Al-Ahram Weekly Online   27 Feb. - 5 March 2003
Issue No. 627
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Old lessons for a new world

Ayman El-Amir* urges the world community to avoid the path of least resistance

Ayman El-Amir At the critical United Nations Security Council meeting on Iraq last week, France and Germany, the standard-bearers of "old Europe", appear to have taught the new world an ancient lesson: war is an avoidable evil. Much to the chagrin of the Bush administration, the two leading European states, supported by Russia, rallied the other members of the council to oppose Washington's eager quest for a UN- sanctioned war against Iraq. What's more significant is that the three continental powers seemed to pursue a strategy that is capable of navigating what might turn out to be the new world order that has eluded the international community since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1990. If the momentum is to continue, it could mark the beginning of the erosion of the United States's unipolar hegemony that the world has endured for more than a decade. For the Arab countries that are joining the US-led war coalition, the European lesson, and the unprecedented anti- war protests that have swept the world's five continents over the weekend, offer good reason for moderation.

In confronting Iraq, the world community is divided along the lines of the Security Council debate. For the minority, led by the US, the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is the panacea that would end all evils. The majority of the international community, for whom the choice between war and peace is an agonising decision, the objective is to de-claw Iraq by ridding it of weapons of mass destruction, and thus minimise the threat it may pose to its neighbours. For both sides, there is the Anglo- American hidden agenda, driven by Israel, to control Iraq's huge oil and water resources and with them the destiny of the Middle East for decades to come. The majority opinion is that United Nations inspectors are disarming Iraq effectively and the case for war is unwarranted.

On the Arab front, the rift is even more agonising. Kuwait, which suffered the ravages of unjustified Iraqi invasion in 1990, insists in public statements that the removal of Saddam Hussein is a precondition for normalising relations with Iraq. At the other end of the spectrum, a majority of Arab countries, including Syria in particular, see the invasion and control of Iraq as a direct threat to their security, sovereignty and independence. It would be a precursor of domination of the region by Israel, who would assume the role of the US pro-consul. Between an alliance with the US and opposition to its planned conquest, Arab foreign ministers who met in Cairo this week have been at pains to find a consensus, in preparation for the extra-ordinary Arab summit that has tentatively been scheduled for the end of February.

In retrospect, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait was an unmitigated disaster for all Arab states. One of its casualties was the Arab Common Security Pact, which had been adopted in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab- Israeli war. Theoretically, it was viewed as an umbrella for the collective defence of any Arab country that might come under attack. The pact, however, was not designed to provide credible security for any Arab country against attack by another Arab country. With the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, the Arab Common Security pact collapsed, reducing the Arab League to the position of a redundant house of cards. Only the formidable international coalition that was assembled by the senior President George Bush, between August 1990 and February 1991, managed to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. The lesson was not lost on Kuwait and the rest of the Arab Gulf states: the so-called collective Arab security offered no substitute for the protection of US firepower. In 2000, the Gulf Cooperation Council's six member states agreed to form a Gulf Defence Pact. Again, reality dictated that US protection was indispensable.

For the Arab countries that have committed themselves to supporting an Anglo-American war against Iraq, there is a catch 22. By offering their territories as launching pads for the US war machine, they risk harvesting the wrath of their restive populations, who will judge them harshly. After all, the US military presence in the Gulf has been viewed by Islamist groups as a casus belli for holy war. If, on the other hand, they deny the US their support, they risk losing its protection in case one or more of them should face a showdown with a superior military power like Iran.

The present crisis in the Gulf is different from that of 1991, in that it is leading to the most unpopular war in the history of the region. A decade ago, the international community was unanimous in its resolve to evict Iraq from Kuwait, which it had illegally conquered and occupied. There was hardly a voice of dissent. Today, the case is more controversial and the agenda is certainly suspect. There is no question that the forces that the US has put together, with backstopping from some Arab countries in the Gulf and elsewhere, will deal Iraq a most devastating blow. However, there will also be serious ramifications for the entire Arab region. Caught between a rock and a hard place, the coalition's Arab partners should promptly exclude themselves from abetting an attack against another Arab country unless there is a clear and unanimous declaration of war by the Security Council.

Some recent media reports have suggested that Saudi Arabia was planning for military disengagement from the US by requesting it to withdraw its armed forces from the kingdom once the campaign against Iraq was successfully implemented. Both Saudi and US officials denied the reports. Four decades ago, during the heyday of Arab nationalism, Arab governments that hosted foreign military bases were branded by the late President Gamal Abdel-Nasser as agents of colonialism. At the time, Dhahran airbase in Saudi Arabia hosted a squadron of nuclear-armed bombers of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC). In 1963, the late King Faisal ordered the SAC squadron to evacuate the base they had maintained since the early 1950s. It was a rare example of bold leadership at a time of hard choices. Hard choices, though, are the hallmark of hardy leaders. In the present circumstances, a destructive war against Iraq appears to be the easiest of all choices.

* The writer is a former correspondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.

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