Issue No. 610
Opinion
Previous issue
Site map
|
|
31 Oct. - 6 Nov. 2002 Issue No. 610 Opinion |
Current issue Previous issue Site map | |
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
Beyond stagnation
Dialogue is the key to a brighter future, argues Mona Makram-Ebeid*, but only if honesty prevails
As Washington scrambles to define a policy for "phase two" of the campaign against terror, academics, scholars, journalists and policy makers from both the US and the Arab and Islamic world met in Doha, Qatar, last week to debate "US relations with the Islamic world". This was the first time such a group of representatives from the two sides have met since 11 September 2001. Seventy participants came together for a two-day, often heated, high-level intensive dialogue, as they attempted to formulate a response to some of the profound questions that the terrorist attacks of 11 September have raised for US policy.
According to the organisers of the conference (the Saban Centre for Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution) in the wake of 11 September the US entered a new epoch, a new era in which many in the US feel a new approach towards the world is gradually coalescing, similar in means, and ends, to that which informed American foreign policy during the Cold War.
US policy is being shaped with three objectives in mind. First is the war on terrorism, which has become an all-encompassing paradigm through which both policy-makers and the American public view the world. Those who harbour terrorists, ie "rogue" states, will be targeted. Phase I targeted Al-Qa'eda; phase II will probably target Iraq and phase III will probably target those deemed to sponsor terrorism.
Linked to this war is the second determinant of US policy. Washington intends to maintain its military capacities beyond any possible challenge, and will be willing to launch pre-emptive attacks should it deem these necessary.
The third element informing policy is the promotion of freedom ie democracy, within which context it is interesting to note the divisions that exist within the US administrations between three schools of thought. The realist school, represented by Colin Powell, does not seek to remake the world in America's image. The neo-conservative (or neo- imperialists, as they are often called) want to reshape the world in the US image and promote democracy; their chief spokesman is perhaps Paul Wolfwitz. And then there are the old line conservatives, who tend to be both isolationist and interventionist, best represented by Donald Rumsfeld. The president has a foot in all three camps.
The overwhelming tragedy of the attacks of 11 September meant that business would no longer carry on as usual. No longer would hard decisions be deferred. A mandate had been given to redirect US foreign policy.
Both American and Arab participants in Doha mentioned deepening tensions between the US and the wider Islamic world and the spread of anti-American sentiment within the region as continuing violence in the Middle East hardens attitudes. Suspicion and antipathy, it was stated, plague relations even in those instances where the two sides profess common foes and common interests.
Moving on to the discussion on democratisation, it was declared that for the last few decades US policy towards the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East, has been shaped around an essential "bargain": as long as stability and other US strategic interests (ie support in the Cold War against communism and the assurance of a stable flow of energy) were met, the US was willing to support the status quo and not push for economic and political reforms within Islamic states. But after 11 September not only did American strategic interests change in response to the newly revealed terrorist threat, it began to be whispered that the autocratic governments that had previously received Washington's support had failed to live up to their side of the "bargain". US support for repressive regimes may, it was suggested, have backfired, acting, in effect, to increase the dangers the US faces. It began to be said that the majority of Islamic countries -- only one fifth of countries with Muslim majorities are democracies -- are ruled by regimes that palpably fail to represent their own people. And the result, it is argued, are high levels of repression and low levels of individual human rights in the Middle East and most Islamic states when compared to other parts of the world.
The failure of the state began to be perceived as a central problem, among its results being the fact that standards of living over the last quarter century (in terms of per capita GDP) have either fallen or remained the same in many Islamic countries. The prevailing model is more often than not a brittle regime, beset by cronyism, which provides little in the way of public goods and services. And with most Muslim countries facing growing populations and deteriorating economies, the situation is likely to worsen.
The general failings of the state reinforce a growing sense of anger, particularly among the young, educated (and often unemployed), an anger that is often directed at America as the guardian of a status quo that has failed the common Muslim. The sense of indignity daily present in the lives of ordinary citizens in the region is, furthermore, exacerbated by the Palestinian issue. And the result is fierce criticism of American double standards, certainly regarding the Palestinian issue, but also in the face of American rhetoric promoting certain principles abroad -- freedom, human rights and democracy -- when in fact what Washington is doing is cynically pursuing its own perceived national interests.
The general sense of alienation, lack of accountability, and lack of political or economic success helped create the context for the attacks of 11 September; for these reasons reform, political and economic, may now have to become an American strategic priority. Democratisation, it was argued in Doha, could resolve the problems facing the Islamic world, including the support for extremists which emanates from sectors of the population who feel disenfranchised, excluded from participation in politics, and subjected to poor governance by corrupt regimes. Democratisation might also serve, it was suggested, to help stem regional conflicts -- in the Middle East, India, and elsewhere -- which are often stoked as a means to divert internal tensions onto external issues. A push for democracy however, it was argued, would imply that the US reverse decades of policy and end the "bargain" it had struck with allied governments. Instead, a push for human rights and other principles of transparency and reform would become an integral part of the US agenda. It would become a constant issue raised in diplomatic exchanges, a subject of congressional scrutiny and a core component of US assistance programmes.
