How to win the war, and lose the peace
The US administration is set to make itself even more deeply unpopular over its plans for post-war Iraq, writes Mohamed Hakki from Washington
Most people one talks to in Washington these days will tell you that Colin Powell must be the unhappiest man in this administration. He has seen most of his ideas for resolving the Iraq problem diplomatically defeated, the State Department marginalised, and his role as secretary of state diminished. So much so that a leading article appeared in The New York Times this weekend entitled: "Why Colin Powell should go". The article considered him, rightly, the "lone grown-up in an administration with a teenager's twitch metabolism and self- centred view of the world". It went on to say: "If others, including the president, seemed given to hype and swagger, Powell's word seemed bankable -- at least until the White House began misspending his credibility in its rush to the war that could not wait.
Throughout the last few weeks preceding the war, Washington witnessed a strange pattern of role reversals. One recalls that when James Baker was the first President Bush's secretary of state, he never allowed Vice-President Dan Quayle to dabble in major foreign policy issues. Moreover, Quayle was never allowed any trips abroad, with the possible exception of Latin America. Similarly, when Colin Powell was chief of staff of the armed forces, Richard Cheney would stand at his side at press conferences without venturing to present views that might contradict his chief of staff. We now see a completely different picture. We notice an antipathetic defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, sitting in a White House planning session with top military advisers, interrupting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Meyers. When President Bush asked a pressing question: how long would the war with Iraq last? Rumsfeld put a hand on Meyers's arm, saying: "Now, Dick, you don't want to answer that." It is interesting to note that, according to the Constitution, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is only answerable to the president of the United States.
Many articles in recent days have described the vice-president's role as "the largest one of all in this war". After more than a month out of public view, Cheney emerged with long interviews making the case for war. He was described by The Wall Street Journal as having become the war counsellor on Iraq with the lowest profile but the highest credibility with Bush. He thus repeatedly defined the bottom line on US policy as the prompt removal of Saddam Hussein from power, with or without a broad international coalition. What is worse is that instead of his persona bias against Iraq and the Arabs being highlighted, he was described as "quickly seeking out experts on the politics and culture of the country". He began hosting small dinner parties at his elegant official residence in Washington. (His neighbours have been complaining of a series of explosions in the middle of the night caused by the building of a concrete bunker underneath it). He personally disclosed in one interview that he had been consulting and sharing ideas with anti- Hussein intellectuals such as Princeton's Bernard Lewis and Johns Hopkins professor Fouad Ajami. This had the same shocking effect as the president describing Ariel Sharon as a man of peace.
This bias, of course, was not the only force driving Cheney. His primary objective and his focus since 1992, or what Harper's magazine called "Dick Cheney's song of America", was, is, and remains his plan for global dominance. Cheney's masterwork, according to Harper's, has taken several forms over the last decade. In fact, it is the product of several ghost writers, most notably Paul Wolfowitz, the under-secretary of defense. The plan does not say that the US must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful.
Cheney's plan called for the US to consolidate its power and pursue a strategy of unilateralism and global domination. The first objective of US defence strategy is to prevent the reemergence of any new rival, or any hostile power from dominating a region of strategic significance. Another theme is the use of preemptive military force, and that the US will defend in this manner access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats to US citizens from terrorism.
Powell, on the other hand, may have had to defend this line publicly. Addressing members of the House Armed Services Committee, he said that the US required sufficient power to "deter any challenges from even dreaming of challenging us or the world stage". To emphasise the point, he cast the US in the role of street thug. "I want to be the bully on the block," he said. "There is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces of the United States."
There is no denying that Powell did come to believe that war was the best option. But anyone watching his last performances at the Security Council knows how difficult it was for him to reach this conclusion. The New York Times said he was nevertheless furious with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, whom he blamed for muddying diplomatic waters by hurling insults at France and Germany. A close friend described his expressing his thoughts as he saw diplomacy slipping away with the feeling that "Rumsfeld needs some duct tape over his mouth." However, he finally accepted the policy of using force, although someone described his single saddest moment in the cynical prelude to war as Bush's abrupt promise to take on the issue of Israel and Palestine. (Bill Keller in the Times said the idea was demeaned by the crass timing. Just in case anyone believed he was serious, the word quickly went out from the White House that it was all intended to buy Tony Blair some peace at home).
