Crisis of credibility

This week the Security Council faces a serious challenge to its credibility. The way in which it deals with the Iraqi crisis will decide, once and for all, whether or not it has any continuing relevance when it comes to maintaining peace in the world or whether it will become little more than a backbench supporter of policies formulated by the US State Department.

Yesterday the Security Council was scheduled to receive evidence from US Secretary of State Colin Powell in support of Washington's claims that Baghdad is in violation of UN resolution 1441. But judging by statements that have emerged from Washington so far it would appear that Colin Powell is going to Washington armed, at most, with indicators, i.e. circumstantial evidence rather than the hard proofs Washington insists it has in its possession.

Such indicators are not what is needed at this time: rather, what is wanted is the kind of hard evidence Washington produced before the Security Council in the 1960s to demonstrate Cuban complicity in the concealment of Soviet missiles.

Powell's aim is to secure authorisation for war against Iraq. If the Security Council agrees to offer such authorisation in the absence of compelling evidence of wrong-doing on the part of Iraq, then its credibility will be left in tatters, particularly among Arab countries that have spent decades pointing to this same body's refusal to take any action to compel Israel to comply with resolutions expressing the will of the international community.

The Security Council is unlikely to pass any new resolutions on Iraq before it receives an updated report on Iraq's compliance with resolution 1441 from the senior UN arms inspectors, scheduled for 14 February. If Blix and El-Baradei declare Baghdad in full cooperation -- unlikely in view of the assessment offered in their reports of 27 January -- then the Security Council will not have to decide whether or not it wants to follow the US. The inspectors will themselves have chosen to oppose Washington. But if the inspectors opt, as they did before, for a hung verdict, then the ball is firmly in the Security Council's court.