Ballots for bullets
The Israeli elections and the likely war with Iraq are heralds of far-reaching geo-political changes, writes Ahmed Abdel-Halim*
The recent Israeli elections were characterised by three factors: electoral apathy since the results were known in advance; how the inability of either side to galvanise the electorate worked to the advantage of the tried and tested Sharon; and prevailing anxiety in Israel over policy and security together with belief in Sharon as the man with the solutions. This was accompanied by changes on the international scene, particularly in the US where the administration leans to the extreme right, that reflected upon the Israeli electorate, which cast Sharon in the mould of US President George Bush. This was reinforced by the concord between US and Israeli desires to end remaining conflicts to their satisfaction. The US seeks to complete its reshaping of the Middle East according to its vision and in its interest, while Israel seeks to settle outstanding issues connected with the Palestinians and begin the settlement of the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict in conformity with US thinking.
In this context, Israeli voters having cast their ballots in the Jewish state's 16th general elections proved that Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister for the first time two years ago, remains their leader of choice for the coming period. More significantly, the Likud Party which he leads has become the sole power holding sway over Israeli politics after 25 years of two-party politics and alternation of rule. Likud went into the elections on a clear platform and with a leader who spoke the language of strength. Sharon's army career was marked by a willingness to take risks and an acceptance of human casualties in the pursuit of important goals. This might serve to explain why loss of life within Israeli society has reached unprecedented levels during Sharon's period in office. Sharon was able to convince his supporters that achieving significant Israeli objectives to secure the place of the Jewish state in the region necessitated Israeli sacrifices.
That the Labour Party under the leadership of Avram Mitzna saw its support drop to its lowest level ever also contributed to the result. Labour's participation for a long period in the ruling coalition with Likud and in the carrying out of Sharon's policies for the last two years helped to weaken the party, caused it to lose its identity and abandon the policies last implemented by Yitzhak Rabin. The party also changed its leader very close to the elections which did not give the new leader sufficient opportunity to organise the party internally, to come up with a rounded political platform on the basis of which it could enter the elections or ready the electorate to accept the party in its new form. The final nail in the coffin was the party's attempt to weaken Likud prior to the elections by playing on the financial scandals involving Sharon and some Likud Party members and by stressing the military aspect to Mitzna and comparing him on this basis with Sharon.
Sharon and his party rapidly brought the financial scandal under control, convincing the electorate that there was no substance to it. As for the military comparison between the two leaders, it did not turn out to be in Mitzna's favour. Sharon, born in 1928, helped create the state, fought in all its wars and gained an exceptional military reputation. Mitzna on the other hand was born in 1945 and does not have a similar history. In fact he was under Sharon's command during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. He resigned from the army during this period, and was only persuaded to return to his post by the intervention of Menachem Begin, Israeli prime minister at the time. Thus, Sharon prevailed as the military figure -- as is reflected in his execution of policy -- and Likud gained support before the elections while Labour sunk to a new low.
Likud fought the elections from a position of strength, while Labour was going through a difficult period as a result of Mitzna's failure to fill the party's leadership vacuum. He was also unable to present a political programme in line with public opinion which is mostly concerned about the security issue. His solutions seemed insipid, whereas Sharon had for two years demonstrated an outstanding capacity to employ military means for political ends. Also part of the picture was Sharon's propaganda that he was in the middle of the job of providing security, and that he alone would be able to finish the task. He highlighted his international political connections, especially with the US, in contrast with Mitzna's lack of such connections. Labour's focus on Mitzna's military career and its raising of Sharon's involvement with corruption actually increased Likud's popularity to the extent that it may be able to form a pure right-wing government.
Sharon, who has up to three months to form a government, has a number of options regarding coalition partners: Likud may form a government with right-wing and religious parties, with Labour or with Shinui, the dark horse of the elections. The final form of the coalition is not only subject to internal Israeli factors; also relevant here are regional factors as represented by Arab and regional parties interested in promoting political stability in the area and international factors depending on the US position towards the Middle East and the outcome of its war with Iraq. Nevertheless, the Israeli political arena will witness new policy developments as a result of Likud's current position. Among the ideas being aired are that the Shinui Party will become the nucleus of a new political constellation which leaves Labour in the cold, or that Labour and Shinui will form a new political alliance, perhaps with some other parties. All this means that the composition of the coalition from which Sharon will form his new government has yet to be decided.
Among the reasons which prompted the Israeli people to elect Sharon and which will necessarily form the principle political axis of his government are the current Palestinian position, the agreements reached by prior Israeli governments that Sharon has reneged upon to forge a peace according to his own vision and the necessity of dealing with the Palestinian Intifada and bring it to an end. The Palestinian factor is the common thread here, a fact which underlines the importance of the Palestinian factions reaching an agreement at the meetings being held in Cairo under Egyptian stewardship. The differences between these factions are at times, however, more pronounced than those between the Palestinians and Israelis. To this must be added the situation regarding Iraq and the possible US war and Iran's new position regarding intervention in the region and its relations with Hizbullah, especially once the issue of Iraq is settled. This redoubles the responsibility the Arabs must take for new political interactions in the Middle East and internationally, and their reflection upon the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Arab- Israeli conflict in general.
There is another important matter in this regard. As a result of the Arab preoccupation with US aggression against Iraq and developments in the Palestinian and Israeli situation there are barely perceptible geo-strategic shifts, which result in geo-political shifts, slowly underway.
The most important geo-strategic changes are centred around a new trend to move the US armed forces by land, by sea and by air, new directions for deployment of US forces, changes in military alliances and the moving of US strategic, operational and tactical headquarters to the Arab region. Accompanying this are political and strategic changes for the non-Arab states in the region: the roles of Turkey, Iran and Israel have all altered. In addition there are profound changes in the role of the Arab states. The form of military alliances is changing: in addition to the old agreements with some Gulf states and the Turkish-Israeli agreement, Qatar reached a new defence agreement with the US and has become headquarters for US military operations against Iraq. In this context the geo- political importance of some states in the region has changed.
As a result of these changes there are noticeable geo-political effects, best represented by a gradual shift northwards in the political centre of gravity of the Middle East. This will become clear after the end of the US war against Iraq when a new axis will be formed relying on a new regime in Baghdad, Ankara, Israel and perhaps another state in the region. In this way the geo- political axis will move north, away from its old Cairo-Riyad alignment. A necessary result will be changes in existing political relations and alliances and accompanying changes in the Egyptian and Saudi positions together with a loss of Arab influence in coming political events for various reasons.
The Israeli elections and the war with Iraq aside, the Middle East is changing without anybody noticing. These changes demand a great deal of attention and preparations to confront them before events overtake us.
* The writer is a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
