The burden of truth
Who's to produce the smoking gun? Ayman El-Amir* explains how Iraq is guilty until proven guilty
The United Nations Security Council is bracing itself for tough political wrangling when it receives the report of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) -- scheduled to arrive on its doorstep on 27 January. Under the terms of Security Council resolution 1441, UNMOVIC is required to update the council on the findings of its search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, and the extent of Iraqi cooperation with its mandated investigation.
So far, UNMOVIC does not seem to have found hard evidence of such weapons, nor does it appear to have reached a final conclusion about its investigation. However, it had apparently made significant progress in eliciting Iraqi cooperation when General Amer Al-Saadi, Iraq's chief scientific adviser, announced on Monday a 10-point programme to enhance cooperation with UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Consequently, the majority of the Security Council's members are not inclined to hand down a guilty verdict. Only the United States has -- in advance -- found Iraq guilty as charged, and is threatening military action -- unilaterally if necessary. The Security Council, accordingly, finds itself in the uncomfortable position of being caught between the US's eagerness for a war and not actually having discovered evidence of Iraq's guilt. As a result, it may opt to issue an ultimatum that would win the inspectors more time, which would have the effect of appeasing the US and heightening the pressure on Iraq.
After the eight-week-long fruitless search for the "smoking gun" that would condemn Iraq, UNMOVIC and the IAEA seem to have changed tactics -- clearly under US pressure. The initial assumption was that Security Council Resolution 1441 apportioned the burden of proof equally to both the Gulf country and UNMOVIC. Hence, it was Iraq's responsibility to unveil its suspected caches of WMD, and UNMOVIC's role to "monitor, inspect and verify" the destruction of those weapons. In their daily barrage of statements -- which seemed unusual for such a sensitive mission -- the directors of UNMOVIC and IAEA, Hans Blix and Mohamed El-Baradei, respectively, have recently shifted the entire burden of proof squarely onto the shoulders of Iraq. Blix has acknowledged that while the Iraqis have guaranteed UNMOVIC "prompt access" to an estimated 200 inspection sites so far, they needed to be "proactive" in their cooperation. UNMOVIC did not have "evidence of weapons of mass destruction", but had questions about them, Blix said, warning that a lack of cooperation would not serve the interests of Iraq. El- Baradei said the Iraqis' "frame of mind is not helpful" and asked them "to change gear". The pressure, then, is accelerating, and, if General Al-Saadi's statement is any indication, it seems to be working.
On the US side, senior administration officials raised the stakes. President Bush's National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made the shift of the onus even clearer when she stated on a Sunday television show: "The question is not if the inspectors have found something, the question is if Iraq is willing to disarm." Similarly, Secretary of State Colin Powell, preempting any ambivalence that UNMOVIC's report may indicate, emphatically stated, "by the end of the month [January], it will be convincingly proven that Iraq is not cooperating with UNMOVIC" -- a veiled threat of recourse to force.
Hence, Iraq is under pressure to come forward with the smoking gun that the inspectors have so far failed to uncover, while the inspectors need more time to complete their mission.
As US war preparations against Iraq move into high gear, and the inspectors work to fulfill their mandate, the international community faces the agonising question of whether the purpose of UNMOVIC is to disarm Iraq or to topple its president. US strategy suggests that a change of regime in Iraq would also rid it of WMD, while at the same time reshape the Middle East in US interests.
Other members of the Security Council, including many US allies, seem to disagree. They consider that the purpose of Resolution 1441 is to disarm Iraq -- not to remove or send into exile President Saddam Hussein. Blix's European tour last week, during which he met French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, was directed at winning the support of the two permanent members of the Security Council for more patience while UNMOVIC and IAEA continue their work. In the meantime, though, the hawkish administration of President Bush is not only impatient, but also gives the appearance of being trigger-happy.
Two opposing positions seem to be coalescing within the Security Council on the eve of the submission of UNMOVIC's report. For the majority, the discovery of empty chemical warheads and some documents dealing with research on laser technology found at the home of an Iraqi scientist are signs that the inspection process is effective and, therefore, more time is needed. However, an extended inspection schedule, and indications that Iraq is being increasingly forthcoming regarding cooperation with the inspectors, undermines the US rationale for war. It slows the momentum for the use of force and strengthens the anti-war coalition -- both at the official level and within the grassroots movement.
In Washington, US Senator Dianne Feinstein, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has recently stated that it is critical for the US's international standing that it receives the support of the Security Council should it decide to go to war against Iraq. She added, "There has been no evidence that Iraq poses a threat to the US or that it is linked to Al-Qa'eda." Anti- war demonstrations in many Arab and international capitals last weekend, including in Washington, seem to corroborate public opinion surveys that indicate that at least 75 per cent of the German and the French populations, among other Europeans, oppose war. The outcome of Turkey's call for a conference of regional powers in Istanbul on 23 January to work out a peaceful solution, and its reluctance to offer the full extent of military support required by the US to launch an attack against Iraq, are significant factors that will have an impact on Security Council deliberations.
The rising anti-war sentiment has not been lost on senior members of the Bush administration. Not surprisingly, then, they used last weekend's television interview shows both to raise the stakes of war against Iraq and, at the same time, offer President Saddam Hussein the carrot of an escape hatch. They also sounded an urgent note with respect to the deadline for the mission of UNMOVIC/IAEA -- a sentiment that was echoed by the directors of both organisations. In this tense atmosphere, the Security Council is unlikely to authorise military action, but instead will tighten the noose on Iraq. The US will then be faced with the difficult choice of siding with the international consensus on disarming the Gulf country or pursuing its own agenda of ousting Saddam.
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The writer is a former correspondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
