Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (482)
The longest marathon
From October 1931 to January the following year, the Al-Ahram column "Fifty Years Ago" ran a record 50-part series dealing mainly with the Orabi Revolution. Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* examines the long-running work
Dawoud Barakat
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The word "marathon" usually refers to the long-distance event in the Olympic Games. In today's instalment of the Chronicle, however, we use the term to indicate a contest to see the length of articles appearing in Al-Ahram. By the early 1930s, the newspaper was well familiar with articles serialised over several editions, sometimes up to 10 or more. However, for a series to reach 50 instalments was a new event in the history of the newspaper and, therefore, one that merits closer inspection. True, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal's "Frankly Speaking", during his management of Al-Ahram (1957-1974), and current Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Nafie's "Calmly Speaking" extended over much longer periods. However, these were commentaries on disparate current events as they occurred rather than extensive studies on a single subject, as was the case with "Fifty years ago: The Orabi Revolution and its effect on Egypt and the world."
The author of this series was another editor-in-chief of Al- Ahram. Dawoud Barakat was born in Qaisarwan, Lebanon, in 1870. At 20, he immigrated with his family to Egypt where he worked as a teacher in Zifta and Tanta. He began his career in journalism in 1894, working first for Al-Mahrousa and then with Youssef El-Khazen in the publication of Al-Akhbar. In 1899, he joined Al-Ahram. In 1901, following the death of Bishara Taqla, the younger brother of Al-Ahram's founder, Barakat took over as editor-in-chief of the newspaper. He remained in this capacity until his death in 1933, or just a little more than a year after he published "Fifty Years Ago".
The first to draw attention to this series was Hassan Hafez in Books in Russian on Modern Egyptian History. In the course of his study, Hafez came across a work on the Orabi Revolution in Egypt, published in 1937, which included a translation into Russian of Barakat's articles. Because of the importance of these articles, as noted by the Russian scholar 70 years ago, the Centre for Contemporary Egyptian History in the Egyptian Library reproduced them in an excellent academic work whose preface includes an extensive chronicle of the Orabi Revolution to serve as a guide for readers.
This instalment of the Chronicle is dedicated to a reintroduction of Barakat's articles because they represent one trajectory of the growth and development of Al-Ahram. "Thirty years ago in Al-Ahram," as the column was called, first appeared in 1906 and continued to appear daily until 1926, at which point its name was changed to "Fifty Years Ago". Even then, Al-Ahram readers thirsted, not only for more, but for a form of vindication. For example, "Fifty years ago" of 10 June 1931, on the rivalry between indigenous Egyptians and Circassians over positions in army command, quoted the following item from a half-century earlier:
"It has been reported that there occurred among the members of the Military Board an incident that provoked grave concern. However, the rumour proved entirely false. What in fact transpired was merely that in the course of deliberations over promotions in rank, one of the members of the committee offered the suggestion that selection should be based on qualifications rather than seniority and that the commander of each division should be accorded the right to confer promotions within his division, with the final authorisation given by the minister of war. There is no truth whatsoever to rumours of unrest among the officers, among whom peace and order prevail."
While the political climate of 1881 may have dictated such prudent reporting, this was no longer the case in the early 1930s. The age of the Khedive Tawfiq had long since passed; indeed, there were no longer Circassians around for Egyptians to quarrel with. Perhaps the objectivity that could be brought to bear with the passage of time, added to the demands of the readership, is what inspired Dawoud Barakat to embark on a historical study of that period. Not that he was new to demands of historical enquiry, having produced in 1924 The Egyptian Sudan and British Political Ambitions.
Unlike most historical studies, however, it was obvious that Barakat's account of the Orabi Revolution was not completed in advance. Although some instalments appeared on successive days, it was more often the case that anywhere from three days to a week would elapse between one instalment and the next. Given that the entire series extended over 114 days, from 7 October 1931 to 29 January 1932, the average interval was three days. Evidently, too, Barakat was determined to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Orabi Revolution with precisely 50 instalments, which led him to depart on occasion from his narrative, as was the case in the eighth instalment, in which he supplied short biographies of a number of prominent figures in the revolution.
