Not for oil alone
The invasion of Iraq, Azmi Bishara* argues, involves grander designs than controlling the Arab country's oil
Perhaps the masters of aggression, the pirates of this age, were taken aback at the extent of Iraqi resistance, having been blinded by racist assumptions and wishful thinking. Competition pervades decision-making processes in the United States, as it does everything else. Such an orientation, though, can make people selective in their memory when they are trying to make a point. But such blinkers do not fully explain the debacle in which Bush, Blair, and their coterie of advisers find themselves today. Their major error was to underestimate the role of the state in Iraq -- a country not just rich in oil, but in culture and history.
Since independence, the army has played a central role in Iraq's history -- a role supported by the country's oil wealth which enabled it to maintain a large military that has gained extensive experience over the past three decades. But Iraq has more than just a strong army. Its state institutions provide extensive services to large sectors of the population. Since the fall of the monarchy, these institutions helped foster a national identity transcending ethnic and tribal boundaries.
The state has, on occasion, exacerbated ethnic tension through certain actions and also through the composition of its army. Such friction is what the Americans and the British decided to focus upon. They wagered on the divisions within Iraqi society and, when the time comes to address the question of Iraq's future, are likely to keep doing so.
Iraq is fighting a war of self-defence under unfavourable circumstances. The state is used to regular, not guerrilla, warfare. The future of the Iraqi resistance, and whether it would survive the possible demise of the state are open questions. The Iraqi army not only lacks air support, but also sophisticated hardware and communications. Regular battles are likely to erupt around cities -- near civilians, that is. This would complicate invaders' mission and lead to catastrophic results. Is another Stalingrad on the cards? Perhaps not. Stalingrad was not the last defence line. It received logistical supplies, albeit at high cost, from across the Volga.
Had Iraq been in possession of weapons of mass destruction, the right time for the regime to use them would be when it thought it was about to fall. So, where are these weapons? There are two possibilities. Either they don't exist, or the mere attempt to disarm Iraq would, ironically, lead to their use. This only illustrates the futility of Bush's declared mission to disarm the Gulf country.
With each passing day, the campaign becomes bloodier and the post-war tasks costlier for the Americans. I wouldn't rule out the possibility that there are deranged people in the US administration who want this war to be costly in the hopes that it would effect a radical shift in US foreign policy.
Extensive losses for Iraq, followed by similar ones on the US side, followed by victory. Such scenario could wipe out for good the memory of Vietnam. Grenada and Panama were too easy to leave much of a mark. What the US's extremist elite craves is a victory fraught with suffering -- one that would change foreign policy as well as the public perception of war. Such a victory could make the US public more accepting of the idea of costly but successful military adventures.
Such vision is reminiscent of Sharon's. He has repeatedly said that the problem in Israel is not the army's ability to achieve victory, but the public's low tolerance of human losses. "Let's win", he often tells the Israelis. The impatience of US hard-line Republicans with the anti-war movement echoes the sentiments of the Israeli right-wing concerning the Intifada.
The course of battle in Iraq has contradicted the expectations of the Pentagon. The reaction of public opinion, inside and outside the United States, to the ongoing war is likely to disappoint Washington's deranged hard-liners who believe that the UN is an anachronism and that the United States should take its military prowess more seriously. The primary goal of US hard-line strategists is to achieve a decisive military and political victory in Iraq, and to impose US hegemony on the region by force. This goal is more important than oil because oil could be obtained through applying commercial and economic pressure.
Many Israeli officials see Pentagon hard-liners as their long-awaited saviours. "The Americans have at last come to see our point of view", the officials must now be rejoicing. The sad truth is that neither American nor Israeli hard-liners are listening. Neither is aware of the disasters their actions would unleash. They think they will laugh last and longest, but their actions will bring forth only tears.
* The writer is a leading Palestinian political activist and member of the Knesset.