In the session entitled "Inclusion or exclusion" discussions revolved around Islamist political parties and movements, and more specifically, on whether they should be included in the system or not. The dilemma was identified as being how to push for change and democratisation and in doing so avoid the risk of offering extremists a means to power. Algeria was given as an example of how extremist tendencies might use any new openness to gain power and even hijack the system.
Many suggested that in order to circumvent the Algerian experience a culture of democracy must be established and liberal parties encouraged to project competing visions and new alternatives, as in many states Islamist political parties or movements have no clear rivals. Several participants from the Islamist world underlined that Muslim countries are hardly uniform, that Islamists (a term that was resented by many) may be either radical or moderate, political or apolitical, violent or non-violent, traditional or modernising, democratic or authoritarian. There are also liberals, formulating their own reform programmes with potentially long term consequences, as well as dozens of Islamic institutes, mostly in the West, that are developing new ideas and employing modern communications to spur debate and disseminate information. Islamist feminist movements, it was remarked, are studying the Qur'an and Islamic law (Shari'a) in order to interpret the teachings for themselves and distinguish between what their religion clearly stipulates and those traditions arbitrarily devised and enforced by patriarchal leaders.
It was suggested that US policy-makers should focus on nurturing the voices of moderation, including those liberal intellectuals, often squeezed between autocratic regimes and extremist radicals. They must be empowered to a degree where they can begin to wage their own battle for the hearts and minds of the people in the region. The importance of building a strong civil society in the Islamic world was stressed, since civil society can offer alternatives to both autocratic rule and radicalism.
In opening up a new space for local actors, positive developments might be generated from the ground level upwards, as was mentioned in the Arab Human Development Report (referred to by both participants from the West and from Arab and Muslim countries). The report identified the freedom deficit in the Arab world as one of the region's major problems, alongside the failure to empower women and to develop human resources.
It was interesting to note that participant East Asian states noted that the "sickness" prevalent in the Arab world might be characterised as too much complaining and not enough action. They offered Muslim states in East Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and others, as models that merit emulation, certainly in their adoption of participatory democracy, their guaranteeing of minority rights and their investment in education rather than bloated defence budgets. Other promising cases cited were Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco and Yemen, each of which had embarked on the road to political and social liberalisation and evolution.
While the organisers tried hard to avoid discussing the Palestinian issue and instead wanted to concentrate on Iraq, it was clear that no other issue polarises the US and the Islamic world or presents greater dilemmas to American policy than the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and the US role therein. Even participants from states thousands of miles away, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, included the situation in Palestine and Israeli brutality in all their discussions on US relations with Islam. As a result of American political and military aid to an Israel that has continued to occupy and build settlements in the West Bank, that has induced a humanitarian catastrophe in which unemployment has reached 65 per cent and 50 per cent of the Palestinian population lives on less than $2 a day, Washington is increasingly viewed as an inherently biased player against the Palestinians and, by extension, Muslims. The resulting sense of alienation, participants argued, presents a great challenge to American polices towards Muslim states and movements. It was also noted that one of the main drawbacks of Washington's blind endorsement of Israel's most extreme policies is that, in the long run, they are bad for Israel's future as a Middle East country. It can lead nowhere, and serves simply to delay the inevitable withdrawal. So why cannot the US see that a just settlement for the Palestinians remains a key weapon in the fight against terrorism? It was also noted that the administration's most recent efforts to calm the Israeli- Palestinian conflict were motivated by its own plans for "regime change" in Iraq.
Concerning Iraq the majority of participants expressed serious reservations about the hazards that any American military adventure will bring in its wake. Regime change imposed by a foreign power was viewed as a blatant example of neo- imperialism.
But perhaps the biggest questions over the impact of 11 September revolve around the delicate balance in Washington between unilateralism and multilateralism. Before 11 September concern was growing abroad about America's increasing preference for unilateral action and its scepticism towards international institutions and treaties, from the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, from the International Criminal Court to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. How significant the change has been may become clearer as the administration develops its strategy towards Iraq. Will it attempt to build an international coalition, focusing on Iraq's non-compliance with Security Council resolutions on eliminating weapons of mass destruction, before using force to overthrow Saddam Hussein?
A year after the horrendous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon American foreign policy faces a series of complex and demanding issues vis-à-vis its policy towards the Islamic world. Terrorists must be punished and terrorism certainly needs to be confronted and dealt with forcefully. But will Washington limit itself to a merely punitive agenda?
Reducing the multiple dangers facing the world to one monolithic threat is clearly a recipe that will result in the exclusive focus on threats, rather than on the strategies necessary to capitalise on opportunities. The US and its allies, clearly, have yet to learn how to address the underlying problems that make Islamic extremism appealing to a young generation, not only in the Muslim world but also in Europe and the US.
Meanwhile, Islamic intellectuals must emerge from their state of stagnation and lead the search for the democratic values latent in Islamic thought, scrutinising, in the process, the conditions within their own societies that contribute to their problems. Which is why dialogue, such as the one that took place in Qatar, must be encouraged.
* The writer, a former member of parliament, teaches political science at The American University in Cairo.
|
 |
|
|||||||||||||||||
| ARCHIVES Letter from the Editor Editorial Board Subscription Advertise! |
WEEKLY ONLINE: weekly.ahram.org.eg Updated every Thursday at 20.00 GMT, 10 pm local time weeklyweb@ahram.org.eg |
 Al-Ahram Organisation |