At the beginning of that instalment, appearing on 3 November 1931, Barakat himself admits to writing the articles as he went along. He relays the following short letter to the editor:
Dear Sir,
Al-Ahram has featured several articles on the Orabi Revolution to mark the 50th anniversary of that event. Readers have been following the stories with great interest and enthusiasm and most have held on to their copies. Sadly, however, Al- Ahram interrupted this series several days ago. What might the reason for this be? We had hoped to be able to continue to follow this period of history day after day, for it is both edifying and enjoyable. Is there a possibility it might resume?
Ahmed Fahmi
Barakat went on to write, by way of apology:
"Although we received this letter several days ago, we did not wish to publish it because we had pledged in our last instalment on the revolution that we would follow its developments daily."
In many of his 50 articles, Barakat relies on back editions of Al-Ahram. In the fourth instalment, for example, he cites an interview between the Al-Ahram founder, Salim Taqla, and the French foreign minister. Appearing on 20 September 1881, the interview revolved around the situation in Egypt following a major demonstration by Egyptian army officers in Abdeen Palace Square. Responding to the French minister's concern over the situation in Egypt, Taqla observed that the recent disruption "appears to have been borne of a chain reaction of events that should have been prevented from the outset". He adds, "I do not believe that the reports in the newspapers attributing these events to France, Britain and another nation are true."
In answer to another question put to him by the French foreign minister, Taqla remarked that the current cabinet, headed by Sherif Pasha, was made up of "the greatest and finest men in Egypt who are revered and trusted by the people". Here, too, the Al-Ahram founder took issue with reports in the press: "I do not agree with the contention in some newspapers that Sherif Pasha lacks sufficient initiative and resolve. The current situation requires the man's patriotism, because it is his country and because his is an honourable duty."
That Barakat frequently and effectively tapped that mine of 50-year-old editions of Al- Ahram sparks one's admiration for his serialised history of the Orabi Revolution. But what fires the enthusiasm further is his comprehensive vision, which led him to delve into subjects that received at best slight attention in other accounts of that event. He was particularly interested, for example, in the relationship between the Orabi Revolution and the Mahdi uprising in Sudan, a relationship that is still the subject of contention.
Under the headline, "The Orabi Revolution and its association with the Mahdist Revolution", he cites Samuel Baker, at one time the British governor of the Equatorial Directorate in Sudan, who was convinced that the two uprisings were in alliance and supported one another in the events that erupted "in Egypt and its Sudan". The result was that confidence in Sudan's allegiance was eroded, whereas only seven years earlier a voyager in Sudan could observe that "the authority of the khedive is firmer and more secure than in the Delta".
Barakat goes on to conclude that were it not for the fact that the two uprisings in the Nile Valley occurred simultaneously, "Britain would never have been able to attach two strings to its policy guitar, enabling it to play on the tune of economic crisis in Egypt and the tune of a political crisis in Sudan". He continues, "At the outset of the occupation, were one to remind Britain of its pledge to evacuate Egypt, it would not have been able to say, 'What about the danger of Sudan and the Sudanese?' And, were one to counter, 'But, Sudan is calm,' it would not have been able to respond, 'What about the financial crisis in Egypt?'"
Barakat was also keen to cite items from old Al-Ahram editions that added immediacy and colour to his account. In the 41st instalment, appearing on 17 January 1932, he describes Ahmed Orabi's arrival in Cairo following the defeat of Egyptian nationalist forces in the battle of Tel Al-Kabir in 1882. Under the headline, "The decisive battle in Tel Al-Kabir and Orabi's flight", Barakat writes, "On the day Orabi arrived in Cairo, processions of people, led by Sufi chiefs, had been parading through the streets since eight o'clock that morning, shouting, 'Oh kind and mighty Lord, destroy the infidel soldiers!' And from the tops of minarets the muezzins called out the news of victory and conquest sent by Abdullah Nadim [nationalist writer associated with Ahmed Orabi]. Thus, when it was announced that Orabi arrived, the rumour circulated that he was carrying the head of Admiral Seymore and that of other British commanders and senior officers, and cries of jubilation erupted, women trilled in ululation and the entire city thronged with people celebrating."
