Before war is declared
Is there still time to avoid the worst-case scenario, not only for Iraq, but also for Palestine, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
If the Bush administration carries through its threat to resolve the Iraqi 'problem' by force of arms this will have dangerous, and unpredictable, repercussions throughout the entire region. With the shift in focus one of the main victims of the political fallout will be the Palestinian issue, which will be exposed to all-out liquidation. Moreover, a military conflagration in the region will only increase the feelings of resentment and helplessness that drive people to acts of desperation; that is, instead of containing terrorism, it will lead to even more violent terrorist acts. With the Middle East poised on the brink of an abyss every effort should be made to come up with damage-control scenarios, with special emphasis on protecting the Palestinian problem against the fallout from the Iraqi problem.
That issue is the main focus of talks between a delegation from the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA), currently visiting Paris and Brussels, and members of similar French and Belgium organisations. The Egyptian delegation, of which I am a member, is discussing with their European counterparts where Europe stands at this decisive moment. It is clear that the European Union has begun to distance itself from Washington's war preparations against Iraq. It has spoken out against military intervention that is not backed by conclusive evidence that Iraq has violated Security Council resolutions. Without the discovery by UN inspectors of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq the Europeans have stated clearly that they will not support military operations, especially since Washington refuses to share the evidence it claims to have gathered from its own intelligence source with its European allies.
There is no objective reason for the Iraqi problem to enjoy priority over the Palestinian. The only reason it has acquired such prominence is purely subjective, an arbitrary decision by George Bush to make it the top item on America's foreign policy agenda to serve the requirements of his confrontation with terrorism, and his contention that a number of 'rogue' states are a source of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist groups. There is no local, Middle Eastern reason to put Iraq before Palestine, when everybody agrees that the Palestinian problem is at the very heart of conflict in the region.
This is why the London Conference proposed by Tony Blair is important. It is not because it is devoid of defects, notably the fact that it concentrates fundamentally on reforming the Palestinian Authority, as if what is really behind Palestinian reform is to better adapt Palestinian institutions to the requirements of the Iraqi problem, while it is the very opposite that should be reaffirmed. The Palestinian problem should be regarded as the normal door into the problems of the region, not become a marginalised issue so that more attention is devoted to other agendas.
Moreover, the issue of reform should not be confused with that of having Arafat replaced by somebody else at the head of the Palestinian Authority, a decision only the Palestinians themselves are qualified to make. Cairo is now trying to pave the way for various Palestinian factions to get together and participate in a wide debate. The process, which began with talks between Fatah and Hamas, has now extended to include other organisations.
An unexpected step aimed at regenerating interest in the Palestinian issue was the recent London Conference. Although the Israeli authorities prevented the Palestinian delegation from attending in person following the latest Tel Aviv bombing, forcing them to participate through video-phones linked up to the conference hall, this did not detract from the symbolic significance of the conference. On the one hand, it served to remind the world that Iraq is not the only issue on the international agenda; on the other, it was the brainchild of Tony Blair, usually considered Bush's closest ally. In coming up with this initiative Blair is signalling to Bush that he is in no hurry to go to war against Iraq. The American president is thus becoming increasingly isolated as he continues to insist on the war option, at least as long as no further evidence of Iraq's weapons programme comes to light.
Arab parties too have a role to play in preventing the marginalisation of the Palestinian problem. There is considerable room for Arab-European cooperation in this regard. Egypt is furnishing efforts to promote inter-Palestinian talks; the London talks aim at resurrecting the moribund peace process. If these efforts succeed in bringing about a resumption of peace negotiations, instead of allowing frustration, despair and anger to take over, they can do much to suppress the reasons standing behind the proliferation of violence and the spiral of terror and counter-terror.
But the procedural aspects alone are not sufficient. A substantive gain for the Palestinians must be on the cards if they are to restore hope and confidence in the future, specifically on the central issue of the Palestinian state. With the exception of Netanyahu and Israel's super-hawks no party opposes the right of the Palestinians to a state of their own. In practice, however, the denial of this right is by no means limited to the hawks.
Although Bush announced the need for a Palestinian state after the events of 11 September the decision is said to have been taken shortly before the events, thus suggesting the absence of causality between that day and the announcement. But whatever the truth it does not seem that anything more than an announcement was ever contemplated. There is a clear discrepancy between the absence of any effective steps to turn the slogan of a Palestinian state into reality and the way measures for the implementation of war against Iraq have moved forward. Obviously the slogan was launched only as a sop to Arab sensibilities at a time Bush needed to neutralise any potential opposition to his all-out war on Bin Laden and Al-Qa'eda.
That was Bush's plan at the time. But it was not Sharon's who, from the start, wanted to link Arafat to Bin Laden, describing the Palestinian leader as the "Bin Laden of the Middle East".
Washington is still paying lip service to the slogan of the Palestinian state, even if it is doing nothing to bring it into being. On the question of Arafat Bush's stand is now practically indistinguishable from Sharon's. The whole Palestinian issue is now caught up in a diabolical game that is being played out between Sharon, on the one hand, and the Palestinian rejectionists on the other. Irreconcilable enemies from the subjective point of view, from an objective viewpoint they serve the same purpose, in the sense that both categorically oppose peace and are bent on systematically sabotaging the peace process.
With any prospect of a Palestinian state extremely remote, and with the entire Middle East bracing itself for the impending war on Iraq, it is high time to ask why matters have reached this point. How true is it that America's fixation on Iraq is due to the commendable aim of eliminating weapons of mass destruction? Washington's claim that it is acting to avert the danger of a new arms race in the Middle East rings somewhat hollow in the light of its attitude towards Israel's nuclear arsenal. Surely the most effective way of ending the arms race would be for America to force Israel to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction, albeit in steps, albeit in exchange for guarantees, and under the terms of agreements the implementation of which would be made conditional on reaching a solid and permanent peace in the region. But America does not want Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. It is interested only in going after suspected caches of weapons of mass destruction held by countries that are Israel's enemies. This double standard is the main obstacle in the way of finding a real solution to the problem of weapons of mass destruction.
If not weapons of mass destruction, is it oil that stands at the heart of the problem? The only superpower in the world can hardly be expected to yield control over sources of oil, which will remain the most important source of energy for at least another half century even if alternative sources are discovered in the coming decades. Between 1940 and 1967 US companies increased their control of Middle Eastern oil from 10 per cent to close to 60 per cent, while reserves under British control decreased from 72 per cent in 1940 to 30 per cent in 1967. These figures are indicative of what we can expect in the coming decades.
And this is an issue that does not concern America alone. It explains the European Union's harsh reactions to the American hawks at a time UN inspectors have found "no smoking gun" despite their systematic inspection of suspected Iraqi sites. France and Britain insist that the decision to go to war must be based on concrete evidence of a "material breach" by Iraq as well as on a Security Council resolution. This has enraged the far right in America. A prominent American hawk accused Colin Powell of resorting to a policy of containment, of keeping Saddam Hussein in power and of extending the time- frame of the weapons inspectors' mission, thus limiting the freedom of action of the American administration. These accusations reflect Washington's displeasure with two recent initiatives. One is Turkey's call for a regional conference for the purpose of convincing Saddam to accept alternative proposals in order to avert war. The other is the visit by an EU delegation to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the aim of avoiding the outbreak of war with Iraq. Some US hawks have expressed concern that the EU delegation might eventually even consider adding Iraq to its itinerary!
