'No to war...No to tyranny'
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses recommendations put forward by Egyptian NGOs on how to face the present critical situation in the Middle East
In a petition addressed what was to have been the emergency Arab League summit called by Egypt to discuss the Iraq situation, a group of Egyptian NGOs put forward a number of recommendations that I found extremely timely and relevant. Even if in practical terms some of the proposals in the petition are difficult to implement, no one can argue with the main principles on which they are based. Moreover, the recommendations are, to the best of my knowledge, the first serious attempt to elaborate both a theoretical and a practical vision of what should be done to face the danger of a devastating war against Iraq. As such, they could become the point of departure for a meaningful Arab debate on the issue.
The premise from which the recommendations proceed is the total rejection and complete condemnation of the plans aimed at launching a war against Iraq. The recommendations are firmly opposed to the American stand, which violates a rule established since the end of the bipolar world order holding that all conflicts can -- and must -- be resolved by peaceful means. The first recommendation rejects "the American threat to forcibly overthrow the Iraqi regime", on the grounds that such an act will set a dangerous precedent in international relations. The most salient, and regrettable, feature of the Bush administration's approach to the Iraq problem is its insistence on resorting to military force before exhausting all other options.
The recommendations require not only the American side to abandon one of the pillars on which the current administration's policies rest, but are equally critical of the policies of the Iraqi regime. The second recommendation talks openly of the suffering of the Iraqi people "under three decades of tyranny" and the huge sacrifices made by millions of Iraqis who were forced into two wars that exhausted Iraq's natural and human resources. Warning that its failure to introduce radical reforms to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people would reinforce justification for foreign intervention, the second recommendation calls on Iraq to promptly adopt a serious programme for radical political reform which would launch a new political dynamic and open the door to effective national reconciliation.
To that end, the same recommendation calls for the abrogation of repressive laws curtailing civil liberties, for the invalidation of laws targeting opponents of the regime and for the lifting of constraints on freedom of expression, on the right of association, on membership in political parties and on free participation in public affairs. It urges the Iraqi regime to end its monopoly of political and trade-union activities, to abandon its policies of isolation and exclusion, respect pluralism, safeguard the legitimate national rights of the Kurds, reject political sectarianism and accelerate the establishment of the rule of law and of principles of equity and justice that reflect genuine political ethnic, cultural and religious diversity.
Finally, the second recommendation calls upon the Arab League to take the initiative in pushing for the necessary reforms by hosting a meeting of all Iraqi political forces, whether from inside or outside the political elite, or from within or outside Iraq, to lay down the required basis and essential guarantees that could clear the way for free and fair elections under the supervision of the United Nations, in participation with the Arab League and the European Union, to enable the Iraqi people to freely choose their ruler.
Thus in calling for political reforms in Iraq, the recommendation does not address only the Iraqi regime, but contemplates a role for the Arab league, as the embodiment of the collective Arab will that is required to actively engage in the process. Unfortunately, this will remain a pipe dream as long as the Arab world continues to be as divided as it now is on the issue of Iraq, with some states providing America's war machine with military facilities and others denouncing its war plans. This inability to stand united in face of what is clearly a threat to the Arab world in its entirety is the main reason why Arab foreign ministers were unable to agree on a date for the emergency summit proposed by Egypt. Many Arab leaders feared that the disarray in Arab ranks would be even worse after the summit, as was the case following the summit held in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Moreover, the recommendation assumes that a reconciliation is possible between the Iraqis themselves, between political forces inside the country and those based abroad. Indeed, it assumes not only that a coalition of Iraqi political forces can emerge but that it can be stronger than Saddam's determination to maintain his iron grip on the reins of power and to deal ruthlessly with any hint of dissent. It is hard to see how the Arab order can, in its present fragmented state, initiate a process that will unleash a new political dynamic conducive to the emergence of such a coalition.
Finally, it assumes that these developments -- the forging of a common Arab stand and a national Iraqi reconciliation -- can be crowned by free and fair elections, both legislative and presidential, in Iraq. How realistic is this assumption given the veritable arsenal of anti-democratic laws and practices in Iraq today?
These three proposals stand at the heart of the NGOs' recommendations. The problem is that their commendable effort to come up with a plan of action for the Arabs in general and the Iraqis in particular at this critical juncture depends on the emergence of a political will to put it into effect. Can Arab intellectuals, supported by the Arab street, become a catalyst for the required change?
The third recommendation affirms that the elimination of weapons of mass destruction is a process that should be governed by a single, uniform criterion applicable to all states without discrimination. It calls on the international community to redouble efforts to oblige all states, including Israel, to ratify the non-proliferation treaty and to submit to international inspections. At the same time, it warns the Iraqi government that it cannot hope to avert war unless it raises the level of its cooperation with the UN inspectors and makes a serious effort to bridge the contested gaps referred to in their previous reports.
The fourth recommendation contrasts the strong anti-war protests staged by global civil society with the virtual absence of any popular manifestations of anti-war sentiment in the Arab street. Describing the mass demonstrations which erupted in cities all over the world on 15 February, and in which an estimated 110 million participants took part, as a "worldwide popular intifada", it urges Arab governments to lift all restrictions on mass demonstrations in the streets of their respective countries so that the Arab people can express their support for the anti-war movement. The recommendation considers it "shameful" that the Arab world represents the weakest link in the anti-war movement, while the strongest opposition to America's war plans is coming from civil society in countries in the pro-war camp, notably Britain, Spain, Italy and the United States itself.
The fifth, and last, recommendation warns that the Arab regional system is threatened with total collapse unless the Arabs rise above their traditional differences and unite in their commitment to deny the use of their facilities and resources by forces planning an invasion of Iraq, "even if the invasion is launched under the aegis of the United Nations and the Security Council". This last point is of particular significance at a time the Bush administration is hell-bent on pushing through a second Security Council resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq. To that end, it is not averse to using arm-twisting tactics on Council members, especially those with veto powers, to secure the nine votes needed for the adoption of a resolution that will endow its war on Iraq with "international legitimacy".
However, Washington has made it clear that even if passage of the resolution is blocked, it will push ahead with its war plans. The implications of a unilateral American attack on Iraq, based on its reading of Resolution 1441, would be disastrous for the United Nations. It would destroy the international organisation as the ultimate arbiter of intractable international disputes and deal a death blow to the very notion of international legitimacy. Indeed, it would mark the end of the world system as we have known it since 1945.
At this decisive moment, the main principles on which the Egyptian NGOs' recommendations are based can provide useful guidelines not only for a way out of the present impasse but also for the definition of international legitimacy. The first principle is that all conflicts can -- and must -- be resolved by peaceful means, war being a last resort to be avoided until all other conflict-resolution methods have been exhausted. The second is that the peaceful resolution of any conflict entails replacing despotism, tyranny and repression by democracy, transparency and openness. The third is that regional problems are interrelated and indivisible. Thus no real solution of the Iraqi problem can be envisaged without a solution of the Palestinian problem. Unfortunately, the link between the two problems is likely to manifest itself all too clearly in the event of a war, which will provide Israel with an ideal opportunity to launch a massive onslaught on the Palestinians in preparation for the total liquidation of the Palestinian problem.
