How likely is war?
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses the possible scenarios for war against Iraq
Iraq's future is now in the hands of the UN weapons inspectors, as they embark on a mission the outcome of which will determine whether the United States launches a war against Iraq. Will they discover weapons of mass destruction or not? Will the methods they use to inspect sites suspected of harbouring caches of banned weapons be so sophisticated that, however well the Iraqis have concealed them, they will ultimately be unearthed? Does the final outcome depend to any extent on luck? Whatever the verdict of the inspectors only three scenarios are possible.
The first is that they fail to discover any banned weapons. This is not the most likely scenario, if only because American and British intelligence have made every possible effort to collect information from a variety of sources, including scientists who have worked in Iraq's military industry and who have defected from Iraq in the last few years. Whether this information is right or wrong, it is certainly enough to induce the inspectors to conduct their mission diligently.
In the second scenario, the inspectors do find weapons of mass destruction, but Saddam Hussein disclaims all knowledge of their existence and blames some of his subordinates for developing them behind his back. If Saddam succeeds in presenting himself as an innocent victim of deception, this would complicate the situation and make it difficult to insist on his removal.
The third scenario is the discovery by the inspectors that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or that it has revived covert programmes to develop them, and Saddam either defiantly challenges the right of the international community to disarm Iraq or cannot credibly deny his responsibility. In such a case, no one will be in a position to challenge the legitimacy of US military intervention, or accuse it of being incompatible with Security Council Resolution 1442, even if no further UN resolution is issued to confirm it.
This last scenario will mean war, especially if Saddam tries to deny the facts and especially if the evidence is such that it cannot be refuted. Actually, of the three, it is the only one whose outcome can be predicted. In the case of the first two scenarios, the outcome is an open question. But whichever of the three scenarios materialises, it might be useful to examine the factors which, irrespective of the findings of the UN weapons inspectors, can determine which is the more likely.
There is first of all the climate factor. Because of the unbearable heat in the Iraqi deserts throughout summer, a ground war is impossible from the end of March to mid-October, especially if the troops are made to wear anti-gas masks that will raise their body temperatures even more. So war is constrained by the climate agenda, irrespective of the political agenda and the possibility that war proves to be necessary during the summer period.
Then there is the political factor. Much will depend on convincing international public opinion, particularly in the West, that the weapons found, even if categorised as weapons of mass destruction, justify waging a war that is expected to cost tens of billions of dollars. Views are bound to differ in this connection, especially among the great powers which will be required to share the financial burden. Of course, the US can choose to go it alone, even in the face of strong disapproval from its allies. Security Council Resolution 1441 commits the US to engage in consultations with other Security Council members in the event Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction is confirmed, but does not require it to obtain the Council's explicit approval before attacking Iraq.
Washington's decision to go to war is thus subject to certain constraints and will not depend only on the findings of the inspectors. On the political front it will have to consult the Security Council before launching a war, a process that, though purely formal, could force it to delay its war plans, while for practical considerations it will have to bow to climatic constraints. How will these constraints affect the various possible scenarios?
When it comes to the first scenario, that of not discovering any hidden weapons at all, I do not believe the Bush administration will take the inspectors' word for granted. In any case the investigations have so far been limited to only a few of the 900 sites to be investigated. So nothing conclusive can be expected for some time, even if no weapons are discovered in the near future.
The US administration might also be betting on the fact that Saddam will find it difficult to comply with all the requirements of an extremely intrusive inspection process, especially if some of the demands made on him represent a clear infringement of Iraq's national sovereignty. This would make it easy to accuse him of not cooperating fully with the inspectors in violation of Security Council Resolution 1441. At any rate, Saddam's assertion that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction is unlikely to be confirmed by the inspectors any time soon. And even if it is Washington will not allow the Iraqi dossier to be closed that easily. Indeed, it is hard to see how the Bush administration can accept scenario one when it has declared on more than one occasion that its aim is not only to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, illegal or not, but also Saddam himself.
Then there is the second scenario in which weapons are discovered that were not included on the list Saddam is required to submit to the Security Council on 8 December pursuant to resolution 1441, but that do not, in the eyes of many states, justify waging a war, especially if Saddam uses the margin of manoeuvre available to him to deny any personal involvement in this "material breach", exactly as Arafat did when he denied all knowledge of the vessel laden with weapons that was intercepted by Israel in the Red Sea a few months ago.
It therefore appears that the most likely scenario is one version or another of the second scenario. For neither scenario one, which assumes that Saddam Hussein will succeed in establishing his complete innocence of charges that he is in possession of weapons of mass destruction, is likely, nor scenario two, which assumes that the UN inspectors will find the weapons they are looking for and that their findings can be used by Bush to justify launching an immediate attack on Iraq and exposing the region to a long, protracted situation generating tensions that will be impossible to confine to Iraq alone.
A decision will be taken concerning Iraq at a time the Palestinian problem is reaching its most critical stage and the Sudanese problem a particularly sensitive moment, in short, at a time several regional crises are coming to a head. Opening a new front in these circumstances is bound to resonate throughout the region and to further complicate already acute crises. Is this not reason enough to approach critically the various scenarios and try to optimise the chances for the least painful?
