Who's afraid of the US plan?
Hala Mustafa* looks beyond the controversy over the US initiative for democracy in the Arab world to the prerequisites for generating progressive change from within
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC in December, US Secretary of State Colin Powell heralded the US initiative for democracy in the Arab world. He said, "Throughout history, the countries of the Middle East have made invaluable contributions to the arts and sciences. Today, however, too many people there lack the very political and economic freedom, the empowerment of women, and modern education they need to prosper in the 21st century." Citing the 2002 Arab Human Development Report issued by the UN, he added that the peoples of the region face "a fundamental choice between 'inertia' and 'an Arab renaissance that will build a prosperous future for all Arabs'".
The initiative announced by Powell must be viewed in the context of the growing US conviction, since 11 September, that diverse economic, social, political and cultural circumstances in Arab societies are behind the growth of a political extremism that in its most virulent form not only targeted US interests abroad but, as 11 September demonstrated, also posed a direct threat to US national security. This realisation, in turn, precipitated -- according to many US officials -- a re-examination of US attitudes and policies towards the Middle East and the Arab world in particular.
In the Arab world, reactions to the initiative ran the gamut from cautious approval through mistrustful scepticism to outright objection. Such reticence emanates from a number of considerations. The initiative directly and explicitly targets domestic affairs in Arab countries, which inherently rouses many political and cultural sensitivities. Regardless of its merits or flaws, the initiative is also viewed with considerable circumspection in the context of Washington's role in the Middle East peace process, which is widely criticised for its strong pro-Israeli bias and recourse to double standards. Many believe, moreover, that Washington should focus on resolving this conflict, which increasingly threatens to spiral out of control, before addressing circumstances in Arab societies. Finally, among Arab intellectuals, fearful of an "American cultural invasion" under the new world order and globalisation, the initiative represents yet another link in the chain of attempts to impose a "foreign" culture and way of life that are inimical to the prevalent customs and traditions in Arab societies.
To be frank, while some of these reservations and suspicions are valid, others stem from political biases or ideological rigidity. To object to everything American simply because it is American is illogical and defies the rational conduct of international relations between states and societies. The rules and principles upon which the new world order is founded will not accommodate such forms of political or ideological "rupture" in the near or distant future. Naturally, this should not mean that we should ignore the fact that the US has begun to link the security of its vital interests in the Middle East with the need to promote processes of political and social change in the region.
Yet, distancing ourselves from this controversy for the moment, the demands for modernisation, democratisation, respect for human rights, the promotion of women's rights and the development of education have long formed a national prospectus in Arab societies. Indeed, these have been the sub-headings of the projects for Arab renaissance since the late 19th century. In addition, many Arab governments and regimes have adopted, without foreign pressure, various programmes for economic reform and democratic development, and most are signatories to the universal human rights accords. Egypt was and continues to be a pioneer in the Arab world for its comprehensive economic, political and social reform programme. Mubarak's project to modernise Egypt to enable it to compete effectively in the 21st century is tangible proof of the authenticity of this ambition in our country.
Consequently, there should be no reason to fear the US initiative or others like it. After all, there exists a common ground that conforms with the aspirations of many Arab governments and peoples, alike, to promote the various facets of reform, entrench the principles of rational interaction and tolerance, and eliminate the various forms and causes of extremism and violence. On this basis, it should be possible to assess the US initiative objectively in light of its applicability to Arab societies.
If the demands for expanding popular participation in government, breaching the knowledge gap, enabling women to contribute more effectively in the political and developmental processes are valid, the cultural and social environment in the Arab world remains largely incompatible with these ends. The predominant norms and modes of social relations in the Arab world are vastly different from those that prevailed in other societies, in Eastern Europe or Latin America, for example, that underwent similar processes of democratic transformation. The latter, in particular, has always been culturally closer to the West in terms of its embracing the individualism, liberalism, secularism and modernism that are at the heart of human rights and civil liberties as they evolved in the West. Most Arab societies, by contrast, are still in various phases of transition, not only with regard to democratic transformation but, more importantly, with regard to the modernisation process, itself.
As the foregoing suggests, democratisation cannot be reduced to mere institutional measures or legislation aimed at transforming one type of society into another. Rather, the process is inextricably linked with a society's culture, traditions and modes of behaviour. It follows, therefore, that any form of outside support for the process (such as the US initiative) cannot succeed unless the domestic climate is prepared for and receptive to changes, not only in the external political processes but in the substance of social and cultural values and behaviour. In other words, the chances for the US initiative to succeed do not merely depend on America's wishing it to be so.
Simultaneously, the readiness of Arab societies to promote democratisation is not merely contingent upon their acceptance of the principle of broader popular participation through periodic elections. On the contrary, it is fundamentally dependent upon the political consciousness of the majority of the citizens, who embody the true substance of democracy: the espousal of the values of individual freedoms and civil liberties, the respect for the right to choose at the political, cultural and economic levels; in short, the liberal spirit, or the democratic culture, which transcends the formal electoral process. In the absence of this dimension in Arab societies, such demands as respect for individual freedoms, the empowerment of women, freedom of thought and expression and the right to the acquisition of knowledge and education will be difficult to realise in light of certain cultural variables associated with the indigenous heritage, customs and traditions. Or, at best, such manifestations of democratic culture will remain merely a façade without having penetrated the wider society.
This gap cannot be breached overnight through partial, hastily implemented remedies. Rather, thoroughgoing democratisation requires a comprehensive vision that embraces all facets of society and is translated into practice through long- range policies, which, moreover, do not prioritise formal democratic practices at the expense of cultural modernisation and liberalisation.
Such a reconciliation between form and substance is not inconsistent with the broad outlines of the American initiative for democracy in the Arab world, nor with the attempts by many Arab governments to promote reform and development or national demands for democratisation. What it does do is take into consideration the prevalent socio-cultural circumstances of these societies and the fact that they are societies in various phases of growth and transition.
The more the citizenry is endowed with a cognizant will capable of selecting from among clear alternatives, the greater the prospects of closing the cultural gap and instilling positive values with respect to freedom and democracy. Such a will cannot be generated without giving special priority to the cultural aspects of reform in tandem with instituting the practical procedural measures. Pluralistic democracy has never arisen in societies that have not undergone a process of cultural modernisation and liberalisation.
* The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqrateya (Democracy) issued by Al- Ahram.
