Shifting policies
Changes in the influence of extremists over the US administration will have manifold implications for the domestic political maps of several countries in the Middle East, Gamil Mattar argues
In a number of aspects of decision-making at the White House, there are clear signs that the hawks within this elite are no longer getting their way over policy to the extent that they were just one year ago. Differences within this group have become clearer, and the tone of top-level political discourse has become less intransigent. At the same time the voice of moderation is coming from the think-tanks. There are also signs of readjustment to US foreign policy where it had failed to achieve results.
I do not dismiss the idea that someone at the pinnacle of American power realised that the US's harsh, extreme and confused policies were in fact causing it to lose international respect. I suspect it was also realised that American popularity abroad had fallen below the depths plumbed prior to 9/ 11. These indicators confirm the view by American opinion makers that US foreign policy, more than that of any other country, is likely to provoke hatred abroad. The anger on the streets of South Korea shows that the arrogant tone of American discourse has created real dangers. This is particularly the case with recent American military discourse.
We in the Middle East are able to understand more than others the behaviour of the Koreans and the causes of the rising resentment on the streets of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and the Latin American states. Here I'm referring to the tone of US spokesmen and the new-style US diplomacy. This tries to impose American views with harsh, at times rude, language and by unabashed intervention in the most minute affairs of other states. In part, this new style is trying to break the monopoly over public opinion enjoyed by the ruling regime in any Arab, Muslim state.
American society is starting to overcome the shock of 9/11. I suspect that the Americans, who surpass other peoples in their ability to adapt quickly and pragmatically in their own interests, are hesitant to adopt ideological policies proclaimed by extremist forces, especially those largely at odds with the mainstream.
There are signs that religious fundamentalism in the southern states is losing its appeal. In the US, extremism has been exposed as hideous in its thinking and racist in its ambitions. It is no surprise, then, that American commentators are currently discussing the dialectic of terrorism and extremism in US foreign relations. The war on terror has created a new American consciousness that has led to greater awareness of the threat American extremists pose to US principles, the constitution and the future. There is real fear in America that if these forces continue to enjoy the protection of the governing elite and participate with it in fashioning the future, there will be a real catastrophe in the US -- and sooner than even the pessimistic expect.
The ruling elite comprises hawks educated over the past 20 years by those with a vision not only for America, but also for the rest of the world. It seems that this elite has not learned that if it pursues violence abroad, it will start a war, and in a matter of months may involve the US in a number of wars. The elite has succeeded in making war the chief instrument in foreign policy. Observers are open about their fears that these developments will lead to a succession of wars. A glance at the map of American military deployment is sufficient to see that US forces are prepared to fight in at least five regions of the globe, and are participating in at least three wars. Personally, I do not believe that the American forces, in spite of their size, will cope with entanglement in four wars simultaneously.
Nevertheless, it is certain that a change has occurred in American plans for Iraq. The shift towards delaying a full-scale war or replacing it with a sequence of mini wars intensified after the recent Korean crisis. Perhaps Iraq is fortunate that the Korean crisis erupted at this sensitive time.
If this view is correct and some change has indeed occurred among the policy extremists, what will be the effect on the policy Washington settled upon during the period of greatest extremism to pressure the Arab states and some Islamic countries to introduce political and other reforms in government and society? I know that the Americans will not go back on this policy: diplomatic, economic and military decisions are already in the test tube.
The most important factor being raised for us -- as commentators -- is that the examples being discussed in American think- tanks charged with drawing up plans for the future of the Middle East all rely on a fact discovered by American thinkers at least a year after 9/11. This is the recognition of Islam as a political force in all Arab and Islamic states. Consequently, what is important is the choice of appropriate Islamic organisations that are willing and able to deal with a polity based on pluralism or in other words, Islamist movements that accept the principle of the rotation of power.
If these views are correct, we should expect American directives -- sorry, I mean advice -- to Arab governments to intensify their efforts to end all forms of religio-political extremism. The aim is to strengthen moderate Islamist groups in the face of increasing extremism. At the same time, this will not work if such groups contain in their midst proponents of an extreme pro-secular position, since this will irritate the moderate forces prepared to work with liberal policies. In other words, the Americans will soon advance, or already have as I have been told, the necessity to create a suitable environment in every Arab and Islamic state to permit the formation of a moderate Islamist party. Perhaps these will take the form of the ruling party in Turkey or the opposition in Morocco. Whatever the case, the essential factor is that they meet with American approval, and at the same time enjoy the backing of the existing regimes while they are still in the early stages of their development prior to becoming effective and resilient political parties. The final condition with respect to these moderate movements is respect for the rule of law and moderation in all political, economic and social policy.
