Far-flung fallout
The Iraq war has had a profound impact on Latin America. However, it remains to be seen whether the fallout will be as harmful as some fear, Hisham El-Naggar writes from Buenos Aires
The Middle East seems a long way from Latin America. But in a globalised world in which the media transmits images around the world, the war in Iraq has been very much on people's minds from Bogotà to Buenos Aires and beyond. To begin with, the lead up to the war did not leave Latin America indifferent, particularly given that two countries of the region currently have seats on the UN Security Council.
As fate would have it, the two members are Mexico and Chile, arguably the two Latin American countries with the closest economic ties to the United States. Mexico is a member of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and Chile is a awaiting Congressional confirmation to join.
Not surprisingly, both found themselves the object of considerable US pressure to support a Security Council resolution authorising an invasion of Iraq. The arithmetic of the Security Council meant that had the two Latin American countries played along, the US would have secured the "moral sanction" of nine votes out of 15, which would have partially offset the French and Russian vetoes in some minds.
But no, the Latins would not budge. Their positions stemmed from a number of factors. Both countries, however close to the United States, have a fiercely independent tradition in foreign policy, and a nationally-minded electorate which would be none too pleased for their country to be seen as an automatic supporter of a foreign power, especially if the foreign power is the mighty Republic of the North.
Add to that Mexico's resentment over the Republican administration's failure to make good on its promise to grant amnesty to Mexican immigrants in the US, and the two countries' reticence becomes understandable.
As the war unfolded, Latin America's reaction was not very different from much of the rest of the world. Anti-war demonstrations, which included burning American flags, pervaded the streets of virtually all Latin American capitals.
By and large, public opinion was hostile to the US invasion of Iraq, partly because of the Bush administration's flagrant disdain for the UN, and partly because talk of bringing democracy to a an enslaved population failed to convince populations that have long associated the US -- especially Republican administrations -- with a lack of respect towards democracies in Latin American.
Support for the invasion came from the governments of Colombia and most of the Central American republics, whose right-leaning governments are too strongly committed to -- and in some cases dependent on -- their northern neighbour not to back it on such an issue.
In other countries, governments preferred to proclaim neutrality, insisting that failure to obtain Security Council backing lent the whole enterprise an air of dubious legality.
This has left many wondering whether old-fashioned "anti-gringo" sentiment has returned with a vengeance to Latin America. Others worry that the Republican administration, not very well-disposed toward critics of any kind, may settle accounts with its vulnerable neighbours to the South, particularly by denying them access to its markets and support in dealing with international creditors who are either losing patience with them or have already lost it.
Such fears are, however, probably exaggerated. Many Latin American governments may have been reluctant to support what outside Latin America was also criticised as a foreign adventure, but there is little desire to confront the US. Even if anti-Americanism persists at the popular level, foreign policy is not, as a rule, a main concern of Latin American electorates, and governments will not hesitate to draw nearer to the US even if public opinion is less than enthusiastic.
The fact is, the image of the US had been deteriorating in the region for reasons not directly related to the Middle East. Since 9/11, immigration policy has been considerably tighter, resulting in a steady stream of Latin American deportees.
Integration, meaning negotiations for freer access to US markets, has been put on the back burner. And the credit the US received during the years of President Bill Clinton's tenure for backing democracy in Haiti and Peru has been replaced with a perception, perhaps unfounded but nonetheless widespread, that security matters more than democracy in Washington these days.
The result? The coming years will not be easy for US-Latin American ties. Even if there are no reprisals against war- dissenting governments, as Bush has promised there will not be, there are many reasons to believe that Latin America's ranking on the US's list of priorities will drop considerably.
And yes, security will matter a great deal, which will not help Latin American migrants heading North. Closer trade ties, usually a top priority for a business- friendly Republican administration, will not seem as important as attention centres on a distant part of the world.
It is likely that Mexico will continue to be a main trading partner, but warm ties between George W Bush and Mexico's Vicente Fox have cooled considerably. Ratification of preferential trade ties with Chile may not be easy to sell to a Republican-dominated Congress, especially if the Republican president does not lobby actively on its behalf. Perhaps more alarming, if less visible, is the havoc the gaping US deficit is likely to wreak south of the border.
As the inevitable tightening of fiscal and monetary policies sets in, the US's imports from the region may taper off. And if interest rates rise in the US, capital flows to Latin America may diminish, and the cost of servicing the region's huge external debt may grow more onerous.
