Unleashing the genie
By
Isam al-Khafaji
While no one can forecast with any degree of certainty the specific form of alignments among the various segments of the Iraqi population in the immediate aftermath of an American assault, mass actions encapsulating a volatile mixture of euphoria, anxiety about the future, attempts at redressing the grave injustices of more than three decades of tyranny and the joy of practicing freedom would almost certainly be the order of the day once the Iraqi people firmly believe that Saddam's days are numbered.
Where could the violence come from? Not from an imagined "vertical" civil war pitting Shi'ites against Sunnis, or Arabs versus Kurds, but from the source of evil that has been contaminating and corrupting Iraqi society over the past decades; i.e., the highly politicised and violent social atmosphere created by the Ba'athist regime. A protest movement against the war carnage and the humiliation of the army can immediately turn into targeting the most visible symbols of authority: known collaborators with the Ba'athists, members of the countless oppression and control organs, or simply people belonging to Tikrit. In the latter case, revenge need not necessarily take a sectarian colouring. Sunni regions that have been relegated to a secondary position under the Ba'ath, such as Samarra and Dulaim, may well show signs of hatred that surpass those of Shi'as.
Whatever the degree of resistance, or lack thereof, that the Special Republican and Republican Guards, the regular armed forces, the intelligence, security, and party members would put in the face of a US invading force or an imminent revolt, and no matter how these would be eventually defeated, it is reasonable to assume that many members of these apparatuses -- in addition to a host of others like the popular army, Saddam's Fedayeen, or the Iranian Mujahidee Khalq -- would certainly keep their arms even if the new administration would issue strict orders to demilitarise the population.
As new political organisations emerge and those in exile re-establish themselves inside Iraq, they will vie to recruit many of these demobilised elements in order to impose themselves as forces to be reckoned with in the new political atmosphere. The ensuing scene may not look as chaotic as Afghanistan or civil war Lebanon, but it will entail a degree of violent friction even if an American occupation force or a hastily reformed armed force would try to force order. The assumption that newly formed organisations would be tempted to recruit armed individuals emanates from the fact that these organisations would be faced with a power vacuum in which many already armed groups will try to impose their authority through their militias. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) claims that its Badir Corps has 10,000 men under arms. The two main Kurdish parties have several thousands of Peshmergas in the process of being transformed into a Kurdish regular army. Moreover, the US Department of State is inclined to deal with these factions as essential elements in preserving order in a transitional Iraq, thus legitimising their existence.
A possible scenario is that the disbanded armed units or individuals from the Ba'athist regime would search for protection and empowerment by joining one of the newly organised parties. But unlike the post-1991 situation in Kurdistan, where the two major parties competed -- and succeeded -- to recruit the chief of tribes that had collaborated with Saddam Hussein (The Jash), the Baghdad-based organisations of a post-Saddam era would not be of equal appeal to the disbanded Ba'athist units. Because both Kurdish parties adopted a general national liberation agenda, Kurdish Jash tribes made their decisions to join one of the parties mainly along tribal and regional criteria -- that is, which party is more influential in the locality of the tribe, the political allegiance of rival tribes, tribal and regional connections with a leader of one of the parties and so on.
Assuming that the active parties in the immediate post-Saddam era would be the same ones that are in existence today, the obvious option for the ex-Saddam militias would be to join, or to show allegiance, to those organisations whose outlook, composition and leadership background is closest to theirs; namely the Iraqi National Accord (INA). One can understand then why the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an organisation with a pro-Western agenda, has been strongly lobbying with the US administration to train thousands of Iraqi expatriates under the pretext of creating a force to preserve order in the post-Saddam era. Short of an outright solid backing by an occupation force, a pro-Western agenda has an extremely little chance of ruling by the ballots in the immediate post-Saddam era. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the Iraqi supporters of such an agenda in exile would be enthusiastic to return "home" to boost the INC's political standing. Hence, only a well-trained armed militia can serve as a means for carving a share in the power for the latter organisation.
What can an American occupation force do to impose order? Not very much in the short term. Despite a probable euphoric mood among the Iraqis for getting rid of tyrannical rule and despite the possible adoption of a friendly policy by the occupation forces, an Islamic militia supported by its ex-enemies -- the nationalist remnants of the Ba'ath -- could play on an apprehensive mood to wage a "liberation war" against the "imperialist infidels".
The writer is an Iraqi academic and activist living in Holland.
