Flicker in the fog
Galal Nassar reviews the military situation one week after the allied aggression against Iraq
The bulk of the United States and British allied forces are bogged down in daily skirmishes with Iraqi troops. Through the "Fog of the War", as this phase of the engagement has been described, observers have discerned that the Western alliance's plans have gone askew. In Umm Al-Qasr, Fao, Basra and Nasseriya -- predominantly Shi'a areas which military strategists had thought would turn against the regime as soon as the Americans arrived -- Iraqis are fighting to hold on to every inch of their land. In addition, the loss of the northern front due to Turkey's refusal to allow Alliance forces to cross its borders into Iraq has thrown off all predictions on the duration of the war.
Losses in the ranks of US-British forces due to "friendly fire" -- another byproduct of the "fog" -- have made it increasingly clear that a quick and decisive victory over Iraqi forces will not be as easy as General Tommy Franks expected. Iraq will be no "picnic", as was the case in Afghanistan and Haiti. Indeed, the complexities of the Iraqi arena, the high morale of the Iraqi army and people and the overwhelming tide of global opposition to the war may yet hold many more surprises -- not only with regard to the progress of the battle, but also for the anticipated outcome.
One thing is certain at this early phase of the war: over years of sanctions and aerial strikes against the no-flight zones and around Baghdad the Iraqi people have been "immunised to the hazards of war". The drone of aircraft, the blasts of explosions, shortages in food and medicine had long become the Iraqi people's daily diet and the death of loved ones an all too familiar reality of family life. As a result, the protracted psychological war to break the resistance of the Iraqi people and army may prove futile.
Since the Pentagon launched its massive psychological assault months ago, some 40 million leaflets have been air-dropped over Iraq and hundreds of radio broadcasts were beamed into the country all delivering the same message. The Iraqi people should rise up in revolt against Saddam, soldiers should abandon their tanks and head home, the Americans were coming to liberate them. Pentagon officials were confident that their messages would swing the Iraqi people in favour of US forces once they arrived.
Little did they predict how cleverly Iraqi officials would handle Washington's campaign to divide Iraqi ranks and demoralise the people. To its credit, for once the Iraqi media abandoned propaganda bombast and stuck to the facts and its response to US rumours was quick and effective. When the US claimed that Tareq Aziz had fled and that Ezzat Ibrahim, Taha Yassin Ramadan and Hassan Ali Madjid had died all of these high-level officials personally appeared on television to deny the claims. When the US announced that large numbers of the Iraqi 51st infantry division had surrendered and that Umm Al-Qasr, Fao and Nasseriya had fallen General Khaled Al-Hashemi, the commander of that division, held a press conference, in Basra, on Sunday, to refute the reports.
Perhaps, however, the coup de grace of Iraq's counter offensive in the psychological war occurred on Monday with the personal appearance of President Saddam Hussein on Iraqi television, putting paid to the rumour that he was either critically wounded or dead following the missile bombardment of one of his hideouts. The Iraqi leader appeared in perfect health and his words of encouragement to the Iraqi people and army had a great impact in raising the morale of resistance. Then, in particularly solemn and restrained tones, he reminded the world that Iraq did all it could to prevent war and that it was now fighting a legitimate battle of self defense.
The implication was that Iraq had complied fully with the UN arms inspections, in which regard the Iraqi media has also taken every opportunity to deny that Iraq possesses biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. The regime has assiduously avoided any reference to the possible recourse to such weapons, aware that such powers as France and Germany would immediately change their positions on the war in the event that Iraq so much as hinted a threat to use them.
The Iraqi media campaign has succeeded in uniting the Iraqi people behind a single goal: stopping the advance of the US and British "invaders". One indication of the success of this strategy is that UN refugee camps in neighbouring countries have not registered a single appeal for asylum. Indeed, it has been reported that a growing number of refugees at the Iraqi-Jordanian border are changing their minds and heading home again.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, Pentagon planning experts declared that this war would be unlike previous conflicts in the past decade, notably wars in the Gulf in 1991 and in Yugoslavia in 1998. What they did not say was whether the change would be for the better or for the worse. For an answer, therefore, we must turn to what has taken place on the ground so far at the operational, media and diplomatic levels.
