Beyond impotence
How has Israel's domestic
political agenda become so subservient to Tel Aviv's regional ambitions, asks Mustafa El-Feki*
Israel, since its inception, has been adept at subsuming domestic political issues within its overall foreign policy goals and its military adventures. It has had a remarkable instinct for choosing global powers that would take it under their wings at various stages in its development, from Great Britain and France to the US. However, it has also excelled at distributing roles between the various ideological forces in its society, from the ultra religious right to the secularist left, within the framework of its alleged democracy -- "alleged" because it is based on a blatantly racist foundation -- and in the service of its regional ambitions.
Recent developments inside Israel are an extension of a dynamic that has been particularly visible since the beginning of the prospect of peace and communications between Tel Aviv and some Arab governments following the 1973 war. It is as though the Knesset has become the primary arbiter in matters of war and peace, as though the world must wait to see how Israel's domestic wrangles resolve themselves before it can expect a breakthrough towards peace. Meanwhile, the Arabs are obliged to take into account that the Israeli negotiator has his hands tied by the democratic process of his state, while their negotiators are portrayed as free agents, with an absolute remit to sign away concessions with no regard for the interplay among Arab political forces.
Today the influence of domestic Israeli politics on its policies towards the Palestinians and the Arabs is more apparent than ever. The dynamic has been especially vivid in the heated rivalry between Sharon and Netanyahu over the chairmanship of the Likud, with each vying to present himself as the toughest on the Intifada, the staunchest foe of Arafat and the most capable of securing the prolonged sympathy and support of Washington.
That Netanyahu was recently made minister of foreign affairs signals the development of a more tightly knit level of cooperation between Israel and the US, as the region moves inexorably towards conflagration over Iraq. This appointment is a prime example of how roles are allotted towards the realisation of a single aim. The American-Israeli Netanyahu speaks the language of the Zionist and pro-Israeli forces in the US. Indeed, the danger of Netanyahu resides precisely in his ability to project a charisma of statesmanship that Sharon lacks. If Sharon appeared at times confrontational towards the US Administration, Netanyahu offers a less ruffled channel of communication between Washington and Israel for the more critical times to come.
The call for early elections in Israel and the substance of the electoral campaigns provide clear suggestions of what is in store for the Palestinians and the Arabs. One of the most pressing questions Israelis are asking themselves is whether the timing of their elections might come into conflict with a potential US military strike against Iraq. That Israel would capitalise on such an attack to further its own ends in the region goes without saying. Simultaneously, domestic politics in Israel must also be seen in light of a new phase in Washington's war on terrorism in this region, the beginning of which was signaled by the disturbing attack in Yemen, by a pilotless US airplane against a group suspected of links with Al-Qa'eda.
With so much in the balance it is impossible to ignore the impact of Israeli domestic politics upon the Middle East and their ramifications throughout every Arab capital at the official and grassroots levels. We must not approach unfolding developments inside Israel as though they are purely haphazard. Rather, we must strive to perceive the design behind the changes because, if anything, events in recent months have taught that every action has a cause and every utterance a motive.
In this context it is useful to consider what might be the worst case scenario for the region, one founded on that store of cumulated mistrust and suspicion that Israel has taught us. I foresee, in the near future, a possible concurrence between a US strike against Iraq and, while world attention is focused there, a massive Israeli offensive against the Palestinians, aimed at eliminating their effective leaderships, further altering realities on the ground and unleashing the most brutal forms of aggression against civilians. The purpose of this terror is to compel the Palestinians to accept the scraps offered on the negotiating table, these being a Palestinian state, divested of arms and will, an aberrant infant whose deformities will cause it lifelong suffering and pain to all around it.
The coming months will demand the highest levels of Arab national vigilance; they are certain to bring unprecedented developments and unconventional situations. Republicans in the US are exulting over their recent parliamentary victories and the Israelis are undergoing a transition in the ruling composition that does not bode well. Indeed, it is likely that domestic politics in Israel will become an even greater determinant of its foreign policy since, in the current climate, Labour's electoral chances are slim and it appears that hawks will continue to monopolise the decision-making process for a long time to come. But then the interplay between the Israeli left and right has always functioned to produce a leadership appropriate for the season, and in view of the battle between the hawks over the leadership of Likud it is clear which season has arrived.
Why is it that the Israelis have succeeded so magnificently in placing their domestic politics so firmly at the top of the regional agenda? Is it truly because of their superior democracy, as they claim? Perhaps the claim has a certain validity, not only because Israel has been able to exploit its democratic system to advance its foreign policies, but also because it does possess a democratic form of rule, in spite of the underlying ethnic bias of the state.
I cannot help but to feel a certain envy when I watch global TV networks scrambling to cover the Israeli electoral campaigns, keeping viewers posted on up to the minute developments in, for example, the run-offs in the Likud campaigns. Initially I thought that this was due to some pro-Israeli bias in the media, an obscure need to flatter Zionist influence, until I noted that these same media gave just as much attention to the progress of democracy in the Arab world. The parliamentary elections in Egypt in 2000, for example, received considerable international media attention because they were qualitatively different to their predecessors. The recent elections in Morocco and in Bahrain also attracted interest in the global media. The issue, then, resides not in the identity of the country but rather in the existence, or nonexistence, of a democratic form of rule in that country.
One day, perhaps, we will be able to turn Arab democracy, should that long awaited day ever come, to the service of higher Arab goals and interests. That day we will be able to tell the world that the Arab people accept or reject a decision and the world will take us seriously. That day, we too will be able to play upon political, indeed, ethnic and religious, plurality to advance the common aspirations of the speakers of Arabic, regardless of ethnic origin, religious beliefs or political affiliations. Certainly, this is a future to aspire to, a dream of which we would not wish to be deprived. In that future the world will follow the democratic processes in our countries with the same intensity it does those in Israel because the results of these processes must inevitably effect the course of regional and international events. Then, too, Israel's domestic politics will no longer impose themselves so forcibly on the region while the rest of us watch and react with impotent fury.
* The writer is chairman of the foreign affairs committee at the People's Assembly.
