that has generated the most controversy in Egypt.
On the question of tactics and expediency: Was this the right time for the administration to announce a shift in policy towards Egypt? Was this the right way of doing it? There is certainly room for people of goodwill who share common objectives, for the release of an innocent man from prison and for the advancement of human rights and democracy in Egypt, to differ. It is perhaps natural that human rights activists who ply their trade in the towers of New York and the corridors of Washington DC should see things differently from their colleagues in Egypt. It is however a much more serious matter, and one that should not be evaded or ignored, when activists who purport to be part of the same global movement striving towards common universal objectives find themselves on diametrically opposite sides of an issue that is central to their common agenda. The issue is not just one prisoner, but the fundamental question of whether the US government can ever be a positive force for advancing democracy and human rights in Egypt, and indeed throughout the world.
All the major US based human rights organisations with active programmes dealing with Egypt were involved in calling for action from the administration on the Saadeddin Ibrahim case, and have since supported the withholding of supplemental aid. To a greater or lesser extent, all US based internationally focused human rights organisations view US policy as an instrument, that if utilised in the proper manner, could or can be a force for advancing human rights. To believe otherwise would make much of what we do useless. That is not to say that US based human rights groups are uncritical of US foreign policy and its often negative impact on human rights conditions around the world. On the contrary, such groups have played an important role in exposing US involvement in violations, and in mobilising US opinion to bring about change. However, just because the United States has an inglorious record on human rights promotion in many parts of the world, perhaps especially so in the Arab world, it does not mean that the US has never been and could never be a positive force for human rights.
The US role in the construction of strong democracies in Western Europe and Japan after World War II, and more recently in promoting the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe after 1989, has been enormous. Such far-sighted policies have brought immense benefits to tens of millions of people. Even where human rights promotion and democratisation has made less progress, the US government's declared commitment to human rights and democracy, and perhaps most importantly the example of America's own, successful democratic form of government, remains an inspiration throughout the world. It seems perverse for human rights advocates anywhere in the world to want to distance themselves from this legacy. The American Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution are surely seminal texts in what emerged after 1948 as the contemporary system of international human rights treaties and mechanisms. That US policy sometimes, or even often, falls short of these high ideals at home and abroad does not detract from their validity. Ultimately, one has to question where a critique that sees no possible good ever coming from US policy leads to? Isn't its logical conclusion a kind of nihilistic anti-Americanism shared by Osama Bin Laden and his followers?
The specific question of US foreign assistance raises other sensitivities. It is, of course, a reflection of inequitable distribution of global resources that one country should be recipient and the other the donor of substantial sums of financial assistance. By definition, this is not a relationship of equal powers. It is not surprising that many people in Egypt should resent the US threatening to exert its power to influence Egyptian policy on human rights, or on any other issue. Such a relationship of dependency has uncomfortable echoes from the not so distant colonial past.
On the other hand, respect for human rights is a shared objective of the United States and Egypt. Moreover, in addition to Egypt's international obligations as a State Party to numerous international human rights treaties, the Egyptian government has negotiated numerous bilateral agreements with the United States government in which the promotion of democracy, the strengthening of civil society and the protection of human rights are identified as common goals. Many of these bilateral agreements have arisen in the context of the US foreign assistance programme. For example, the 1999 10-year strategic plan (1999--2009) for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Egypt, entitled "Advancing the Partnership", identifies strengthening participation and civil society as a strategic objective. Seen in this light, it appears odd that Egyptians who are supporters of democratisation and human rights should object to the US government using its aid relationship to seek to advance commonly agreed upon objectives.