Certainly the commencement of battle was different to that expected. Instead of an instant unleashing the "shock and awe" bombardment promised by American generals, a single precisely targeted strike was aimed at a building in southern Baghdad in which Saddam was thought to be hiding out. Instead of towers of billowing smoke, television screens on the Thursday morning of the first strike showed a rising sun muted by a calm haze over the Iraqi capital.
Bush's statement delivered earlier that morning featured no grandiose declarations about liberating Iraq or other impassioned pronouncements characteristic of the Winston Churchill inspired mode of American declarations of war. Rather, Bush's statement was surprisingly brief -- a mere 30 terse sentences on "the early phases of military operations". US officials later announced that the opening strike on Iraq was launched in the belief that there was a "window of opportunity" to deliver a critical blow at a crucial target -- Saddam Hussein -- and bring a speedy end to the war. The strike reflected a lesson learned from Afghanistan, when US forces failed to act rapidly enough on intelligence that ostensibly had pinpointed the whereabouts of Bin Laden. In all events, rather than marking the beginning of military engagement, the single strike targeting Saddam could be regarded as an extension of a several-week prelude in which US and British aircraft monitoring the no-flight zones launched several attacks against Iraqi air defenses.
However, not long after the Alliance mounted its "blitzkrieg". Strategists envisioned a campaign of intensive air bombardment, lasting approximately three days and intended to convince Iraqi forces that it was pointless to resist. Then ground forces would enter Iraq and advance towards the capital, while cutting off dispirited Iraqi units on the way. In this respect, plans differed from the 1991 war when ground and air offensives proceeded virtually simultaneously.
The primary objective of the current aerial offensive was to target radar and air defense installations preparatory to securing full control over Iraqi air space. Simultaneously, the newly developed so-called "electronic bombs" would demolish Iraqi control systems in order to cut off communications between the Iraqi military command and the forces. Considerable play had been given to the far greater precision of the satellite guided weapons to be deployed in this war as opposed to the laser-guided weaponry used in 1991.
Several hours after the failed attempt to hunt down and kill Saddam, the Alliance inaugurated its blitz with an air and missile assault unprecedented in military history. In the first two days of fighting alone, 3,000 missiles soared into Iraq, 10 times the number of missiles used during the opening days of the second Gulf War. Most of these, according to US officials, were of the latest high-precision satellite guided variety so as to ensure taking out military installations with the greatest economy possible while minimising damage to Iraqi infrastructure. "Military plans include very specific targets identified by highly accurate intelligence," US political and military leaders declared in an attempt not to further alienate an already outraged international public opinion. But then television screens showing the world scenes of Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk staggering under relentless bombardment day and night told another story.
Saddam Hussein has taken a number of precautions in anticipation of the strike. The Weekly has learned that he moves frequently between several fortified bunkers capable of withstanding missile bombardment and heavily guarded to forestall possible assassination attempts or a coup mounted by Iraqi opposition forces.
As part of the heightened security around the president, he has stopped using phones of any kind, including that linked to a one-of-a-kind top secret cable network created for him by a Swedish firm in the 1980s and never renovated or modified since in order to prevent infiltration.
Saddam has also forbidden his private secretary and other close aides from using any communications devices from his hideouts. Communications are handled through a small number of hand-picked officers, each charged with conveying Saddam's orders -- coded and bearing Saddam's personal signature -- to a specific command authority.
As was the case during the second Gulf War, Saddam has taken precautions to ensure that his movements will be as inconspicuous as possible. He has commandeered for this purpose several old model taxis, which he will drive alone, disguised in Bedouin dress, with his American-made machine gun within easy reach on the seat next to him.
Following the massive initial air and missile bombardment, British and American regular divisions and regiments and special forces moved in to attempt to capture the major cities in southeastern and southwestern Iraq, notably the Fao peninsula and the port of Umm Al-Qasr on the Gulf, Basra, Nasseriya and several oil fields in the area. Again, US strategists had calculated, mistakenly, that this action, instead of proceeding directly to Baghdad, would hasten defection against the regime.
