Open letter to the rejectionists
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed calls for an extensive inter-Arab debate along the lines of the Egyptian-sponsored Palestinian
reconciliation talks
In 1947, when the sharp East-West polarisation that came to be known as the Cold War was just beginning to take shape, Stalin came forward with an apparently strange theory. He identified the Soviet Union's main enemy not as the United States, but as the British Labour Party and its leader, Britain's then prime minister, Clement Attlee. The underlying logic of Stalin's theory was the same as the one that had led Lenin, just before the Bolshevic Revolution, to focus the main thrust of his attacks not against the Tsar but against the Cadet Party, the party of the Russian Liberal bourgeoisie. The logic in both cases was that these apparently less offensive parties, the Cadets in 1917 and the British Labour Party, a typical representative Social-Democracy, in 1947, were better equipped than any other anti- communist forces to attract the masses. As such, they represented the main obstacle in the way of a communist victory, and only by removing that obstacle would the communists succeed in isolating the capitalist enemy and paving the way for its downfall.
In a way, this logic finds its modern counterpart in the strategies of the Arab rejectionist forces, many of whom regard suicide bombings as the most effective form of struggle and the one most capable of dealing decisive blows to the enemy. In their eyes, the readiness of so many young people to sacrifice their lives for the Palestinian cause symbolises that the spirit of resistance has not been broken, despite temporary setbacks. However, this strategy raises more questions than it answers. A crucial question is whether its ultimate aim is the elimination of Israel or the attainment of some kind of modus vivendi with the Zionist state, which in turn leads to the equally crucial question of whether the elimination of Israel is a viable option, or whether the most the Arabs can realistically aspire to in the context of globalisation is to work out a form of peace with Israel, based on a degree of mutual trust, and responding to legitimate Arab demands.
These questions acquire new urgency as we stand on the threshold of a year that promises cataclysmic developments in both Iraq and Palestine and augurs ill for the entire region. Must we resign ourselves to accepting these developments as a forgone conclusion or must we, on the contrary, come up with an alternative vision to avert the doomsday scenario that seems to be heading our way with alarming rapidity? True, a peace scenario is hard to envisage in the present circumstances. America's hawkish line on Iraq is creating favourable conditions for Israel to push ahead with its policy of liquidating the Palestinian problem on a large scale. Moreover, Washington has so far failed to extract promise from Sharon not to attack Iraq in case there is a war, while Israel's Foreign Minister Netanyahu has openly declared that he opposes any such commitment, and that he rejects the roadmap Bush has drawn up for the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians. At any rate, in response to Israel's request, the whole issue has been postponed until after the Israeli elections in end January.
Still, an increase in the intensity of the conflict with Israel should not become a reason for an increase in the intensity of inter-Arab conflict. Indeed, it should do just the opposite, especially that it is in our power to overcome our differences by launching a debate to address the reasons the Arabs are so divided among themselves over issues that should bring them closer together not drive them further apart. I believe the time has come to address the issue boldly and with an open mind in an attempt to end the inter-Arab squabbling that is so detrimental to the Arab cause.
Any debate must proceed from the premise that the Arab world as a whole is gripped by a strong feeling of defeat. This is as true of the advocates of a peaceful settlement as it is of the refuseniks. The feeling of defeat makes for a sense of alienation, which in turn encourages the adoption of contradictory stands by parties whose interest lies in adopting a unified stand, with advocates of an uncompromising line on the one hand and of what is sometimes an overly flexible line on the other.
Failure encourages adopting a rejectionist line and resorting to acts of violence whenever possible. While it is true that these acts of violence are directed at the enemy and cause it to incur heavy losses, it is also true that they are extremely detrimental to the Arab side as well, if only because they perpetuate and expand a vicious cycle of more mutual violence and hatred, with no way out. Hence the need for an alternative mechanism aimed at breaking the present stalemate.
