Beyond fear
Hassan Abu-Taleb* explores the reasons for the Iraqis' tenacious resistance to US forces
Several days into the war, US military forecasts began to take on a modicum of realism as Washington scrambled to revise its plans to accommodate the unanticipated level of Iraqi resistance, Baghdad's relatively coolheaded handling of the media, and the ever increasing popular outrage against the war that has swept many countries. Strategists have further realised that many of the premises upon which they based their plans -- whether founded on information supplied by US intelligence agencies, Iraqi opposition forces or by certain "Americanised" research and official quarters in the Arab world -- were heavily infused with wishful thinking. The net result of these information gathering efforts had been to encourage Washington's desire to overthrow the regime in Baghdad and to occupy the country and thereby sap its wealth and the energies of its people in the service of its own economy.
There are many possible military explanations for the confusion of US-British planners and their sudden change of tack after having discovered that the siege of the cities in the south and of Baghdad was not going to be as easy as they had envisioned. However, unanswered questions remain. What accounts for Iraqis' tenacity and heroism in the face of the powerful onslaught ostensibly come to liberate them? And, what will be the fate of the invaders? These questions represent the main preoccupations of the members of the US-forged coalition, whose diplomatic missions in Cairo put them to leading Egyptian scholars in the hope of a clear answer.
Although I cannot claim to know all the answers these scholars gave, I imagine that many focussed on two essential points. The first pertains to the growing gulf in understanding by US political thinkers who influence decision-making processes in Washington on the one hand and the peoples of other societies and cultures on the other. Such a gulf in understanding leads to erroneous conclusions and then the formation of policies that are, at the very least, inimical to America's own interests because of their tendency to broaden the breach between the US and other nations and peoples. This phenomenon is not limited to the US's relations with Arab and Islamic countries, but extends to those with other Western countries and even fellow NATO members.
Who, for example, would have anticipated that France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy and other countries of 'old Europe' would have seen such massive demonstrations in protest against US belligerency and the unbridled extremism of its ultra-right administration? Who would have imagined such a widespread movement in these countries to boycott US-made products and those famous fast food chains that are taken as emblematic of the US? Who would have thought that influential political parties and associations would call for a globalised boycott of those US firms -- such as oil companies and weapons manufacturers -- regarded as instrumental in promoting an unjust war against the people of Iraq?
If the US and pro-American voices in the Arab world had described Arab boycotts of US products in response to Washington's policies on the Palestinian Intifada as a sign of weakness and lack of imagination, how might one describe such calls in economically advanced countries in Europe, which have also been the US's strategic allies for decades? And, how does one explain the near hysterical reaction in the US to France's refusal to approve a resolution that would have conferred a cover of international legitimacy on the aggression against Iraq -- a reaction that has gone to such absurd lengths as to change the name of French fries to "Freedom fries"?
That these questions and others could have arisen at all suggest that the US's political vision has not only turned inward, but that its leaders are proud of this development. The consequent inability to discern what is happening abroad is superbly suited to the whims and delusions of zealous adventurers.
The second point is more immediately germane to the shock Americans felt when their arrival in Iraq was not greeted with cheers. An aspect of Arab political culture that has totally escaped the US administration is that it puts national independence ahead of all other considerations, such that the people willingly sacrifice many principles, such as freedom, for example, for the sake of ensuring that they and their country are not subordinate to a foreign power. This is the same culture that would welcome the tyranny of the father rather than allowing outsiders to meddle in family affairs. As the poet put it, our country is dear even if it wrongs us, and our people are magnanimous however tightfisted they may be.
Such a closing of the ranks, whether in the family or as a nation, against the intervention of outsiders may go a long way to explain many of the most common manifestations of underdevelopment in Arab societies. Ours has been variously described as a culture of oppression, a culture of submission and resignation, an anti-democratic culture. Such descriptions may help account for the domestic cohesion in Iraq in spite of the many cruelties meted out by a totalitarian regime. This phenomenon should also be seen against the background of Iraq's relatively recent independence. All Arab societies, regardless of their size, are perhaps more protective than others of their recently won independence.
If we take this culture in conjunction with the way the US handled Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction, we see that the Iraqi people were bound to draw the conclusion that the true aim of the US was to occupy their country in order to seize control over their oil. How else were they to see Washington's evident determination to undermine the international inspections process, its feeble "proof" that Iraq still possessed such weapons, its derision of every step Baghdad took to comply with the demands of the inspection teams, its stipulation that the Iraqi regime must go and its relentless drive to a war ostensibly to liberate the Iraqi people, while its unreservedly pro-Israeli policies actively contributed to the perpetuation of the subjugation of the Palestinians. In other words, they saw that their totalitarian, but ultimately national government, was to be supplanted by a colonialist rule reminiscent of an earlier epoch of subjugation to a despised foreign power. It was only natural, therefore, that coalition soldiers would encounter stiff resistance rather than the jubilant reception they had counted on.
Moreover, the Iraqi spirit of cohesion against outsiders manifested itself in a quarter the allies had least expected. Senior Shi'a authorities in Najaf issued a statement calling for the reordering of priorities so that the Iraqi people could stand united against the "criminal invaders". Against the background of the historic conflict between these religious authorities and the Iraqi regime, which they have long held was a tyranny that must be resisted, the significance of their statement cannot be underestimated. The fight against the oppressor at home should be deferred until the heretical invaders are expelled, the statement stressed, conveying the message that if anyone is to overthrow the tyrants in Baghdad it is the people of Iraq -- not some foreign, non-Muslim force. The Iraqi Shi'a displayed a similar loyalty to their country during the Iran-Iraq war (1981-1988), in defiance of the appeal from the supreme Shi'a leader, the Imam Khomeini, urging them to rebel.
The cultural factors I have referred to may not fully explain the spirit of resistance displayed by the civilian, military and paramilitary sectors in Iraq against the invading forces. US and British sources contend, for example, that the tenacity of those elements that had long benefited from their allegiance to Saddam at the expense of the rest of the people is in fact a form of desperation. These forces, they claim, have no choice but to fight to the last in the defence of their regime because the alternative they face is prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
In purely formal terms, this argument is eminently suited to the materialism and pragmatism that tends to govern the American mentality, in general, but it falls short of the crux of the issue. While one might concede that much of the Iraqi resistance is being mounted by forces owing a strong allegiance to Saddam, it does not follow that such allegiance results from fear. Allegiance under coercion is more generally an incentive to liberate oneself from such ties when an opportunity affords itself. The current situation -- a brutal war and the many enticements the Americans said would await the Iraqi soldiers who surrendered -- would seem to be such a moment if the soldiers were so inclined. Yet, the numbers of Iraqis who are said to have surrendered is negligible, which suggests that the allegiance of the Iraqi is founded on a conviction that goes far deeper than the pragmatics of fear.
For the Americans, the best scenario would be the death of Saddam Hussein, his two sons and his closest aides. With the consequent rapid disintegration of the political order, other Iraqi military and political leaders would find themselves free to cooperate with the US and its allies, thereby averting the need for a siege of Baghdad and the humanitarian horrors it would entail.
The American dream of a victory at minimum cost ignores, and perhaps never apprehended, the true character of the Iraqi army. This is a highly politicised force with a fighting creed that merges the nation and the leader and in which the nation itself stands as an eternal, historical truth to be defended. In addition, family, clan and tribal bonds are integral to the formation of all military, political, media and security sectors and organisations. When the professional soldier fuses political creed and kinship bonds, the concept of nation becomes a tangible reality and acquires a value that merits the greatest sacrifices.
* The writer is an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and chief editor of the annual Arab Strategic Report.