Perhaps, the raising of the US flag at the entrance to the port at Umm Al-Qasr was the most counter- productive action of the war so far. Nothing could have more unwittingly symbolised that American forces have come as occupiers rather than liberators. By the time US commanders realised the implications, took down the US flag and put the Iraqi flag back up it was too late.
According to Al-Shabab Television, whose director is Saddam's eldest son, Uday, the sight of the US flag had ignited patriotic passions among the Iraqi people and fired the spirit of resistance among Iraqi forces, whether of the regular army or of "Saddam's freedom fighters". Nor can one doubt the impact on the popular morale of the report, on Monday, that an Iraqi farmer in Karbala was able to down a US Apache fighter with his machine gun.
It also appears that US war planners, perhaps numbed by the general megalomania that characterises the rhetoric of the current US administration, have forgotten the principles of desert warfare. A decisive victory is impossible using air power alone. Professional, appropriately trained ground troops, armoured units and mechanised infantry are needed to seize control over the battle terrain. Airborne forces must be dropped to the ground to occupy strategic sites. Munitions and supply lines, among other forms of logistic support, must be set up and secured.
The road to Baghdad did not need all that military and media rigmarole. US-British forces could have taken a more or less straight line to Baghdad without those unnecessary detours to other Iraqi cities, thereby focussing the main thrust of the battle around the capital while ensuring supply lines to the front. Yet, by the fourth day of fighting the US third division, following the west bank of the Euphrates northwards, had succeeded in approaching no further than 100 km from Baghdad.
Unlike most conventional wars, the Iraqi army did not attempt to counter the incursion at the borders. Indeed, it has avoided all direct confrontations in which superior fire power would be the decisive factor. Instead, Iraq has opted to lure invading forces into the cities where the urban terrain would be unfamiliar, force them to disperse and render them more vulnerable. Iraqi strategists have divided Iraq into several military sectors and instead of the customary, easily targeted large troop deployments, they have created relatively small detachments, thereby ensuring greater and quicker manoeuverability and more difficult detection. Iraq has also concentrated the bulk of its defenses in and around Baghdad where more than 80 per cent of the Iraqi armed forces have been deployed.
The Iraqi military command, as it appeared from the mobilisation meetings held before the war, is headed by Head of the Republican Guard Qusay Saddam Hussein, Minister of Defense General Sultan Hashem Ahmed and Secretary-General of Command of the Iraqi armed forces General Hussein Al- Rashid. In addition to sectioning Iraq into four military zones, Iraqi command has abolished the customary hierarchy in the chain of command. The commander of each zone has been given full decision-making powers over tactics, troop movements and weapons, with the exception of the use of Scud and Samud-2 missiles, authorisation for which must come directly from Saddam or Qusay. In addition, only days before the war began, Iraq put into place an alternative communications system, using long-range mobile devices and an underground optical cable network that will be difficult to detect and destroy.
Given such a strategy for command and force deployments, the Americans are certain to encounter tough resistance in every city they try to seize. In many instances, it will be as though they were fighting ghosts. According to available information, Iraqi forces have been positioned above the ground and below; in fields, schools, mosques and churches. The last place they are to be found is in the military installations that have been flagged on the Alliance's maps. More importantly, they are reported to have been trained in urban guerrilla warfare and are armed with enormous reserves of determination. In addition, small bands of Special Forces -- rather than Republican Guards as US military leaders have claimed -- have been deployed in several cities, with the purpose of forming pockets of resistance intended to wreak maximum attrition on invading forces.
Although US political and military leaders have declared that they would not engage in urban warfare, the opening days of the war indicate that they have set this intention aside as well. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how they could avoid it. The crucial battle of Baghdad promises to be the most gruesome. Alliance forces cannot win that battle unless Iraq's most elite combat forces -- the Special Forces and the Republican Guards -- surrender.
