End of the Arab order?
Will the Arab region withstand the crises it is currently facing? Hassan Nafaa* explores its past and current predicaments
Since its founding in 1945, the Arab League encountered several crises that imperilled its existence. In 1948, Israel occupied most of Palestine and transformed the majority of Palestinians into refugees. Then, in 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the Golan Heights and the rest of Palestine. Egypt had its membership in the Arab League frozen in 1979 following its unilateral conclusion of a peace agreement with Israel. Then, following Iraq's criminal invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US was able to destroy Iraq, impose a blockade on its people, sap the wealth of the Gulf and establish military bases in the region. Despite the repercussions of all these events, the Arab order demonstrated considerable resilience. Whether it will be able to withstand the challenges it currently faces is an open question.
Three major crises have converged on the Arab world at once, jeopardising the future of Iraq, Palestine and Arab- Islamic culture as a whole. Iraq, today, faces destruction and the possibility of direct occupation; the Palestinians' cause has been marginalised. Meanwhile, Arab-Islamic culture is no longer just the object of a campaign of distortion and vilification, but of an offensive to change or break it at gunpoint. Moreover, these three crises appear so intertwined as to have melded into a massive crisis that threatens to overwhelm the Arab order and tear it from its foundations.
Although each of the crises originated at different times, their diverse currents have fed into a single raging torrent, and it is important to understand the mechanisms that brought this about. Arab-Islamic culture has been under assault for centuries -- perhaps since the Ottoman occupation of portions of Europe. Palestine has been progressively raped since the birth of the Zionist movement at the turn of the 20th century. The Iraqi people have been reeling under sanctions now for just over a decade. The disparity in the starting points of these crises might be taken as proof that they have such divergent causes and motivating factors as to obviate an attempt to lump them together as variations on a theme. However, a discerning observer can easily detect the fine thread that connects what appear to be disparate beads into a harmonious necklace. That thread can be found in the events of 11 September.
Fate destined -- or perhaps it was not all that coincidental -- that the horror of 11 September occurred only months after the most conservative administration in US history reached power and within months of the "election" of a war criminal as Israeli prime minister. The coincidence of these two leaderships helped eliminate any obstacles that had prevented the US and Israel from reaching full conformity in their vision for a "new" Middle East. Of course, the US has always been unreservedly pro-Israeli. However, US-Israeli relations underwent a profound and unprecedented transformation with the arrival of Bush junior to the White House at the head of a team consisting of a number of fundamentalist Christians who subscribe to the belief that the realisation of Greater Israel is a prerequisite for the return of Christ. For the first time in the history of US-Israeli relations, the US administration's attitudes toward Israel were governed by creed rather than pragmatism. Given the presence of an ultra-right Israeli government that believes absolutely in creating Greater Israel, it was natural that the visions of Washington and Tel Aviv would converge and that the policies of the former would be subordinated to those of the latter.
Against this backdrop, the most fanatical and most pro- Israeli political forces in the US succeeded in exploiting the events of 11 September to compel the US administration to adopt a Middle East policy relying on the following premises. First, the attacks were the product of the cultural-political situation in the Arab world, which is characterised by endemic despotism and corruption. To forestall a repeat of 11 September required a radical long-term remedy.
Second, the remedy should be administered to all Arab countries -- including those claiming to be on friendly terms with the US. Heading the list, here, are Egypt and Saudi Arabia, considered breeding grounds for terrorism because all 19 alleged perpetrators of 11 September were Arab Muslims, of whom 15 were from Saudi Arabia and one from Egypt.
Third, this remedy will not be effective until all paramilitary organisations espousing an Islamist ideology, in general, and fundamentalist beliefs, in particular, are eliminated. They are, without distinction, terrorist organisations that kill civilians. There are no shades of difference between them, whether they call themselves Al-Qa'eda, Hamas, the Palestinian Jihad or Hizbullah, and whether or not they hide behind the banner of resistance against Israeli occupation.
On the basis of these tendentious and easily refutable premises, the proponents of the US's new Middle East philosophy figured that the best way to implement it was to invade and occupy Iraq for a limited period. After all, toppling Saddam was an objective that some Arab regimes would welcome and might even be willing to participate in realising. Disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, which it should have destroyed under UN Security Council resolutions, would furnish the necessary pretext for obtaining the gloss of international legitimacy for a military campaign leading to direct occupation. This, in turn, was to pave the way for change throughout the region via a sort of domino effect. Once Washington is in place in Baghdad, Israel could proceed to eliminate the "terrorist" organisations in Palestine and Lebanon, while US forces in Iraq could keep Syria and Iran at bay should they attempt to intervene on behalf of those organisations. Indeed, Washington may well welcome any such action on the part of Tehran or Damascus, for it would serve as a pretext to effect regime change in those countries as well. Meanwhile, Iraq, a major Arab country with abundant natural and human resources and a unique ethnic and confessional configuration, would make the perfect test case for the type of democratic system Washington would like to see in the region: a decentralised government with only the weakest allegiance -- if any -- to Arabism and political Islam.
In spite of the indications that Washington's vision for a new Middle East has evolved from a collection of vague musings into a concrete plan of action supported by the most influential wing in the US administration, Arab officialdom behaves as though it were in a coma. Governments in the region are divided in their approach to the crisis. Some harbour such a hatred for the Iraqi regime that they appear almost ready to contract a pact with the devil himself towards eradicating it. Others have surrendered to the inevitable and now appear to be scrambling for ways to save face and/or ways to reap some compensation for war losses. A third group is trying to capitalise on popular sentiment, with little concern as to whether this strategy has the potential to influence events. Not surprisingly, all these approaches became mixed together or clashed and so far have produced a big zero.
The Arab order, hence, appears a burden on all. It cannot risk being seen to support the US-led war; nor can it offer substantial support to the French-led opponents to it. Moreover, some Arab nations had long accepted, or been coerced into accepting, US bases on their land and are offering their services for the war virtually free of charge in spite of the enormous political costs they will pay. In short, all now stand to lose: participants, bystanders and opportunistic slogan- mongers, alike.
The Arab order proved incapable of forestalling war on Iraq. It still appears incapable of promoting a just settlement to the Palestinian cause; indeed, of preventing the destruction of that cause. It has even been incapable of defending Arab and Muslim identity and culture. The only course open to it now, it would seem, is to give way to a new, alternative order that must inevitably emerge from the ruins of the one that is about to collapse.
The US might be able to occupy Iraq and change its regime. It might be able to deliver stinging blows to Hamas, Jihad and Hizbullah. It might be able to change the regime in Syria and, perhaps, other countries in order to pave the way for a Greater Israel. However, Washington should realise that these "achievements" -- should they come about -- will only hasten the death of an already moribund official Arab order. But, the Arab people will not surrender. From the heart of their resistance hope will emerge. And I doubt very much whether many tears will be shed over the old order which will hopefully be replaced by one that ushers in a true Arab revival.
* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