Barakat provides certain insights unavailable in other sources. Contrary to the common impression, he informs us that the British forces did not land in Alexandria after their bombardment of that city on 11 July 1882. Rather, other nations had dispatched fleets to Alexandria and it was their soldiers who disembarked in order to protect their subjects and to help put out the raging fires in the port city.
In instalment No 30, appearing in Al-Ahram of 30 December 1931, he writes that Admiral Seymore decided not to land his forces because they were too few. He was certain that had he done so they would have succeeded, "but caution prevailed". Further on he relates that American, Greek and German ships had arrived in the port on the evening of 13 July. "The Greeks and Americans expressed their ardent desire to disembark in response to Admiral Seymore's request for the assistance of foreign forces. The Russians and the French, on the other hand, asked for time to think and deliberate."
Eventually, only handfuls of foreign forces went into Alexandria, if at all. Barakat writes that no more than a few Russians entered the city to help put out the fires and only a few Germans to protect their hospital. "As for the Italians, no soldiers landed, and likewise the French." Barakat further relates a curious piece of information: the British wasted no time in forming a military tribunal to try those accused of incitement to violence and that this tribunal sentenced several Greek and Italian expatriates in Alexandria to death.
In the wake of the aborted Egyptian officers uprising and the subsequent British occupation of the country, it became inherited lore that certain supporters of Khedive Tawfiq were traitors. Notable among them was Sultan Pasha, to whom Barakat devotes his 40th instalment in an attempt to exonerate this controversial figure. Sultan Pasha was at one time a member of the Nationalist Party; at another, he sided with the khedive against the revolution, but in so doing he never believed that he was betraying his country. Indeed, his position was much the same as many others in Egypt at the time, including the owners of Al-Ahram, who faced a difficult choice. Either they support the khedive, the symbol of legitimacy, backed by a decree from the Ottoman Sultan accusing Orabi of sedition, or they side with Orabi and risk being condemned as outlaws themselves.
Barakat argues similarly. At the beginning of the nationalist movement, Sultan was chosen as head of the National Party and, when the Chamber of Deputies was created, he was appointed speaker of that parliamentary body. "However, when the nationalists had their demands met but persisted in their uprising, Sultan shifted his allegiance to the khedive." Barakat continues, "On one occasion, the officers came to him to ask him to convene the Chamber, without a royal order calling it into session, so that it could vote to depose Tawfiq. When Sultan asked the delegation whom they intended to choose as a successor, they fell silent. Aware of their ambitions, he told them to go away and agree upon a successor and then return and inform him of their decision. They departed but they did not return, as it was impossible for them to agree on a successor due to the many vying aspirants."
Barakat did not overlook the fact that Sultan had other motives for shifting his allegiances. In their attempt to win the sympathy of farmers, the Orabi officers expropriated property from the large landholders in Sharqiya and distributed it among poorer farmers. The action alienated major landowners throughout the country, most notably Sultan Pasha whose enormous holdings had earned him the sobriquet of "the king of Upper Egypt". Once the Orabists started to tamper with property, Sultan had no doubt about which side would continue to butter his bread, and he used his considerable influence to fight the rebellion.
The Al-Ahram editor-in-chief did not hesitate to use his series to attack the British occupation as is evident in the title of one of the last instalments: "Lifting the mask off British policy: Exploiting the Orabi incident". Following the defeat of the officers at Tel Al-Kabir and the entry of British forces into the Egyptian capital, London decided to retain 12,000 forces in Egypt to be paid for out of the Egyptian treasury to the tune of LE48,000 per month. "When the Supreme Porte asked Britain when it intended to evacuate those forces, it received no answer. However, London did notify the Ottoman sultan that Britain would not accept the assistance of any other nation in restoring calm to Egypt."
