A campaign in shock
Military planners for the war in Iraq promised what they couldn't deliver. Their mishaps remind Ahmed Abdel-Halim*. of another war
The US-British campaign against Iraq has run into trouble, mostly due to unforeseen factors. Because of Turkish-US differences, the US command had to move the fourth division of the Alexandretta Brigade from Turkey to Kuwait. The offensive was thus mounted from the south alone, instead of the southern and northern fronts, as originally planned. This enabled the Iraqis to concentrate their defences, put up stiff resistance, inflict substantial losses on the American and British invaders, and slow down their advance.
US military planners made several inaccurate assumptions. Counting on their overwhelming aerial superiority, they planned to send armoured units, moving at high speed and avoiding populated areas, towards Baghdad. The offensive, they expected, would soon undermine the Iraqi command and control, encourage the population to rise against the regime, and lead to wide-scale defections among the Iraqi army, including the Republican Guard. None of this happened. On the contrary, a rift occurred between Pentagon officials, such as General Tommy Franks, and the civilian command, including Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and his assistant Richard Perle. The latter consequently resigned.
As glitches began to occur, President Bush submitted a request to Congress for additional war funding of $74.8 billion. Bush also held an unscheduled meeting with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the two made it clear -- in a press conference following the talks -- that the war is going to be longer and harder than expected. This midway change in the political and military conduct of the campaign is going to be costly. The coalition offensive has already lost the element of surprise. In the meantime, the Iraqi people -- both Saddam's supporters and adversaries -- are rallying behind their leaders in an unexpected fashion.
Some people, it seems, do not learn from history. Bush's miscalculation and subsequent request for additional war funding is reminiscent of what President Lyndon Johnson did during the Vietnam war. President Johnson exaggerated the need for the US to get involved in Vietnam, embroiled his nation in a long and deadly conflict, and asked Congress for additional funding to keep the war going. Bush, it can be argued, is heading down the same road. In Johnson's case, the nation turned against him, Congress turned down his requests for funding, and the Vietnam war ended in defeat. Will history repeat itself?
The British are not much better than their American allies when it comes to learning lessons from history. Britain could have learned something from the Suez War in 1956. Obviously, it hasn't.
US and UK military planners spoke of "shock and awe", a strategy based on the use of precision bombing to decapitate Iraqi leadership and entice a popular uprising that brings the war to a happy ending. The technology, we were told, is unprecedented in history. A military force, hailed as the most powerful ever assembled, was supposed to take over Umm Al-Qasr port, occupy the Al-Faw peninsula, race past Basra and secure the bridges near Nasseriya. The bombing and the speed of advance were to be performed with deadly accuracy. The strategy involved a measure of psychological warfare. The Iraqi leadership was supposed to crumble as US and UK military bomb it into befuddled helplessness. Again, none of this happened. The invading troops ran into glitches everywhere. The targets of the aerial bombing seemed unclear. Logistical problems were complicated by the need to airlift troops into northern locations. Turkey's refusal to open the northern front and Iraq's unexpected resistance upset most US and UK calculations.
As a result, the US-UK command announced a temporary pause to regroup. At the same time the Americans declared their intention to bring into battle an additional force of 120,000 troops (four or five new divisions). As the attackers lost momentum, the Iraqis took the military initiative. Recent reports speak of Iraqi irregulars waging suicide attacks against US troops in Najaf and capturing British personnel in hit-and-run attacks.
The Iraq campaign is changing course. It is expected to last longer and be bloodier as time goes by. The Iraqis will have the chance to inflict more losses on the attackers. In response, the Americans will be tempted to use excessive force. If this happens, the international protests against the war will mount, even within Britain and the United States, the Vietnam scenario may be repeated.
One is reminded by the words uttered by the French foreign minister in the course of a recent verbal exchange in the UN Security Council. "The world is better off not standing on its feet, rather than standing on one foot," the minister said, referring to US attempts to monopolise international decision-making.
Regardless of the outcome of the current conflict, one thing is clear. The conflict will change the nature and shape of the new world order that was envisioned by George Bush Sr. It will also influence the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the international and regional view thereof. Meanwhile, the Arabs should start reconsidering their ways and methods. They need to find a more effective way of acting together.
* The writer is an expert in military strategy and member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