A friend who is working in the White House, but on domestic affairs, asked me why I don't believe the president's statement on the Middle East. I said: first, because of his track record which proves he does not have the mettle to stand up to Sharon, and second, because of the timing of this statement -- too little, too late. I tried to describe to him what we in the Arab world see as the "Israelisation of America", from resorting to preemptive war to doing away with civil liberties to openly calling for the assassination of foreign leaders -- things Israel does daily -- to completely disregarding the United Nations, the Security Council and the rule of international law.
But to make the Israelisation of America complete, this administration, considered to be the most pro-Israeli in history, has now chosen a retired army lieutenant-general, Jay Garner, to govern Iraq after the UN occupation as the new Iraqi proconsul or viceroy. He was first described to me as "one of Paul Wolfowitz's boys". Two days later this was confirmed by the Jewish weekly newspaper Forward in an article entitled "Pro-Israeli general will oversee reconstruction of post war Iraq." After citing General Garner's qualifications for the job -- he helped lead Operation Provide Comfort, which delivered food and shelter to Kurds in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War -- Forward said he maintained ties with the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) which, incidentally, was described by the British author Claudie Wright in the booklet Steal, Spy and Run as one of Israel's spying centres in America. The first director of JINSA was Stephen Bryen, who was a subject of an FBI investigation after being caught passing on classified information to an Israeli diplomat in the Mayflower Hotel when he was a congressional aid to Senator "Scoop" Jackson. Bryen was later rewarded under the Clinton administration with one of the highest jobs in the Pentagon as director of the department of technology and scientific transfers for all countries of the world.
Every year, JINSA invites every retiring staff officer from all US military services on a trip to Israel, with their spouses, all expenses paid. Garner visited Israel for the first time in 1998 on a trip sponsored by JINSA. Shoshana Bryen, Stephen's wife, who alternated the directorship of the institute with her husband a few times and now serves as director of special projects for JINSA, praised Garner, whom she accompanied on the trip. In October 2000, shortly after the outbreak of the Intifada, Garner was one of the 26 retired American military leaders to sign a staunchly pro- Israeli statement entitled: "Friends don't leave friends on the battlefield," which lauded the Israeli army for exercising remarkable restraint in the face of lethal violence orchestrated by the leadership of the Palestinian authority. He later described the security of Israel as a matter of great importance to US policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, as well as around the world.
It is remarkable that this administration could not find a single general other than Garner to do this job and at the same time be acceptable to Israel. Not that one is advocating a US military governor, but there are other excellent generals such as Wesley Clark or Anthony Zinni, or any of half a dozen others equally, or better, qualified. Same voices are becoming rarer, or at least they are not to be found in the mainstream media. Even Pope John Paul II's forceful condemnation of the war did not find its way into the press. Rica University's Baker Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations produced an excellent report entitled "Guiding principles for the US post-conflict policy in Iraq" which was also not published in the mainstream media.
The panel's recommendations on Iraq after Saddam are:
-- After a transitional phase, the Iraqi people should choose their own government and run their own oil programme (which faces significant challenges to increase production).
-- The US should play a supporting, not a leading, role in political and economic reconstruction.
-- Treat the Iraqis as "liberated, not defeated people".
The report, led by two distinguished diplomats, ambassadors Edward Bjerejian and Frank Wisner, calls for the appointment of a "Coordinator for Iraq" to oversee and articulate a three-phased strategy in the areas of security, economics and governance.
In a prophetic and clairvoyant conclusion, the report warns that "the US may lose the peace, even if it wins the war," unless the administration lays out plans now for how best to reconstruct and govern Iraq post-Saddam. By choosing a pro-Israeli general, this administration is not only proving once again that it is waiting for Israel to set its agenda, but also that the US may have already lost the peace.