Consider the following analogy: If US foreign assistance was being used to build a bridge, and the bridge was poorly designed and likely to collapse, then Egyptian engineers would complain and tell the US donors that their money was going to waste. The US donors would listen to these complaints, and would tell the contractor: "either make improvements in the design, or we will have to withdraw our support." Such an exchange would serve everyone's interest. There can be little doubt that the prosecution and imprisonment of Saadeddin Ibrahim has been deeply damaging to independent non- governmental organisations in Egypt. Several human rights organisations, for example, have cut back on their acceptance of foreign funding, and on the programmes which it supported, for fear of being prosecuted for "receiving foreign funds without permission". Observing this damage to the common objective of "strengthening civil society", why is the US government not entitled, after years of getting nowhere with quiet diplomacy, to show its concern by threatening to withhold foreign assistance? After all, one of the mutually agreed upon purposes of this assistance, strengthening civil society, has been greatly impaired by this case.
It appears that the level of distrust of US motives runs deep among some critics of the shift towards linkage. They state that the US is not interested in a democratic mechanism that might produce an anti-American outcome. Therefore, the argument goes, the US is only interested in a kind of sham democracy with controlled results producing a leadership supportive of US security interests. This argument is the mirror image of the one often heard in the West that Arab/Muslim societies are unsuited to democracy, and that if there were to be free elections then radical anti-Western extremists would come to power. The result of these two complementary arguments is the same: no democracy for the Arab world and adherence to the status quo for fear of what might replace it.
It is fair to say that US policy towards its Arab allies since the end of the Cold War has held firm to this stability first formula; but since 11 September 2001 there has been a growing realisation that this type of stability is, at best, only short-lived, and may in fact be nothing more than a façade for an unsavory group of more or less illegitimate regimes that are creating nothing but economic, social and political stagnation in their societies; and, at worst, providing a breeding ground for violent extremism. This point of view is based on a belief that a lack of democracy and respect for human rights in much of the Arab world is a cause and not a symptom of domestic instability and regional conflict. Regional conflicts, and especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, according to this argument, are fueled by the democracy deficit in Arab societies. The basic premise of this argument is that Arabs and Muslims are much like people everywhere else in the world, and that given the chance they will embrace democratic freedoms and the peace and prosperity that people in other democratic societies have come to enjoy. Again, this is the kind of universalistic argument that should not be alien to local human rights advocates in the Arab world.
There are good reasons why Arab supporters of human rights and democracy may be skeptical about this argument. Firstly, US policy in the region over many decades has done little to inspire confidence that concern for the internal governance of its allies in the region is high on the list of policy priorities. Even today, when the administration is speaking more explicitly than ever before about the need for democratisation among its allies, the US government is still developing supportive relationships with deeply undemocratic governments in Central Asia and elsewhere. Secondly, with the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and the violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories, there is simply no faith in the US as an honest broker in the region. There is nothing wrong in demanding results from the US government to allay both these concerns. The US becoming a positive force for human rights and democracy in the region requires sustained and consistent engagement from the US government across a range of countries. It will take more than a one time intervention on behalf of one man. Making progress towards a just resolution in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict cannot be quietly dropped from the agenda. Nevertheless, at the same time, human rights advocates cannot afford to be cynical about official US statements promising a higher place for democracy and human rights in US policy in the region. We have waited too long, and seen too much injustice to turn our back on this glimmer of hope, however faint and uncertain it may be.
I don't know whether the Bush administration's linkage of foreign assistance to the Saadeddin Ibrahim case will prolong Dr Ibrahim's imprisonment or shorten it. Naturally, I hope he will be released tomorrow, and this whole damaging case swept aside. Whatever happens, by linking foreign assistance to a human rights issue the Bush administration has opened an important debate about the uses of US foreign assistance in Egypt. If, as has been agreed between the two governments, strengthening civil society, promoting participation and good governance are to be objectives of the programme, then it seems reasonable that we should expect progress in these areas. This will require both governments to be attentive to human rights conditions, and not to remain silent in the face of violations. The first beneficiaries of progress towards human rights and democratisation would be the Egyptian people, but the interests of both governments would also be well served.
* The writer is the director of the Human Rights Defenders' Project of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in New York.
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