Yet, America's superior technology and fire power will be of little avail in an urban environment, especially in confrontations with such crack troops as the Republican Guards. Communications networks are far less effective in a jungle of high-rises than in the open expanse of the desert. Laser tracking can be easily bounced off course by the reflection of window panes. Helicopters are vulnerable to sniper fire. The possibilities of camouflage are endless, while the risks of high civilian casualties are too great, especially at a time when the Alliance's conduct of operations is under the closest international scrutiny.
For months during the buildup to war, in a special location in the Kuwaiti desert near the Iraqi frontier, an artificial village had been constructed so that US forces could train in urban combat. The walls in this village are now riddled with holes. The charred hulks of burned out cars lie abandoned on the sand streets that have been crisscrossed with barbed wire. In that city, soldiers used live ammunition in their drills on room to room hunts of enemy targets. Nevertheless, military experts concur that any Iraqi armed with a Kalashnikov, familiar with a city's back alleyways and the booby-trapped doors, can easily outwit a foreign invader, however armed he might be from head to toe.
It appears that the Alliance is up against much more than it bargained for. Not only are most Iraqi forces highly trained, they have a cause they believe in. The Arab cultural and tribal climate breeds a deep attachment to the land, even if that land happens to be governed by Saddam Hussein.
Also, in spite of a decade of blockade, Iraqi forces are still considerable. With a standing army of 390,000, consisting of six Republican Guard divisions and 16 national army divisions, Iraq possesses the largest army in the Gulf after Iran (520,000 troops).
The six Republican Guard divisions contain three tank and armoured vehicle battalions and four special battalions assigned with the protection of the Iraqi leadership. Of the 16 divisions in the regular army, 11 are light infantry divisions. The regular army also has five commando and two special forces regiments. Iraq possesses between 2,200 and 3,600 tanks, of which approximately 1800-2000 are in combat condition. Although these tanks are not of the order of American tanks, they include 700 Soviet-made T-72s and a large number of T-62s. These are supplemented by approximately 3,700 armoured vehicles, most of which have been allocated to the Republican Guard and Special Forces. Iraq also possesses a large reserve of relatively up- to-date anti-tank missiles and of relatively old anti- tank artillery. The Iraqi air force, a force of 17,000, has more than 850 ground-air missile launching pads, 3,000 antiaircraft artillery and the densest air- defense missile network in the world, according to a Reuters report. Most air defense centres are located below ground where they are linked to a complex network of radar and electronic communications devices. It has been rumoured that modern radar equipment has been smuggled into Iraq from the Ukraine.
The Weekly has learned that Iraqi defense experts have been able to develop mobile air defense systems that are ready to use, though not in sufficient numbers. Those that are available, it is said, will be used in the event that US forces succeed in pinpointing the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and move in to attack him. The mobile air defense units consist of Russian-made land-air missiles that have been modified to increase their range and have been concealed in underground shelters from where they will be able to ambush an offensive air strike. Tests of this advanced missilery were conducted under the supervision of the Special Security Agency and in the presence of Qusay.
The missiles also proved satisfactory under more practical conditions, having succeeded in downing several US pilotless airplanes in the months prior to the war. However, the best testimony on behalf of Iraqi air defense comes from the Pentagon itself, which announced on Sunday that Iraqi air forces are fighting back with greater ferocity than anticipated, causing serious problems for US and British pilots.
On the other hand, American forces in the region consist of 230,000 troops, 850 tanks and 1,100 planes, while Britain has contributed 45,000 troops, 120 tanks and 100 planes. Three US aircraft carriers are stationed in the Gulf as is a British aircraft carrier, accompanied by 16 ships carrying 4,000 Royal Marines.
A large number of US warships were also located in the eastern Mediterranean, in anticipation of Turkey's approval for opening a northern front against Iraq.
While US, British and Australian forces are wondering whether they can reach and lay siege to Baghdad without too many more losses, global public opinion asks itself another question: given the stiff resistance Iraqis have displayed in the smaller towns, what will be the scale in Baghdad in which the key figures of the Iraqi regime are holed up, along with a quarter million professional soldiers and five million Iraqi citizens, among whom perhaps more than 50 per cent are bearing arms?