Soon afterwards, the British prevailed upon the khedive to dissolve the current Egyptian army and to form a new one that would be under the command of Sir Valentine Parker, a general in the Ottoman army. It was Parker's recommendation, firstly, to dismiss all Egyptian officers and appoint in their stead Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Bulgaria and, secondly, to appoint British officers to all senior positions. Fortunately, Parker was quickly replaced by another Englishman, Sir Evelyn Wood, who implemented Parker's second recommendation but not the first.
The British also sought to further their political ends through the trial of Orabi and his comrades. While on the surface one was surprised to find the British press sympathetic with the revolution, in fact, Barakat writes, Britain hoped to use the Orabi case as a policy weapon. "However, it was a weapon that they wanted to support with arguments and proof." The result, in Barakat's opinion, was that Orabi became a tool of the British, who arranged a trial in which he would be defended by a prominent British lawyer, not only to demonstrate British compassion but British authority over the Egyptian government. The editor-in-chief continues, "The Orabi affair acquired such international notoriety that a Russian woman of great status offered to marry him and a group of Americans pressed him to write a speech. Indeed, the owner of the New York Herald made a purely American offer to the Egyptian government. They would pay the 'blood price' for Orabi and transport him to the US on the condition that he write an article a week for that newspaper. Then, once this offer no longer bore fruit, the newspaper would offer him a large sum of money as a pension for the rest of his life." Although there is nothing to indicate how the Egyptian or British authorities responded to this offer, it certainly is indicative of Orabi's fame.
In any event, under the headline, "Agreement with Orabi over his trial and sentence", Barakat resumes the account of the revolutionary leader's fate. Although the British preferred to exile Orabi without a trial, Egyptian ministers Sherif and Riyad were determined to prosecute him. Ultimately, a compromise was reached: a summary trial with the verdict agreed upon in advance. Under the headline, "The performance of the pre-arranged play", Barakat relates that the trial lasted a bare three minutes and that although the court sentenced Orabi to death, the khedive immediately issued a royal pardon, revoking the sentence but condemning Orabi and his fellow defendants to exile and the expropriation of their property. According to Barakat, Orabi was delighted that instead of death he awaited exile to Ceylon. Apparently, too, he had no small say in the arrangements. Following some deliberations, it was decided that each of the exiled revolutionary leaders could be accompanied to Ceylon by his family members, a eunuch to attend to the women and a maid and nurse for the children. "However, some of the women complained that the staff was too small and refused to leave Egypt. In addition, most of the wives of the condemned had their own sources of wealth but the Egyptian government did not touch upon that issue."
In his final instalment, Barakat quotes the famous archeologist Maspero who said, "Egypt is the only nation that rises strong and vigorous from its slumber when others have proclaimed it dead and buried."
A clear example of this phenomenon was to be found at the beginning of Egypt's modern history, when Mohamed Ali salvaged the country from the internecine wars of the Mamelukes and restored its unity. "Not only did he revive its strength, he extended its power from the Taurus Mountains to the Indian Ocean and from the Persian Gulf and the equator to the borders of Libya, creating a vigorous Egyptian Arab empire the spectre of which alarmed Europe."
European colonial powers quickly conspired to eliminate that spectre. Declaring that only the British were suited to rule Egypt, the British ambassador to Istanbul alerted the Supreme Porte to the peril emanating from that quarter. Italy, which aspired to share control over Egypt with Britain and France, manoeuvred against the Egyptian ruler, while Bismarck seized the opportunity to offer Egypt to Britain in exchange for the British concession that equatorial Africa would be Germany's preserve. The Anglo-German agreement fired France's aspirations for a similar arrangement with regard to its colonies, with the result that Paris did not intervene to suppress the Orabi Revolution, leaving that task to the British alone.
Dawoud Barakat may have been guilty of exaggeration when he declared that the British occupation of Egypt, "changed world politics". What is certain is that it entrenched the partition of the Middle East and Africa among colonial powers. But he was careful to leave readers of his marathon series with the impression that, although the occupation may have pronounced Egypt dead, resurrection was just around the corner.
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
