Turkey and its new Islamic rulers
Can the Turkish experiment help define new rules for cooperation between Europe and the Islamic world? Asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
Turkey's bid for membership in the European Union is facing stiff opposition from influential figures on the continent. One of the most outspoken opponents, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, devoted an entire article in Le Monde to argue strenuously against Turkey's admission. His main arguments were that, unlike all the other members, Turkey is an Islamic country and that, moreover, only one fifth of its territory lies in Europe. But in the age of globalisation, geography and religion are not the only criteria which determine a country's affiliation to this or that economic bloc of states.
The issue of Turkish membership in the EU has acquired new urgency following the landslide victory scored by the Islamic Justice and Development Party (JDP) in last November's general elections. This development has introduced a wholly new dimension to the age-old problem of relations between Islam and the Christian world.
The recent period has been marked by acute tensions between Islam and the Judeo-Christian West. The events of 11 September 2001 were seen as evidence of a growing rift between the two worlds and a vindication of Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory. But dire predictions that we were entering a new stage marked by mutual hatred and clashes need to be revised in the light of the Turkish experiment, which carries the promise of an altogether different pattern of behaviour between the two worlds. Sceptics could argue that Turkey is a special case with specific characteristics that set it apart from the rest of the Islamic world. But it should be remembered that for centuries Turkey was the main bastion of Islam, its role as the keeper of the faith part of the collective memory of Muslims everywhere. For this, if for no other reason, the Turkish experiment is bound to resonate beyond its own borders.
Relations between the Arabs and Turkey since the end of World War I have been determined, not by Islam, but by the downfall of the Islamic Caliphate in Istanbul and the rise of Attaturk's secular rule on its ruins. The liberal character of the 1919 revolution in Egypt reinforced the inbuilt antipathy towards Turks throughout the Arab world after centuries of Turkish oppression. This became all the more obvious after the downfall of the monarchy in Egypt and the rise of pan-Arab nationalism, which extended to the entire Arab Nation, especially in the wake of the creation of the state of Israel.
As the Arab-Israeli conflict became more intense, especially after the Arab defeat of 1967, it became clear that Turkey, though an Islamic state, was closer to Israel than to the Arabs. Washington was quick to add Turkey to NATO. It also joined the pro-American Baghdad Pact and other Western-oriented organisations hostile to pan-Arabism.
Turkey has an Islamic culture in common with the Arabs. But it is separated from them by old animosities that go back to Ottoman rule and new animosities triggered by the pan-Arab revolution, which threatened to upset the balance of power in the region. This threat prompted Turkey's rapprochement with Israel, which it saw as a countervailing force capable of cutting the Arabs down to size. Moreover, Turkey's secularism, more especially, the secularism of its army generals, not only symbolised the army's loyalty to Attaturk's legacy and its role as the custodian of Turkey's modernisation drive, but also allowed Ankara to disregard the sensitivities of the Islamic world towards Israel and establish a special relationship with the Jewish state.
However, neither Turkey's unwavering support for the West nor its close relations with Israel were enough to ensure its acceptance as part of Europe, whose historical hostility to its erstwhile enemy is rooted in a long and bloody history. The West's attitude towards Turkey is marked by double standards. Turkey is required to be part of the West when it comes to the security system set up to defend the West's strategic interests but rejected in its bid to become part of the Western identity. Thus while Washington was keen to bring Turkey into NATO for security considerations, the European capitals are far from keen to admit it to the European Union. Washington insists that measures be taken to accelerate Turkey's admission to the EU, but the European capitals express reservations, avoid committing themselves, and, at the last EU Copenhagen summit, deferred the final decision on Turkey's membership to the end of 2004. Such double standards confront Turkey with difficult choices, especially with the Islamic Justice and Development Party in power.
The battle of the JDP to rule the country in accordance with the reformist agenda which ensured its victory at the polls will be a fierce one. Signs of this are already obvious. Its leader, Recept Tayyip Erdogan, cannot assume the office of prime minister, in his capacity as head of the majority party, because he has been convicted of sedition and banned from standing for parliament. To overcome this difficulty, the JDP, which has the necessary two thirds majority of the seats in parliament for a constitutional change, tried to introduce amendments to the constitution, but the head of state, Ahmed Necdet Sezer, overruled the amendments on the grounds that they were designed to serve the interests of one particular individual! However, he was forced to back down after a respected professor from Ankara University, known for his strong secular convictions, was assassinated. The Turkish press is unanimous in asserting that difficult days lie ahead.
But the future does not augur negative developments only. Take, for example, the issue of Cyprus, frozen for over a quarter of a century. After a short-lived military junta staged a coup designed to unify the island with Greece, a Turkish Cypriot republic was proclaimed in the north of the island. The new republic was recognised by no state in the world with the exception of Turkey, which, to guarantee its survival, maintains a force of 35,000 troops on the island.
Erdogan has declared: "I do not favour Turkey's policy towards Cyprus throughout the last 30 years. We will do what we have to on this issue. This is not a question that only concerns Denktash" (the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, who is now dragging his feet on talks for the reunification of the island). Erdogan made these statements in the aftermath of a mass demonstration that grouped 30,000 Turkish Cypriots calling for the resignation of Denktash, and for the integration of the northern part of Cyprus into the European Union.
But Turkish and Greek Cypriots failed to settle their difference at the Copenhagen summit. This was no surprise, if only because settling that issue was the main card the Turkish Cypriots hold to induce the EU to speed up the process of Turkey's integration into Europe. During the summit, the participants called on the two sides to settle their differences before 28 February, failing which only the Greek part of Cyprus would be admitted to the EU. They also urged Denktash to begin negotiations on this matter without delay. Will the latter respond or take advantage of the opposition still exhibited by given quarters in Turkey's institutions against the party now enjoying overwhelming support among the masses?
Then there is the issue of the Kurds and the unresolved problems in Turkish-Kurdish relations, rendered even more acute since the abduction of Kurdish leader Occalan and the death sentence passed against him. True, the sentence has not been carried out and is not expected to take place if Turkey is successful in its bid to join the EU, which has abolished the death sentence in all European countries. Will Erdogan take positive steps to break the impasse by responding to Occalan's call for a negotiated settlement based on the renunciation of violence by the Kurdish side in exchange for some form of Kurdish autonomy? If so, moderate Islamists in Turkey will have resolved two issues impeding Turkey's ability to cope with the requirements of the modern world and frustrating its efforts to join Europe: the issues of Cyprus and of the Kurds.
But what is the scope of manoeuvre available to the government formed by a moderate Islamic party like the JDP to adopt a peaceful line in a regional environment where unprecedented measures are being taken in preparation for a war against Iraq? Can Erdogan resist Washington's pressures for Turkey to play an important role in that war? And assuming he can't, is he in a position to implement any of the reforms he promised to introduce?
At a time tensions between Islam and the West are running high, and with the region poised on the brink of a war with unforeseen consequences, the significance of an Islamic party in power that seems determined to address explosive problems in a peaceful manner cannot be overstated. Even if Turkey is an atypical Muslim country, even if it has specific characteristics not shred by other Islamic states, its current experiment with democracy is a beacon of light in a dark landscape. What is happening in Turkey today stands as a denial of the 'clash of civilisations'. The rules governing relations between the European Union and the Islamic world are still in the making. The Turkish experiment can do much to suggest positive ideas in this connection.
