Media shield
The contemporary media may not be able to stop the outbreak of war but it remains a force to be reckoned with, argues Awatef Abdel-Rahman*
As recent history amply illustrates the media has emerged as a powerful protector of the interests of those who control it. Studies have demonstrated that international conflicts contributed to the rise of the so-called media weapon -- one that has come to play a crucial role in tipping the balance against advocates of just causes and in favour of the aims of those who dominate the media.
But the efficacy of the media in shielding dominant interests is contingent upon the extent to which circumstances allow the media to steer public opinion in the desired direction. And contrary to the commonly held view, the relationship between information and the media is an equal one: while news and information furnished by the media works to shape public opinion the media cannot ignore the concerns and content demands of the public. When the needs of the public coincide with the orientation of the media then the media shield operates to optimum effect. This generally occurs at the beginning or end of armed conflicts, at that time when diverse forces and passions converge to compel the outbreak or cessation of hostilities. Modern instances of this are legion. Perhaps the most salient are the Algerian War of liberation, the war in Vietnam, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the Egyptian Revolution of 1919.
It is the intermediate phases of war that generally find public opinion most divided between, for example, those advocating battle until victory and those who feel their interests would best be served by an end to conflict. Inevitably the media reflects this divergence, debilitating the media shield protecting the war drive. It is also generally the case that the worst wartime atrocities occur in times of a weak and ineffective anti-war media.
Again, contrary to the general impression, sustained use of the media weapon weakens its efficacy. The media shield thrives on the coalescence of diverse and complex factors that may appear unrelated but the absence of any one of which will impede its effective development. Perhaps this dynamic is best illustrated by the Arab summit in Beirut, convened to discuss the Arab peace initiative set into motion by Saudi Arabian crown prince Abdullah Bin Abdel-Aziz. The heavy media presence surrounding what many regarded as a major shift in the Arab position failed miserably in deterring Israeli warplanes from flying intimidatingly over the Lebanese capital.
The media shield, in contrast, has proved most effective with regard to recent developments in Iraq. French and Russian efforts alone could not have restrained Washington from pressing ahead with its determination to strike Iraq with or without Security Council approval. It was the link the media created between what was happening in the corridors of international diplomacy and global and American public opinion that succeeded in compelling the US to back down. It also explains why Washington has conceded a role to the UN, so intent is it to win over domestic and foreign public opinion and to ensure the media shield operates on its side in the event of any military operation against Iraq.
The same applies to other nations: all too aware of Washington's propensity to forge ahead with its plans, as it did in Afghanistan, they have cultivated their own media shield as the only available means to counter Washington's determination to monopolise the decision to make war.
There are many illustrations of the successful use of media shields. Lebanon timed its inauguration of the Al- Wazani River project to coincide with the Francophone summit. Hundreds of international journalists and media figures were at hand to cover the 55-nation convention, effectively neutralising any Israeli threat. The media shield also proved successful in the case of the demonstration mounted by the families of those Iraqi prisoners not released under Saddam Hussein's general amnesty. Such a demonstration would have been impossible in Iraq were it not for the protective presence of hundreds of international journalists in Baghdad. That the march headed directly to the press centre reflects the demonstrators' acute awareness both of the power of the media and of their government's current sensitivity to this power.
Other instances illustrate how it is possible to capitalise on the absence of the media shield. When some 700 people were taken hostage in a theatre in Moscow, drawing widespread media attention, Israel seized the moment to invade Jenin. With international media attention focussed elsewhere the Palestinians were left exposed. Israel could press ahead with its onslaught against innocent civilians while its own media shield glossed over or covered up the atrocity that was being perpetrated.
Propitious circumstances and the justice of the cause are, in themselves, clearly not sufficient to win public sympathy. The media can just as easily manipulate information to distort a just cause as it can to promote it. It all depends on who controls the media and how expertly they use it. This gives rise to the perennial questions: Who does the media serve? Who is it that constitutes the audiences the media targets for enlightenment or deception? What sympathies does it play on to channel them towards good or propel them towards evil?
* The writer is professor of mass communication at Cairo University.
