Time for action
Egypt has stayed out of the intra-Sudanese negotiations, feeling snubbed by the Machakos sponsors. Its absence,
says Hassan Abu-Taleb*, is not helping anyone
The second round of Machakos talks between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended on 18 November with the approval of two documents. One of these establishes a cease- fire until the end of March, while the other outlines a formula for power-sharing. The coming round of talks, slated for January, will look into the distribution of oil resources, sort out property issues, create a new central bank and currency, and determine the powers given to the legislative and administrative bodies.
Needless to say, all of the above issues are open to more than one interpretation, and several ideas have already been tabled by the sponsors of the talks; namely, the Inter- governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the group of European countries known as friends of IGAD, and the United States. The ideas, particularly those concerning constitutional matters, draw upon the federal experiences of other countries. For the most part, though, they are an attempt to figure out the form of government best-suited to a country embodying as much diversity as Sudan does.
Information about the two rounds of Machakos talks suggests that mediators played an important role in formulating -- and even phrasing -- certain clauses of the agreement. The wording, notably, is at times ambiguous enough to allow for more than one interpretation.
The mediators who worked out these documents were African, European and American -- not a single Arab was involved. The formulas reached seem to be in need of extensive revision, but the room for manoeuvring is narrowing as time goes by. One is tempted to wonder: shouldn't there be a measure of Arab representation among mediators in Kenya in January? The Arab countries most involved in the developments in Sudan are Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, and Djibouti. Egypt, in particular, has some vital interests at stake in Sudan.
So far, Egypt has based its Sudan policy on three principles: Sudan's unity, a comprehensive approach to the problem, and the use of diplomatic means. All of these factors were present in the joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative, declared in August 1998.
Egypt is known to have reservations about the Machakos talks and their outcome, particularly the framework agreement signed on 20 July 2002. A primary reason for this stance is that the said agreement allows for the possibility of secession, which runs counter to Egypt's stated position. Another is that Egypt was merely invited to attend the second set of Machakos talks as an observer -- a gesture Egyptian diplomats interpreted as a snub.
Yet, aloofness is not the right policy in situations that are constantly changing, and where inaction could lead to unpleasant, and even perhaps irreversible, results. Sudan's future is being decided in exclusion of Egypt and the Arab League, and this is not an encouraging sign. Take for example the US decision to invite representatives from the Sudanese government and the SPLM for brainstorming sessions in Washington about power-sharing later this month. This in itself is an indication that aloofness is costly. Egypt, and other Arab countries, could still play a crucial part in the talks themselves, if they so choose.
Egypt does, however, have legitimate reservations about the Machakos talks. It is rightly concerned about the possibility of secession, but this is exactly why it should take part in the talks. Egyptian engagement is also important as it should begin to forge workable relations with the southerners, for it would need such relations if Sudan does ultimately split in two.
Realities are more important than reservations. When Eritrea was seeking to secede from Ethiopia, many Arab and African countries objected to the prospect, calling instead for a privileged status for the Eritrean province within the unified borders of Ethiopia. Once Mengistu's regime collapsed and the Ethiopians and Eritreans agreed to the independence of Eritrea (in May 1993) the objections became obsolete. What happened afterwards was that the Eritreans felt bitter, at least for a while, towards those Arab countries that opposed Eritrea's independence.
History must not be allowed to repeat itself. Egypt, forever concerned about its supply of Nile water, cannot afford to alienate a potential regime in south Sudan. Relations between Egypt and the southerners are good for the moment, but they may not be good enough to sustain bilateral relations if the south becomes independent.
Even if the country were to remain unified after the six- year transitional period has elapsed, it is hardly in Egypt's interest to keep its distance from the talks shaping Sudan's future. Sudan's future priorities will be affected by the ongoing talks and by the relative weight the various intermediaries assume in the process. Those absent from the talks stand to lose most, whether Sudan remains a single entity or divides into two. A similar development is now underway in Nubia -- the area has strong geographical and historical ties with Egypt, but is now obtaining assistance from foreign quarters.
Certain procedural and diplomatic matters will have to be ironed out before Egypt is admitted into the intra- Sudanese talks. This should not be a daunting task, for many Sudanese want Egypt to become part of the Machakos process, and both IGAD and the US have asked Egypt to participate. If Egypt insists on a certain modality of participation, it should start working on the matter.
Egyptian officials and academics often refer to Egypt's central role in the region, however, deeds, not discourse, are required. Sudan is passing through a critical phase in its history and Egypt should become involved. The Sudanese expect this, because Egyptian mediation would be in the interests of both southerners and northerners alike.
Egypt should reconsider its reservations about Machakos. The Arabs should be represented in the talks in order to minimise the risk of secession and active participation should replace the wait-and-see attitude we have assumed so far. Time is of the essence, as the next round of talks is due to take place in a few weeks. Egypt's failure to join the discussions would not go down well with the Sudanese, whether their country continues to be united or not.
* The writer is an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and editor-in-chief of the annual Arab Strategic Report