Before going any further, I would like to stress that I am in no way implying that rejectionism is necessarily negative, or that in all cases it is synonymous with the use of violence. Indeed, the forces of rejectionism could prove to be right in the long term. What I mean by rejectionism is the political trend which does not believe in a peace process (a line that finds much to justify it in the present circumstances), and which sees Israel as an alien body implanted in the region that is bound eventually to disappear. There is no reason to exclude the rejectionists from the national debate.
We need to engage the rejectionist trends in a calm and rational discussion, instead of continuing the pattern of mutual recrimination and accusations of betrayal, a pattern that can only make inter-Arab conflict more intense than conflict with any external element. With the region poised on the brink of unprecedented upheavals, with the challenge to the integrity of the Arab world as we know it coming from outside, it is ludicrous for inter-Arab differences to overshadow the Arab- Israeli conflict, or that the conflict between pan- Arab forces and Islamic forces, more generally, between the secular and religious forces, should be more intense than the conflict between Arabs and Zionists.
After the downfall of the bipolar world order, it was believed that all conflicts could -- and should -- be resolved by peaceful means. The failure to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict brought about deep frustration and anger that took the form of a second Intifada on the Palestinian side and the unprecedented popularity of super-hawk Sharon, the perpetrator of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, on the Israeli side. The replacement of hope by despair added impetus to the rejectionist logic on both sides of the confrontation line. What is now required is a way out of the deadlock.
This is extremely difficult in an environment where mutual hatred has left no room for even a modicum of mutual trust and in which the impending war with Iraq is eclipsing all other issues. However, some guidelines should be regarded as musts if the present impasse is to be overcome:
First, a more comprehensive vision of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be formulated, one going beyond the day-to-day developments on the ground to address long-term considerations and set parameters for the final status issues, in particular the Palestinian state.
Second, the active involvement of the international community is a condition precedent for moving forward towards a peaceful settlement. Relations between Israelis and Palestinians are at an all-time low, and any prospect of the two sides finding their way to a negotiated settlement without help from outside parties is extremely remote, not to say impossible. The international community can intervene to support positive initiatives as well as to prevent any negative moves that could further complicate progress towards a settlement.
Third, the same respect should be accorded to the decision-makers on either side. As the Israelis are allowed to decide who should speak in their name, so too the Palestinians should be allowed to decide who is their legitimate representative, without outside interference. Any talk of "reforming" the Palestinian Authority is an issue that should concern only the Palestinians themselves, and any decisions they make is this regard must be respected.
Fourth, efforts for inter-Palestinian reconciliation should be pursued, along the lines of the Egyptian-sponsored talks between Fatah and Hamas recently held in Cairo, and should be generalised to other Palestinian organisations. Egypt should not be the only Arab state involved in such an endeavour.
Fifth, the use of violence against non-military targets should be discontinued by both sides. Palestinian suicide bombers should stop targetting Israeli civilians, Israeli settlers should stop murdering Palestinians and the Israeli army should stop hunting down and killing Palestinian activists and scores of innocent bystanders who just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The only exception to this rule is Palestinian freedom fighters struggling to end the occupation of their land. The use of violence to end foreign occupation is consecrated by the UN Charter, which rules that all available means, including armed struggle, may legitimately be used against military occupation.
Sixth, and this might be the most important item of all, the balance of power between Israelis and Arabs depends, in the final analysis, on which of the two parties is better equipped to export the intensity of its own internal contradictions into the ranks of the other. Which of the two protagonists suffers more from internal contradictions? True, there are contradictions between Sharon and Netanyahu. And there are also contradictions between Sharon and the new Labour Party leader Mitzna. But as long as Arab parties continue a blanket policy of boycotting all Israeli factions, without discriminating between political trends which call for a peace process and those which are uncompromisingly hostile to the very notion of peace with the Arabs, there is a limit to how far inter-Israeli contradictions can go while there is no limit to how far inter-Arab contradictions can go. Can this fundamental problem be solved? How to balance between pressure on Israel through the boycott weapon, and political pressure through developing a dialogue with selected Israeli factions? These questions are at the very heart of any Arab debate, which must be conducted at the level of civil society and NGO communities before involving official governmental levels.
